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Abstract 
 
There is no doctrine more central to Christianity than the doctrine of the 
Atonement. However, there is also no doctrine more contested. I claim that these 
disputations stem from a failure to attend to what the Atonement is supposed to 
achieve, namely, maximal union with God at the beatific vision. I therefore argue 
that understanding the Christian doctrine of the beatific vision is key to 
understanding the nature of the Christian doctrine of the Atonement.  
I start by analysing the connection between union with God and the Doctrine of the 
Beatific Vision. On one recent model of union, Eleonore Stump’s, maximal union 
requires full knowledge of the other. At the beatific vision, it is supposed that we 
come to know God as God knows us, thereby meeting this criterion for union. 
I then explore an account of the problem the doctrine of the Atonement is 
supposed to resolve, namely, the problem of ‘willed loneliness’, where willed 
loneliness includes (1) the reflexive inability to share attention with the other, and 
(2) the sort of psychological fragmentation that makes it difficult or impossible to 
be fully known by someone else, where (1) and (2) are inimical to beholding the 
beatific vision. 
I use recent work in ethics to provide a plausible solution to this general problem of 
willed loneliness; however, I suggest the Christian doctrine of the Atonement must 
explain a particularly intractable case of willed loneliness, and therefore that this 
general framework is, by itself, explanatorily insufficient.  
I conclude by demonstrating one way the work of Christ might fit into this 
framework, and how one might avail of this work. I argue that maximal union with 
God can be achieved through a certain kind of union with Christ, and I outline one 
candidate for such union. 
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Introduction 
Analytic Theology: A Methodology 
 
There is no doctrine more central to Christianity than the doctrine of the 
Atonement.1 However, there is also no doctrine more contested.2 For, whilst church 
councils have been relatively clear on what the Atonement generally secures, 
namely, the Christian’s salvation, they have been decidedly unclear on either what 
such salvation looks like, or how the Atonement secures it.  
Trying to resolve this long-established problem by motivating a further 
underexplored model seems, on the face of it, doomed to fail. Nevertheless, there 
are two reasons why, despite this, this project has continued. First, I am convinced 
that there is more to be said, philosophically, about the thing the Atonement is 
supposed to secure, namely, a person’s union with God at the beatific vision, and I 
believe that reflection on the beatific vision can provide an underexplored angle at 
which to view the Atonement. Second, I am convinced recent philosophical work on 
the nature of Atonement in general, that is, the everyday making of amends we all 
engage in, can be fruitfully brought into dialogue with the lineaments of the 
Christian doctrine, such as they are. Therefore, in addition to work on the nature of 
the beatific vision, I also intend to employ recent philosophical work in ethics to 
explore what I will call a reunion account of the Atonement. 
Before I begin either task, however, it is important to note that the Christian 
doctrine of the Atonement is motivated by and derived from revealed theology, 
rather than from natural theology. That is to say, without reference to purported 
divine revelation, it is not at all apparent that the Atonement is either necessary, or 
                                                          
1 Atonement could refer to either the Christian doctrine, that is, to the specific work of Christ, or to 
the general making of amends between persons. Throughout this thesis I will use ‘the Atonement’ or 
‘Atonement’ (with the ‘A’ capitalised) to refer the specific work of Christ, as laid out in the Christian 
doctrine of the Atonement, and the lower case ‘atonement’ to refer to the general making of 
amends. 
2 Richard Cross, for instance, notes that ‘[f]inding a theory to explain how Christ's life, death, and 
resurrection can bring about human redemption has long been one of the more intractable tasks 
faced by the theologian.’ (Cross, 2001: 397) 
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that it is somehow secured through the work of Christ, whatever that work might 
be. Given this, it is necessary that the revelation that motivates it, that is, the 
various passages of Christian scripture that refer to the doctrine, be critically 
engaged with. Thus, scriptural coherence, alongside ethical and logical coherence, 
will form the desiderata for any successful account of the Christian doctrine of 
Atonement. Whilst I shall later address relevant scriptural desiderata, in this 
introductory section I will explore one recent methodology for laying out how a 
philosopher might reasonably engage with scripture, namely, the methodology 
present in what has become known as ‘analytic theology’.  
 
Analytic Theology: A Brief History 
Attempts to integrate philosophy and (revealed) theology are not new. Exemplars 
include Augustine’s use of Plato,3 and Aquinas’s use of Aristotle. More recently, too, 
philosophers such as Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, Robert Adams, and 
William Alston have used developments in analytic philosophy (particularly, analytic 
metaphysics and epistemology) to address longstanding historical problems in 
philosophy of religion.4 Nevertheless, in at least the post-logical positivist Anglo-
American tradition, interdisciplinary analytic engagement with theology has been 
limited to a relatively small number of analytic philosophers. However, with the 
advent of what has become known as ‘analytic theology’, this relatively small 
number of analytic philosophers has begun to grow, and, over the last ten years, 
the number of those claiming to engage in analytical approaches to theology has 
reached unprecedented levels.5 
The term ‘analytic theology’ comes from Oliver Crisp and Michael Rea’s 2009 edited 
volume Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology.6 The 
                                                          
3 At least, the Platonism of Plotinus (204 – 270) and Porphyry (233 – 305). 
4 See, for instance, Swinburne 1994, Alston 1993, Adams 1999, Plantinga 2000. 
5 I will not attempt to explain why interest in analytic theology has grown. I am sure the generosity 
of the Templeton Foundation has something to do with it, but this cannot be the only reason. 
6 See Crisp and Rea 2009. As far as I can gather, the inspiration for the book, and for the title, 
emerged from Michael Rea’s 2006 Metaphysics and Christian Theology graduate class at the 
University of Notre Dame. 
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publication of that anthology marked something of a watershed in analytic 
approaches to theology. That same year, the University of Notre Dame began the 
annual Logos Workshop with a view to fostering interactions between analytic 
philosophers and theologians. In 2010, a major Templeton Foundation grant was 
awarded to the University of Notre Dame, the University of Innsbruck, and the 
Shalem Centre in Israel to run a four-year project in Analytic Theology. This 
formative project hosted several fully funded summer schools for younger scholars, 
employed post-doctoral and senior researchers, and organised essay prizes 
encouraging practitioners in both analytic philosophy and theology to engage in the 
area. In addition, this grant included further funding for course development and 
cluster group awards, broadening the reach of the analytic theology project. In 
2011, the inaugural annual Analytic Theology Lecture was given at the Conference 
for the American Academy of Religion, and in 2013, four years after the inaugural 
anthology was published, a new annual journal devoted to analytic theology, The 
Journal for Analytic Theology, was established. 
In more recent years, the John Templeton Foundation (and the Templeton Religion 
Trust) has awarded additional funding for major multi-year projects in analytic 
theology to the Herzl Institute (Analytic Theology: Philosophical Investigation of the 
Hebrew Scriptures, Talmud and Midrash), Fuller Theological Seminar (Prayer, Love, 
and Human Nature: Analytic Theology for Theological Formation), the University of 
St Andrews (Analytic and Exegetical Theology), the University of Innsbruck (Analytic 
Theology and the Nature of God: Integrating Insights from Science and Philosophy 
into Theology), and the Kalam Research and Media Centre (Islamic Analytic 
Theology). In addition to these major awards, Oxford University Press has recently 
started a series in Oxford Studies in Analytic Theology, and a new European journal 
dedicated to the publication of work within analytic theology in different European 
languages, TheoLogica, has also been established. Outside of specialist venues for 
analytic theology, there have been numerous special editions devoted to the rise of 
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analytic theology, and even more papers claiming to be works of analytic theology 
published in established philosophical and theological journals.7 
In sum, over the last eight years, analytic theology has established itself as a distinct 
area of research, with many researchers claiming the subject as one of their areas 
of specialisation or competency. Despite so positioning itself, however, it is still not 
entirely clear how analytic theology contrasts itself from existing projects in 
philosophical theology and philosophy of religion. So, what is analytic theology? 
And more pointedly, what exactly is meant when someone claims to be doing 
analytic theology? 
  
What is Analytic Theology? 
Whatever the subject matter of analytic theology is, there is at least consensus that 
those engaging in analytic theology do so in broad accordance with the general 
methodological style of analytic philosophy, which is very roughly taken to be 
characterised by the following five prescriptions: 
P1. Write as if philosophical positions and conclusions can be adequately 
formulated in sentences that can be formalized and logically manipulated. 
P2. Prioritize precision, clarity, and logical coherence. 
P3. Avoid substantive (non-decorative) use of metaphor and other tropes 
whose semantic content outstrips their propositional content. 
P4. Work as much as possible with well-understood primitive concepts, and 
concepts that can be analyzed in terms of those 
P5. Treat conceptual analysis (insofar as it is possible) as a source of 
evidence.8 
                                                          
7 See, for instance, Crisp 2017, Coakley 2013, MacDonald 2014, Timpe 2015, Gasser 2015, and Göcke 
2013. 
8 Rea, 2009: 5. 
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As well as prizing terminological clarity and argumentative rigor, analytic 
theologians see themselves as (where appropriate) applying the conceptual tools 
and practices developed in analytic philosophy into the study of theology.9 
However, this definition brings with it an immediate concern, aptly captured by 
William Wood, who writes:  
Analytic theology as currently practiced has an ambiguous character. It may 
be understood either formally, as any instance of theology that draws on 
analytic philosophy, or substantively, as a cohesive theological school that 
draws on analytic philosophy in defense of traditional Christian orthodoxy. 
Both conceptions assume that analytic philosophy furnishes ‘tools and 
methods’ to the analytic theologian. Yet on the best recent accounts of 
analytic philosophy, analytic philosophy has no unique tools and methods.10 
This is not, of course, to say that analytic philosophy has no generally distinctive 
style (the distinctive style is, I venture, the general commitment to the above 
prescriptions), more that its methodology and conceptual tools can also be found at 
use in other disciplines, including, in theory, theology. However, since the mere use 
of these conceptual tools or of these prescriptions is not sufficient to distinguish 
analytic theology from other forms of theology, so too the commitment to these 
tools and to these prescriptions cannot distinguish analytic theology from, for 
instance, analytic philosophy of religion. So, it is not apparent that either use or 
commitment to these prescriptions or these conceptual tools necessarily sets the 
practitioner of analytic theology apart from either theologians or philosophers of 
religion, who seem equally capable of such use and such commitment. Thus, whilst 
                                                          
9 See, for instance, Abraham 2009, who writes: 
 
Analytic theology can be usefully defined as follows: … systematic theology attuned to the 
deployment of the skills, resources, and virtues of analytic philosophy. It is the articulation 
of the central themes of Christian teaching illuminated by the best insights of analytic 
philosophy. (54) 
 
For a self-identified example of this in action in an attempt to explain the Christian Doctrine of 
Atonement, see Crisp 2016. 
10 Wood, 2016: 254. 
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this methodological style might typify analytic theology, it cannot clearly distinguish 
it.  
What does distinguish analytic theology from other forms of analytic engagement 
with religion, however, is the subject matter that this methodological style, and 
these conceptual tools, are brought to bear upon; namely, anything that could lend 
itself to constructive theology.11 On this point, Andrew Chignell writes: 
Philosophy of religion involves arguments about religiously pertinent 
philosophical issues, of course, but these arguments are customarily 
constructed in such a way that, ideally, anyone will be able to feel their 
probative force on the basis of ‘reason alone’. Analytic theology, by 
contrast, appeals to sources of topics and evidence that go well beyond our 
collective heritage as rational beings with the standard complement of 
cognitive faculties.12  
But, because it is the subject matter that distinguishes analytic theology from, say, 
analytic philosophy of religion, it is far from clear that analytic theology can stand as 
a completely independent discipline, for the problems analytic theologians work on, 
and the sources that analytic theologians work with, are (or, perhaps, ought to be) 
directly derived from an existing branch of theology.13 Analytic theology is, 
therefore, both a kind of applied philosophy and also a methodological style of 
doing theology, and as inasmuch as it is a style of theology, it should be best viewed 
                                                          
11 In a recent paper, Oliver Crisp (2017) has suggested for this reason analytic theology is best 
viewed as a species of systematic theology, but I am not convinced this view is necessary. Rather, I 
side with Sarah Coakley’s view (2013) that analytic theologians bare a family resemblance to each 
other, and as such, analytic theologians can engage with systematic theology, but they can also 
engage with mystical theology, or exegetical theology and still be doing analytic theology. Coakley 
writes: 
 
rather than hoping to find the essence of Analytic Theology in a club with certain defined 
rules and requirements for admission, it would seem more profitable, in the spirit of the 
later Ludwig Wittgenstein, to speak of us analytic theologians as a ‘family resemblance’ 
group who share some, but not all, of a range of overlapping and related goals and 
aspirations… And if this is right, it is pointless to look for one essentialist definition of our 
project. (602-603) 
For more on the distinction between analytic theology and analytic philosophy of religion, see Baker-
Hytch 2016. 
12 Chignell, 2009: 119. 
13 By this I mean to say that analytic theology is not a new independent branch of theology.  
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as a helpmeet to other areas of ‘data-providing’ theology (exegetical, systematic, 
biblical, natural etc.) in just the same way as mathematical physics, taught as it is in 
mathematics departments, acts as a helpmeet to the ‘data-providing’ study of 
physics (astro-, particle, atomic, etc.).14  
On this view, and contrary to positions taken up by Oliver Crisp15 and William 
Abraham16, analytic theology can be paired with any type of theology; natural 
theology, systematic theology, biblical theology, exegetical theology, and so forth. 
But in each pairing, the analytic theologian brings to the discipline no further aim 
than the intention to conduct their investigations (either procedurally or 
instrumentally) in line with the prescriptions outlined above.  
This view helps to distinguish analytic theology from, say, analytic philosophy of 
religion. Whilst the pairing of analytic theology and natural theology (which 
includes attempts to explore the nature of the divine without any reference to 
particular divine revelation) neatly coheres with some of the subject matter of 
analytic philosophy of religion, the pairing of analytic theology with, say, systematic 
theology (which includes attempts to rearrange divine revelation into a self-
consistent whole) or exegetical theology is evidently something that does not fall 
within the purview of analytic philosophy of religion. 
Furthermore, there is nothing in these methodological prescriptions about either 
historicity, reason or truth.17 As I see it, analytic theologians are not committed to 
explaining why previous thinkers viewed the world as they did, or how we should 
view the world now, or even how the world actually is. Rather, they are committed 
to explaining how the world could possibly be, and given a plurality of possibilities, 
how the world most likely is (given the parameters of whichever type of theology 
they are engaging with). And whilst many analytic theologians also happen to sign 
                                                          
14 I thank my supervisor, David Efird, for this analogy. It is worth noting that just as mathematical 
physics is taught in mathematics departments, and philosophy of physics is taught in philosophy 
departments, so too, I suggest, analytic theology finds itself a natural home in a department of 
philosophy.  
15 See Crisp, 2017. 
16 See Abraham, 2009. Both Crisp and Abraham think analytic theology is a species of systematic 
theology. 
17 It would seem that the prioritization of precision, clarity, and logical coherence comes at the 
expense of prioritizing truth, although the hope is that the former are all compatible with the latter. 
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up to the correspondence theory of truth, such a view is compatible with the 
thought that we cannot know whether propositions do in fact correspond to facts 
about the world. It is enough to say that they possibly do, or necessarily do not. 
Concerning this view of truth, Oliver Crisp writes: 
A much more satisfactory way of thinking about analytic theology is in the 
context of a correspondence theory of truth, according to which a 
proposition is true just in case it corresponds to a fact about the world to 
which it refers. Such theories of truth are commonly called ‘realist’. This 
theory of truth appears compatible with the ‘understanding is independent 
of believing’ criterion of the procedural use of reason. It is also consistent 
with analytic theology as a descriptive, rather than prescriptive, method in 
theology. Finally, the correspondence theory is commensurate with the 
notion that there is such a thing as truth (about Christian doctrine) and that 
human beings are capable of apprehending what that truth is. It may be that 
we cannot apprehend all there is to know about a particular matter. But 
there is nothing inconsistent in saying that analytic theology uses a 
correspondence theory of truth and that there are limits to the use of 
reason in theology. One could hold both of these things together with a 
robust doctrine of divine mystery and be engaged in an internally consistent 
theological method. 
It may be that one could hold to a rather austere version of the 
correspondence theory as an analytic theologian. In which case, one might 
think that there are truths of the matter, but that we may not be in a 
position to know the truth in every instance. Applied to theology, one might 
say ‘the Chalcedonian ‘‘definition’’ of the person of Christ is the best way we 
have of thinking about the Incarnation’. But this is consistent with saying 
‘whether the Chalcedonian definition gives us the truth of the matter or not, 
we cannot say’.18 
                                                          
18 Crisp, 2009: 50. 
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And this focus on precision, clarity and logical coherence, settling for possibility at 
the expense of ‘truth’, along with its ability to engage with different branches of 
theology (and particularly, its ability to engage with scripture and tradition at face 
value), are, I venture, two major reasons why interest in analytic theology has 
increased in recent years.19 For, in doing so, it has ‘legitimized’ the expanding of 
analytic philosophy of religion’s traditional focus on natural theology into areas of 
revealed theology, and particularly, Christian systematic theology. 
But this expansion into revealed theology has not been universally welcomed. 
Many people who now call themselves analytic theologians are typically either 
trained philosophers and not trained theologians, or else, trained theologians but 
not trained philosophers. Setting the latter aside for the moment, there is no doubt 
that many attempts by theologically untrained analytic philosophers to navigate 
both revealed theology and tradition have been taken to be somewhat ham-fisted 
by those with the relevant theological expertise. Consider, for instance, what Sarah 
Coakley has to say: 
The philosophical theologian who has a respect for analytic philosophy may 
find herself in something of a methodological bind. On the one hand, the 
fierce clarity and apologetic incisiveness of the analytic tradition offers 
philosophical deliverances which the continental tradition, even at its best, 
is hard put to rival. On the other hand, the analytic approach can on 
occasion display a certain hermeneutical blindness which is nothing less 
than embarrassing to those trained in continental ways of reading. 20  
Although (supposedly) acting as a helpmeet to other branches of theology, there is 
a general concern that in ‘giving up on truth’, analytic theologians have given 
themselves license to ride roughshod over carefully nuanced texts and historically 
informed positions. Whilst taking tradition and scripture at face value on the guise 
of possibility is attractive to some, it is also an anathema to those who are trying to 
reconstruct the biblical data as it ought to be interpreted, not merely how it could 
                                                          
19 Undoubtedly the generosity of the John Templeton Foundation is another important reason. 
20 Coakley, 2009: 280. 
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be. So, whilst there seems to be no problem with the analytic theologian choosing 
to engage with existing problems in various branches of revealed theology, how 
careful do they need to be whilst engaging with these problems? 
Is, for instance, the analytic theologian, trained as a philosopher, competent to 
interpret divine revelation themselves, without reference to what specialists in 
systematic theology, exegetical theology, or biblical studies might have to say on 
the matter? Even though the analytic theologian may only be interested in 
possibility, developing a possible response to an existing problem that uses a 
misreading of historical or revealed theology is likely to turn out to be an answer 
nobody from that branch of theology is willing to accept.21 
This task is perhaps a little easier for the analytic theologian wanting to engage with 
systematic theology. For the most part, there are relatively clear ecumenical creeds 
that determine the bounds of doctrinal heresy. However, as the creeds typically 
trace the boundary of heresy, they often do not offer a tightly worked explanation 
for theological doctrine itself. In particular, as I will expand upon in the fourth 
chapter of this thesis, the ecumenical creeds offer very little by way of guidance on 
how we are to actually explain the doctrine of the Atonement. And so, it seems that 
the analytic theologian, in engaging in systematic theology in an attempt to develop 
just such a tightly worked explanation of the Atonement, a doctrine as mentioned, 
beyond the purview of the natural theologian, must at some level engage with 
divine revelation directly.22  
However, divine revelation is often complex, and it is especially complex when it 
comes to passages that relate to the doctrine of the Atonement. Such passages are 
full of metaphors and similes and complex literary tropes that do not lend 
                                                          
21 Responding to this concern, I take it, was the reasoning behind the Analytic and Exegetical 
Theology project in St Andrews. 
22 That something like the Atonement is required is, plausibly, available to the natural theologian. 
However, how the Atonement is secured, namely, through something to do with the life, passion, 
death or resurrection of Christ is evidently not. 
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themselves to easy analysis, especially not analysis that confirms to the above five 
prescriptions.23 
There are therefore two moves open to the analytic theologian who seeks to 
engage with systematic theology. Either they can endeavour to gain theological 
training so that they can ‘correctly’ interpret the scriptural data, where this ‘correct’ 
interpretation can be stated clearly, precisely and coherently (if it cannot be stated 
clearly, precisely and coherently, one might think it has no place in analytic 
theology). Such training would include engaging with the best work of exegetical 
and biblical scholars on the relevant pieces of revelation, as well as familiarising 
oneself with contemporary hermeneutic theory.  
Alternatively, the analytic theologian can forego this theological training and simply 
deny that either (i) theological training is necessary for interpretation (after all, if 
scripture is divinely inspired, one might think it unlikely that the Christian God 
would only allow only those certain people with the time and resources available to 
study it, for instance, academics at a top Western university, to correctly interpret 
it) or (ii) that their interpretation has to be the best interpretation, so long as it is a 
plausible one.24 On either (i) or (ii), nothing about the analytic prescriptions 
mentioned above commit the analytic theologian to looking for what is true (at 
least, true in this world); rather, that they merely need to commit to look for what 
is possible (or, perhaps, plausible). Certainly, if the analytic theologian wanted to 
engage in exegetical or biblical theology, they would have to take the first route 
very seriously, but, it seems to me, the second route is open to the analytic 
theologian engaging in systematic theology. 
Either way, however, the analytic theologian wanting to engage in systematic, 
exegetical, or biblical theology will have to engage with at least some texts that do 
not lend themselves to easy analysis. In the next section, I will address one method 
for engaging with such difficult texts, and one problem I see this method facing, 
before in the final section of this introduction, addressing how I intend to use such 
                                                          
23 See, for instance, Isaiah 53, one of the most important descriptions of the Atonement in the Old 
Testament. 
24 For more on this line of argument, see Westphal 2009. 
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an analytic theology methodology in this thesis on the Christian doctrine of the 
Atonement. 
 
Analytic Theology and Divine Revelation 
As already mentioned, in the introduction to Analytic Theology: New Essays in the 
Philosophy of Theology, Michael Rea characterises analytic philosophy (and by 
extension, analytic theology25) as ‘avoiding substantive use of metaphor and other 
tropes whose semantic content outstrips their propositional content.’26 Rea’s idea 
was not that metaphor and other literary tropes (like typology or analogy) should 
be avoided completely – to do so would severely limit the primary source material 
available to the analytic theologian wanting to engage with exegetical or biblical 
theology – rather, as Thomas McCall puts it, that analytic theologians ‘are not at 
liberty to trade loosely in metaphor without ever being able to specify just what is 
meant by those metaphors. They are not, then, free to make claims the meaning of 
which cannot be specified or spelled out.’27 In essence, although they can be 
identified as such, metaphors (and other literary tropes) should only be utilised by 
the analytic theologian if they can be rendered in some sense propositionally 
unambiguous. 
Such an expectation certainly seems fitting for work produced by so-called analytic 
theologians. However, the question remains: how are analytic theologians to deal 
with the ambiguities of the metaphors, typologies and similar tropes already 
present in their primary texts? Should Christian or Jewish analytic theologians, for 
instance, gloss over the parts of the Biblical text that do not lend themselves to 
straightforward propositional analysis, or are they at liberty to assume that beyond 
the metaphors and other literary tropes the authors or final editors of the Biblical 
                                                          
25 There are, of course, philosophers working within the analytic tradition that do use literary 
narrative, for example Eleonore Stump and Martha Nussbaum, but for present purposes I will treat 
these as non-representative. 
26 Rea, 2009: 6 
27 McCall, 2015: 20 
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texts were (at the very least far more often than not) engaging in some coherent 
work that can be teased out and rendered propositionally unambiguous?28 
One analytic theologian who has engaged at length with this question is Yoram 
Hazony.29 Hazony affirms the latter position and in his book The Philosophy of 
Hebrew Scripture he sets out a methodological framework for how this work might 
be undertaken (at least, in Jewish analytic theology). Hazony argues that the Biblical 
prophets were engaging in works of reason, works at least comparable to the Greek 
philosophers, and that their work should be considered authoritative because it is 
reasonable, and not (just) because their work is taken on faith to have been 
revealed to them by God. Expanding upon this claim, Hazony begins his book’s 
conclusion with the following words: 
Not too long from now it may be possible to write a comprehensive work on 
the ideas of the Hebrew Scriptures. [This book suggests] a methodological 
framework [which] I believe can permit a more rapid advance in the 
direction of a well-articulated understanding of the philosophical content of 
the Hebrew Scripture than we’ve seen so far.30 
Reason, Hazony says, has traditionally involved ‘deducing propositions from other 
propositions.’ What he proposes instead is to extend this understanding of reason 
to include abductively inferring propositions from what he calls ‘non-propositional’ 
analogy, metaphor, and typology found in the Hebrew bible.31 In essence, Hazony is 
proposing to take the very literary tropes at question, reduce them to what he sees 
as their approximate propositional content and then set them to work in analytic 
arguments to articulate what he sees as the philosophy of Hebrew scripture. 
                                                          
28 This is not to say that analytic theologians of the former persuasion are unable to say anything 
about such non-propositional content; as I hope to show, they can attempt to articulate why, in 
general terms, such non-propositional content might have been included. 
29 Although I am looking at Hazony’s work (his work is the most substantive attempt to engage with 
this question that I have come across), I think the concerns I raise would be common to any attempt 
by an analytic theologian to propositionally analyse the literary tropes in a religious text. Hazony is 
one of the beneficiaries of the original John Templeton Foundation analytic theology grant, and 
currently the recipient of a further Templeton grant to study Jewish analytic theology at the Herzl 
Institute in Jerusalem. 
30 Hazony, 2012: 265 
31 See also Hazony, 2012: 27, 272. 
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The methodological framework that Hazony develops requires his inquirer to first 
learn how to reliably ‘recognize a given general cause or nature in experience’ as 
only once this is done ‘is it then possible to begin trying to establish a partial 
description of it in propositions’.32 Hazony follows this up by suggesting that as 
soon as one recognises that 
metaphor, analogy, and typology are in fact means by which the author of a 
work can establish positions with respect to general causes or natures, it 
becomes much easier to see that the great majority of the biblical authors, 
and perhaps all of them, are indeed engaged in reason; and that it is the 
exercise of reason they hope for, as well, in their readers.33 
I find Hazony’s suggestion that metaphor, analogy, and typology can be used by an 
author to establish positions with respect to general causes or natures a deeply 
plausible one.34 However, I foresee a problem with this line of thought. For, 
metaphor, analogy, and typology are all modes of narrative and following a line of 
argument developed by Eleonore Stump, I will argue that narratives (including 
metaphor, analogy, and typology) might convey knowledge that cannot be 
communicated in non-narrative propositional form. As a result, there is a real risk of 
losing something in trying to convey in non-narrative propositional form the ideas 
present in divine revelation in a work of analytic theology.35  
On page 21 of The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture Hazony cites Stump’s book, 
Wandering in Darkness, as being the first book by a prominent philosopher to argue 
for the need to incorporate the biblical narrative into the discipline of philosophy.  
                                                          
32 Hazony, 2012: 272. 
33 Hazony, 2012: 273. 
34 Although this view is not uncontroversial. See for instance Brinks (2015: 247). 
35 Of course, even if this is Yoram Hazony’s position, it is evidently not the case that all analytic 
theologians are committed to conveying every idea of the Bible in non-narrative prose. Rather, as I 
will suggest, the analytic theologian needs merely (if needs anything at all) to identify areas 
irreducible to non-narrative prose and explain why (and perhaps how) such passages are irreducible 
to non-narrative prose.  
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In Wandering in Darkness Stump makes a distinction between two kinds of 
knowledge, what she calls propositional knowledge (or Dominican knowledge) and 
what she calls knowledge of persons (or Franciscan knowledge):36 
Propositional knowledge is knowledge that X, and as such, propositional 
knowledge can always be reduced to and conveyed by propositions.  
Knowledge of persons, on the other hand, is knowledge irreducible to 
propositional form. Unlike propositional knowledge, knowledge of persons 
can only be conveyed through second-personal experience or, and crucially 
for present purposes, narrative. 37  
This is how Stump describes, or more precisely, does not describe knowledge of 
persons: 
At this point, it is worth considering how this question [what is the nature of 
knowledge of persons?] could be answered. Here is how it could not be 
answered. It could not be answered by trying to spell out what exactly is 
known in the Franciscan knowledge of persons, contrasting it with 
knowledge that, and considering whether the distinctive elements of that 
Franciscan knowledge are philosophically significant. The objector's 
question could not be answered in this way because then the position being 
defended would be incoherent... I would be trying to describe in the familiar 
                                                          
36 Stump, 2010: 59.  
37 See Stump 2010 (77-80) for an explanation for how an account can be second-personal. Stump 
writes: 
 
While we cannot express the distinctive knowledge of such an experience as a matter of 
knowing that, we can do something to re‐present the experience itself in such a way that 
we can share the second‐person experience to some degree with others who were not part 
of it, so that at least some of the Franciscan knowledge garnered from the experience is 
also available to them. This is generally what we do when we tell a story. A story takes a 
real or imagined set of second‐person experiences of one sort or another and makes it 
available to a wider audience to share. It does so by making it possible, to one degree or 
another, for a person to experience some of what she would have experienced if she had 
been an onlooker in the second‐person experience represented in the story. That is, a story 
gives a person some of what she would have had if she had had unmediated personal 
interaction with the characters in the story while they were conscious and interacting with 
each other, without actually making her part of the story itself. The re‐presenting of a 
second‐person experience in a story thus constitutes a second‐person account. It is a report 
of a set of second‐person experiences that does not lose (at least does not lose entirely) the 
distinctively second‐person character of the experiences. (78) 
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terms of knowing that the Franciscan knowledge which I have claimed 
cannot be formulated in that way.38 
To support the distinction between these two types of knowledge Stump reworks 
Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument. Stump asks us to imagine some Mary 
who has been locked in a room since birth. Mary has never experienced a second-
personal encounter with her mother, and does not have access to any narrative 
account of her mother. Nevertheless, in Mary’s room Mary has access (through 
encyclopaedias and computers) to all relevant non-narrative propositional 
information about the existence of her loving mother, along with all that science 
can teach about her. Stump writes: 
When Mary is first united with her mother, it seems indisputable that Mary 
will know things she did not know before, even if she knew everything about 
her mother that could be made available to her in non‐narrative 
propositional form, including her mother's psychological states. Although 
Mary knew that her mother loved her before she met her, when she is 
united with her mother, Mary will learn what it is like to be loved. And this 
will be new for her, even if in her isolated state she had as complete a 
scientific description as possible of what a human being feels like when she 
senses that she is loved by someone else.39 
On my reading of this claim, what Stump is committing to in this account of 
knowledge is at odds with, for instance, a traditional analysis of Jackson’s original 
thought experiment that suggests Mary merely learns something old in a new 
way.40 In other words, knowledge of persons (the something new) is in some sense 
                                                          
38 Stump, 2010: 59. And again a little earlier Stump writes: 
 
I want to claim, however, that there is a kind of knowledge of persons, a 
Franciscan knowledge, which is non‐propositional and which is not reducible 
to knowledge that. What could that possibly be?, a skeptical objector may ask. 
But, of course, if I give an answer to the skeptic's question, I will have an 
incoherent position: in answering the question, I will be presenting in terms of 
knowledge that what I am claiming could not be presented that way. (52) 
39 Stump, 2010: 52. 
40 Churchland writes, for instance, that 
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captured by what was previously known, namely, pertinent propositional 
knowledge (the something old). For Stump, on the other hand, what Mary learns is 
not something old in a new way, but something entirely new altogether.41 
So why might this matter? Stump argues that knowledge of persons transmitted in 
her narrative studies can be used to ‘soften the blow’ or ‘prepare the ground’ for 
the arguments that follow.42 Of course, for the reasons she mentioned above, she 
cannot explain exactly how this knowledge of persons does this, nevertheless 
Stump writes 
I [have] argued that a story, which is a second‐person account, can give us 
something of what we would have had if we ourselves had been 
participants, even just as bystanders, in the second‐person experiences that 
the story describes. In the same way, … biblical narratives …constitute a way 
of sharing and passing on interpersonal experiences, including interpersonal 
experiences (whether real or imagined) with God, in all their messy richness. 
These narratively shared experiences can inform in subtle ways our 
intuitions and judgments, just as real‐life experiences do. 
… I cannot explain exactly what way that is, but it is not necessary for me to 
do so…43 
                                                          
the difference between a person who knows all about the visual cortex but has never 
enjoyed a sensation of red, and a person who knows no neuroscience but knows well the 
sensation of red, may reside not in what is respectively known by each (brain states by the 
former, qualia by the latter), but rather in the different type of knowledge each has of 
exactly the same thing. The difference is in the manner of the knowing, not in the nature(s) 
of the thing known. (Churchland, 1989: 24) 
41 See Stump 2010 (52-59) for more details. Stump distinguishes ‘knowledge-of-persons’ from the 
‘knowledge-how’ ability hypothesis that Laurence Nemirow (1990), David Lewis (2004) and Paul 
Churchill (1989) discuss. The knowledge-how ability hypothesis suggests that experience gives us an 
ability and nothing more; an ability to remember, imagine or recognize what it is like to have that 
experience. There is no new knowledge gained at all in this process. The position that Stump takes 
up, then, is closer to Earl Conee’s ‘acquaintance’ hypothesis (1994). For Conee, there is no new 
propositional knowledge gained by experience, but there is something gained beyond mere know-
how, namely, acquaintance with the thing known. 
42 It is worth noting that in Stump’s case, she uses the first four chapters of Wandering in Darkness 
to first explain her methodology (i.e., stressing the importance of narrative alongside propositional 
knowledge), then she uses the next four chapters to develop a conceptual framework (worked out in 
propositions), then, with that framework in view, she spends four chapters presenting the 
narratives. Only once this is done does she present her final argument. In many respects, this thesis 
follows a similar structure. 
43 Further from Stump on this point:  
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I think, therefore, that the best way to make use of … biblical narratives … is 
to let … reflection on them … serve as the equivalent of experience, not the 
experience of traveling through a country but rather something like the 
experience of immersion in a worldview. To experience this worldview is, of 
course, not the same thing as approving of it or being willing to adopt and 
accept as one's own the things peculiar to it. But, even if one rejects it, the 
as‐it‐were travel experience of it will broaden and enrich one's perceptions 
and judgments of things, altering them in subtle and not‐so‐subtle ways, 
much as travel to a very different culture will do even if one is alienated 
from that culture. 
… I will [therefore] treat the stories as one treats the experience of travel. … 
I will let the memory of the preceding readings of the stories inform 
inchoately or tacitly the reflections in this and subsequent chapters … In 
effect, I will count on the stories as a common store of experience shared by 
readers, in the way one might share with others the experience of having 
been to China, even if one disagrees with one's fellow travelers about the 
assessment of what one has seen, even if one disputes what the others take 
to be the facts with regard to the country and its people.44 
                                                          
 
What an American learns after numerous extended trips to China cannot be reduced to 
particular claims about the country, the culture, and the people; the experienced 
traveller will not be able to explain in numbered propositions what his previous trips 
have taught him. But, nonetheless, what virtually all of us believe is that, on his next 
trip to China, he will be readily distinguishable from his colleagues who are visiting 
China for the first time. 
 
He will be able to bridge the gap between American and Chinese cultures by myriad 
small or large insights hard to summarize or to express at all in any propositional way. 
Because of his previous experience with China, he will have an understanding of China 
and its culture and people that his colleagues on their first trip to China will lack; and 
he will not be able to convey to them in terms of knowledge that what he himself has 
learned. His inexperienced colleagues will have to learn it for themselves through 
experience on their own trips to China. Or they might learn some of it in advance 
through stories, which lets them participate vicariously to some extent in the 
experiences their colleague, the experienced traveller to China, has had. (Stump, 2010: 
374) 
44 Stump, 2010: 374.  
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Now, it might be the case that Hazony is right, and with sufficient study we can 
extract all non-narrative propositional knowledge from the analogies, metaphors, 
and typologies in the Bible (although I am not altogether clear on how we would 
judge what qualifies as true typology and what a false typology). In presenting this 
information, however, there is a real risk that analytic theologians will fail to 
transmit the sort of knowledge of persons that the authors or final editors of the 
Hebrew Bible were at least in part concerned with passing on.45 On this view, then, 
metaphor, analogy, and typology are not mere rhetorical flair, nor are they merely 
a device for ‘softening the blow’ of an argument, rather, the knowledge of persons 
gathered from them is necessary for, or at the very least conducive to, full 
understanding of the point under consideration.46 
If this knowledge of persons cannot (by necessity) be reduced to non-narrative 
propositional form, the methodology for engaging in a project to map out the ideas 
present in divine revelation must be carefully revised, with consideration given, at 
the very least, for (ambiguous) narrative’s role47 in analytic theology.48  
 
                                                          
45 This, of course, assumes that there is such a thing as propositionally irreducible Franciscan 
knowledge of persons, and this is by no means an uncontroversial assumption. Even assuming this, 
though, Hazony (or the putative analytic theologian) could respond to this by suggesting that the 
propositional content he extracts is merely a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, the Biblical 
text itself (‘like a travel guide book is a supplement to, by not a replacement for, the tour itself’ - I 
thank one anonymous referee for pressing this point). However, this move (conceding that second-
personal content in the Bible is there, but cannot be marshalled for use in argument) demonstrates 
one limitation of analytic theology, for in making this move the analytic theologian is ignoring 
something that might otherwise prove pertinent to the topic at hand. Such a concession is of course 
neither good nor bad for analytic theology (nor should it really come as a surprise), but is, I suggest, 
usefully illustrative of the fact that analytic theology ‘cannot go it alone’. 
46 Like in Stump’s earlier attempt to explain Franciscan knowledge of persons, I am unable to show 
exactly how Franciscan knowledge might do this (for to do so would require setting out what it 
achieves in propositional form, which, of course, would then render such knowledge propositional 
rather than knowledge of persons). At best, I can point to the Mary thought experiment and use the 
intuition that some may have that Mary really does learn something new when she sees her mother 
to show that knowledge of persons is real, and can be communicated in narrative.  
47 I am here referring to whatever it is about narrative that I am claiming is in some sense 
propositionally irreducible. 
48 To this end Stump’s Wandering in Darkness provides an excellent model for how such biblically 
informed analytic theology might be done, with a full quarter of the book devoted letting the biblical 
narrative speak for itself, if you will (albeit after her propositional framework has been established, 
so reader comes to the narrative with an informed structure already present).  
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Narrative and Methodology 
I have so far suggested that analytic theology is perhaps best understood as a style 
of constructive theology done in the tradition, and using the tools, of analytic 
philosophy. I suggested that analytic theology therefore serves as a helpmeet to an 
existing type of theology, but that, contra Crisp and Abraham, its exercise is not 
necessarily limited to a particular type of theology. 
In this thesis, I intend to engage in a work of analytic theology on the Christian 
doctrine of the Atonement. But given what I have said about analytic theology 
acting as a helpmeet to another type of theology, it is important to reiterate that 
explanations for the Christian doctrine of the Atonement cannot be established 
from natural theology. Rather, the lineaments for the Christian doctrine of the 
Atonement are only available through divine revelation.49 As a result, in engaging in 
a work of analytic theology on the Christian doctrine of the Atonement, I will, of 
necessity, be engaging with the Christian tradition, particularly the work of 
Augustine, Anselm, Abelard, and Aquinas (although, as with Scripture, they are 
introduced to help solve a problem, rather than to be engaged with in a piece of 
serious reconstructive intellectual history50), as well as relevant scriptural and 
conciliar texts, including scriptural texts that do not lend themselves to easy and 
straightforward analysis. Where appropriate, I will use, as Hazony suggests, 
abductive inference from these narratives to offer plausible lineaments for the 
Christian doctrine of the Atonement, but in addition to doing so, I will, as Stump 
suggests, also present the relevant narratival contexts.51 In addition, when 
appropriate, I will quote verses or short passages from scripture with only the 
                                                          
49 Although we can, of course, explore how two persons might make amends, the Christian doctrine 
of the Atonement has a very specific framework in which this takes place, namely, through 
something to do with Christ’s life, passion, death, resurrection or ascension. 
50 I will then, for instance, attempt to use Aquinas in much the same way that Aquinas used Aristotle, 
and so forth. 
51 There is, of course, a tension between the claim that the knowledge conveyed in narrative is (at 
least in part) irreducible to propositional knowledge, and then offering a commentary or exegesis on 
the narratives in question that tries to point out just how to read a passage in order to access such 
knowledge. If the (propositional) commentary actually captures all of what is being conveyed, why 
bother with the narrative in the first place? At best, then, a commentary can only gesture away from 
a misreading of the narrative, or prompt a fresh rereading of an old narrative. Given this, my 
commentary on the biblical texts in question will be, necessarily, minimal, leaving room for a fuller 
reflection on the text. 
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slightest abductive inference or commentary, letting the text, for the most part, 
speak for itself.  
Before I turn the biblical narratives on the Atonement, I will first outline a 
framework (from scripture, tradition, and reason) into which the Atonement can be 
situated. After setting out this framework, I will provide conceptual analysis of what 
I take to be the most promising account of the nature of atonement in general, 
before finally turning to the biblical narratives with a view to defending the 
theological plausibility of this general analysis, and also gesturing towards an 
explanation for the special case of the Christian doctrine of Atonement, an 
explanation that fits both within the general framework previously outlined, with 
this understanding of atonement in general, and with the specific (abductively 
inferred) scriptural desiderata for the doctrine.52 
I will begin the first chapter of this thesis by looking in some depth at one of the 
two motivating reasons I have for pursuing this topic, namely, by exploring the 
thing the Atonement is supposed to secure, that is, a person’s union with God at 
the beatific vision. With this framework for union with God in view, in the second 
chapter, I will explore the inhibitors to such union that the Atonement is supposed 
to overcome, namely, inhibitors to dyadic attention, and psychological integration. 
In the third chapter I will, using recent work in moral philosophy, propose a 
framework for overcoming such inhibitors in everyday relationships. In the fourth 
chapter, I will offer a survey of the biblical data on Atonement, suggesting that 
whilst such everyday solutions provide a helpful framework for thinking about 
atonement in general, when applied to the Christian doctrine of Atonement, each 
solution faces an apparently intractable theological obstacle. Given these 
apparently intractable theological obstacles, I will unpack one of the major 
problems facing current attempts to explain the Christian doctrine of the 
Atonement, namely, the problem of transaction. After exploring every permutation 
of this transaction problem (that the Atonement is secured in part due to some 
                                                          
52 In this way, I will have two standards for success for any Atonement theory. Firstly, whether the 
theory coheres with the biblical data on Atonement (and how that data has been traditionally 
interpreted) and secondly, whether the theory is intelligible, non-arbitrary, logically valid and moral. 
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transfer between God and God, between God and humanity, between humanity 
and God, or between God and some third party), I will suggest that we can avoid 
the transaction problem entirely through an account of the Atonement as reunion. 
In the fifth and final chapter, I will show how this reunion account of Atonement, an 
account that is informed by the work done in the first four chapters, might map 
onto the life, passion, and death of Christ. Finally, I will conclude this thesis by 
summarising and assessing the viability of this Atonement-as-reunion model, 
alongside providing brief analysis of how this model might fit into the order of 
salvation. 
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Chapter 1 
Union with God and the Beatific Vision 
 
The Atonement presents itself as the solution to a problem. But, before we can talk 
sensibly about what this solution might be, whatever it may be, we must identify 
what exactly the problem is, and also what the problem inhibits. As I see it, the 
main reason for disagreement amongst Atonement theorists stems from a failure to 
adequately engage with these two issues, and in particular, a failure to engage with 
the latter. What exactly does the Atonement make possible that would, without it, 
remain out of reach? This chapter will therefore focus on this latter question whilst 
the next chapter will focus on the former.  
What, then, does the Atonement secure? In brief, I will argue that something about 
the Atonement secures union with God at what has become known in the Christian 
tradition as ‘the beatific vision’, that is, the vision of God. 
In this chapter, I will both motivate and explore the mechanics of this final union, 
but I will begin by looking at how this doctrine of the beatific vision has been dealt 
with in scripture and situated in church tradition, particularly, in the works of 
Augustine and Aquinas on joy, peace, and love.53 
This chapter will make and defend the following theological claims, introducing, 
where appropriate, conceptual tools that will then be called upon throughout the 
remainder of the thesis: 
1. The greatest real union with God is necessary for a person’s joy and peace, 
that is, for the blessed life. 
2. Real union with God requires knowledge of God; the greater the knowledge 
the greater the union. 
3. The greatest knowledge of God is attainable only at the beatific vision, by 
those who can and do behold it. 
                                                          
53 Although these are the first three ‘fruits of the Spirit’, I will leave off any discussion of the Spirit’s 
role in their production. For further details on their status as fruits, see, for instance, Pinsent 2012. 
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4. From (1), (2), and (3), beholding the beatific vision is necessary for the 
greatest real union with God, and so necessary for achieving joy and peace, 
that is, for the blessed life. 
In the next chapter, I will explore possible inhibitors to the beholding of the beatific 
vision, and, therefore, the possible problems which an account of the Atonement 
will need to address. These inhibitors will include, namely, (i) an unwillingness to 
behold the vision,54 (ii) an inability to wholeheartedly will to behold the vision,55 
and (iii) an inability to behold the vision at all.56 
As with the doctrine of the Atonement, it is difficult (although, surprisingly, perhaps 
not impossible57) to motivate the doctrine of the beatific vision from natural 
theology alone. Given this, and given the relative lack of attention the doctrine has 
received in recent years, it will prove prudent to motivate, from revealed theology, 
that is, from scripture, the very possibility of a future beholding of the beatific 
vision (i.e., of in some sense beholding God). 
In one of the most famous public discourses of Jesus Christ, the Sermon on the 
Mount, the following beatitude was given: 
Matthew 5:8 ‘Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God.’58 
And John, the ‘disciple whom Jesus loved’59, later wrote: 
1 John 3:2 ‘Beloved, we are God's children now, and what we will be has not 
yet appeared; but we know that when he appears we shall be like him, 
because we shall see him as he is.’ 
                                                          
54 Typically, the preference for one’s own power and pleasure over the greater goods of union with 
God is understood to be a consequence of original sin. 
55 Through the sort of (inevitable) psychological fragmentation that leaves you both unable to 
wholeheartedly desire to behold the vision, and also makes it impossible for another to be as close 
to you as they might otherwise be. 
56 That is, an inability to be significantly present to God, through an inability to dyadically share 
attention with God. 
57 See, for instance, ST I-II, Q 3 A 8. However, this view is controversial. For the wider debate on this 
view, see Feingold, 2010: 397–428. 
58 All biblical references are taken from the English Standard Version (ESV). 
59 See John 13:23, 19:26, and 21:7. 
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This ‘seeing God’ is explained through the metaphor of ‘seeing face to face’ or 
‘seeing God’s face’, terms employed used in both in the Hebrew Bible and the New 
Testament. For instance, the apostle Paul wrote: 
1 Corinthians 13:12 ‘For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. 
Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I have been fully known.’ 
Whilst in the Old Testament, Job is taken to have said: 
Job 19:25-27 ‘For I know that my Redeemer lives, and at the last he will 
stand upon the earth. And after my skin has been thus destroyed, yet in my 
flesh I shall see God, whom I shall see for myself, and my eyes shall behold, 
and not another.’ 
And again in the Old Testament, David writes: 
Psalm 15:11 ‘As for me, I shall behold your face in righteousness; when I 
awake, I shall be satisfied with your likeness.’ 
And in the final picture of humanity at the end of the book of Revelation, the author 
records: 
Revelation 22:3-5 ‘No longer will there be anything accursed, but the throne 
of God and of the Lamb will be in it, and his servants will worship him. They 
will see his face, and his name will be on their foreheads. And night will be 
no more. They will need no light of lamp or sun, for the Lord God will be 
their light, and they will reign forever and ever.’ 
Taken together, the scriptural data suggests that (i) the pure in heart will have a 
vision of God, and that (ii) this vision is in some way connected to their blessed 
state in the afterlife. But why might this be the case? And more pointedly, how 
might this relate to the Atonement? 
Augustine explained that this blessed state was one of eternal joy (with the 
alternative involving a state of eternal torment), and at the start of his On Christian 
Doctrine, he presented what was to become one of the most influential accounts of 
the nature of joy in the Christian tradition. As unpacking Augustine’s account of joy 
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offers an insight into this final state of union with God, it is to his account that this 
thesis now turns. 
 
Augustine on Use and Enjoyment 
In book one of On Christian Doctrine, Augustine states that all things (res) can either 
make us blessed (i.e., for frui, or enjoyment) or can help us attain that which makes 
us blessed (for uti, or use).60 However, he warns, to enjoy what one should merely 
use, or to use some thing to attain an improper object of desire, is to abuse that 
thing.  
It seems, then, that on Augustine’s account, joy emerges from the relationship 
between a person and a thing; joy is a systems-level feature based upon a person’s 
(affective) desire for the object, their intention in having the object (whether it is 
desired for enjoyment, for its own sake, or for use), and, to some extent, their 
having (or laying hold, or resting in, or uniting with) that object. Furthermore, whilst 
joy could emerge from the relationship between a person and any thing, Augustine 
thinks there are in fact proper and improper objects of enjoyment. Essentially, 
proper enjoyment leads to a person’s flourishing, and therefore, to peace and the 
good life, whilst improper enjoyment, on both counts, does not. To make his point 
more clearly, Augustine invites his reader to consider the story of a wayward 
wanderer: 
Suppose, then, we were wanderers in a strange country, and could not live 
happily away from our fatherland, and that we felt wretched in our wandering, 
and wishing to put an end to our misery, determined to return home. We find, 
however, that we must make use of some mode of conveyance, either by land 
or water, in order to reach that fatherland where our enjoyment is to 
commence. But the beauty of the country through which we pass, and the very 
pleasure of the motion, charm our hearts, and turning these things which we 
ought to use into objects of enjoyment, we become unwilling to hasten the end 
                                                          
60 DDC Book 1 Chapter 2. 
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of our journey; and becoming engrossed in a factitious delight, our thoughts are 
diverted from that home whose delights would make us truly happy.61 
In this story, of course, we are represented by the wayward traveller, and in 
enjoying what we should only use, we become engrossed in ‘factitious delight’, 
missing that which ‘would make us truly blessed.’ However, mere counsel against 
enjoying what we should but use is of little use in helping us to flourish. For it to be 
prove valuable, we must know what things are proper to seek enjoyment in. 
Somewhat unsurprisingly, Augustine thinks that for all people the proper object of 
enjoyment is God in Trinity. Echoing the opening of his Confessions, he writes: 
Wherefore, since it is our duty fully to enjoy the truth which lives unchangeably, 
and since the triune God takes counsel in this truth for the things which He has 
made, the soul must be purified that it may have power to perceive that light, 
and to rest in it when it is perceived. And let us look upon this purification as a 
kind of journey or voyage to our native land. For it is not by change of place that 
we can come nearer to Him who is in every place, but by the cultivation of pure 
desires and virtuous habits.62 
Unpacking Augustine’s thought, it seems only God can be wholly enjoyed, with this 
enjoyment fulfilled as a person first perceives God ‘as He is’ and then, once so 
perceiving, finds their ‘rest’ in Him. To ‘perceive’ clearly, Augustine suggests a 
person must go through a process of purification (namely, sanctification), whereby 
they come to have a pure, or wholehearted, desire for God. And, in another work, 
Augustine connects this moment of clear perception to the beatific vision, where, in 
the eschaton, God blesses sanctified human persons by manifesting Himself to 
them.63 
Thus, on Augustine’s account, it seems joy can only properly emerge from the 
relationship a person has with God; it is a systems-level feature (that is to say, joy 
has necessary and sufficient conditions, which, when present, lead to its 
                                                          
61 DDC Book I, Chapter 4. 
62 DDC Book I, Chapter 10. 
63 DCD, Book XXII, Chapter 29. See also Letter 147 ‘On Seeing God’. 
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emergence) emerging from (i) a person’s pure (or wholehearted) desire for God, 
where (ii) this desire for God is for no further reason but for God’s own sake, and 
where (iii) this desire is fully realised, in other words, where a person in some sense 
has God. And for the person to whom (i) and (ii) apply, (iii) is in some sense secured 
at the beatific vision, and therefore, for the person to whom (i) and (ii) apply, at the 
beatific vision, joy properly emerges and full flourishing ensues.64 
Even given this cursory summary, it should be apparent that Augustine’s account of 
proper enjoyment is by no means uncontroversial. For one, his account seems 
excessively severe. If God alone is to be wholly enjoyed, and if this enjoyment is 
indeed reserved until the eschaton, it looks like all pre-eschaton joy will be a 
product of abuse, and therefore unconducive to flourishing. This general concern 
can be cashed out in three ways.  
We might call the first way the severity concern: 
If only God is to be wholly enjoyed, and if God can only be wholly enjoyed in 
the eschaton, it looks like any joy that emerges before the eschaton must be 
a product of abuse. 
And the second way, the exclusivity concern: 
If only God is to be wholly enjoyed, what of those who do not know God or 
do not desire God? It looks like such people are incapable of proper 
enjoyment, and incapable of flourishing. 
And the third way, the friendship concern: 
If only God is to be wholly enjoyed, all other things must be used. So, it looks 
like other people, including our friends and family, are to be used but not 
enjoyed. 
If any of these concerns are indeed entailments of Augustine’s account it would be 
to me, at least, a strike against its plausibility. However, I will suggest that 
                                                          
64 Commenting on this Augustinian account of enjoyment, St Bonaventure, noted that ‘Enjoyment 
includes those three namely, vision, love, laying hold.’ SC, Book 4, Distinction 49, Question 5. 
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appearances are deceiving, and in fact Augustine’s account has within it the 
resources to address each concern. 
Regarding the severity concern, Augustine later introduces a distinction in the 
passions between desire (cupiditas), which is consent to chase after what we want, 
and delight (laetitia), which is consent to enjoy what we wish for.65 On at least 
Peter Lombard’s reading of Augustine, it is proper to enjoy what we delight in, even 
if what we delight in is not yet fulfilled. Thus, we can actually enjoy anticipation of 
the beatific vision, and thus, we can ‘use with delight’ any of those things we might 
use to enable us to receive it.66 Given this distinction, so long as joy emerges from 
delight in either anticipation of the beatific vision, or from using with delight that 
which will help us secure the beatific vision, joy can still properly emerge prior to 
the eschaton. So, it seems the severity concern can be deflated. 
Regarding the exclusivity concern, given Augustine’s belief in divine ineffability, 
even those who purport to know of God’s existence will, in doing so, come to rely 
on some non-propositional, non-conceptual knowledge of God. I will suggest that 
this non-propositional, non-conceptual knowledge (what I think Aquinas calls 
‘connatural knowledge’) may be shared even by those who would deny that God 
exists.  
Regarding the friendship concern, it will become clear that although for Augustine 
only God can be wholly enjoyed, because human persons are made in the image of 
God, they can be both used and enjoyed, so long as their enjoyment does not 
supersede the enjoyment of God.67,68 
On the account presented so far, joy properly emerges as a systems-level feature 
when something like the following three conditions are met, or anticipated, or 
moved towards:  
                                                          
65 Kitanov, 2014: 8. 
66 Kitanov, 2014: 16. 
67 Kitanov, 2014: 17. 
68 It is interesting to note that Augustine does not make room for enjoyment of nature, either of 
non-human animals, or inanimate objects, or abstract ideas. The limits of space prevent me from 
addressing whether his account could be extended to include enjoyment of such non-human things, 
however suffice it to say that such things can still be ‘used with delight’ as mentioned above.  
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(i) a person desires God,  
(ii) this desire for God is for no further reason, and  
(iii) this desire is fully realised, in other words, that a person in some sense 
has God. 
Now, it seems clear enough to me how (i) and (ii) might be met; however, it is not 
at all clear how (iii) might be met. What would it mean for a person to ‘have’ God 
(or for that matter, to ‘have’ another human person)? To get a grip on what 
Augustine is gesturing towards, it is important to note that the beatific vision is not 
merely God’s self-manifestation; Augustine also believed that through this vision 
the beholders are also (and in some sense finally) united with the One in whom 
their ‘restless hearts find rest’.69 
For Augustine, enjoying God requires love (i.e., caritas) of God, where such love is 
understood as an ‘affection of the mind’ aimed towards God.70 Following 
Augustine, both Bonaventure and Aquinas understood ‘affection’ to involve a 
‘desire’ or a ‘movement’. But a desire or a movement must have some end, and so 
Aquinas proposed that love of God required the desire both for the good of God, 
and also for union with Him.71 If the general desire for God is understood as 
including a desire for union with God, it is clearer to see how (iii) might be realised: 
a person who desires union with God, and is in fact united with God, has, in that 
sense, what they desire. It is in uniting with God, and not (just) in beholding God’s 
self-manifestation, that a person’s restless heart finds rest. 
But this response has not answered the initial question, it has only moved the 
goalposts. What, then, is required for union with God? Aquinas, quoting Augustine, 
offers an illuminating insight, distinguishing as he does between real and affective 
union: 
                                                          
69 “You move us to delight in praising You; for You have formed us for Yourself, and our hearts are 
restless till they find rest in You.” Confessions, Book I, Chapter 1 
70 ‘I mean by charity that affection of the mind which aims at the enjoyment of God for His own 
sake, and the enjoyment of one's self and one's neighbor in subordination to God’ DDC, Book III, 
Chapter 10. 
71 See ST II-II Q 23 A 2, also ST II-II Q 25 A 3, ST I-II Q 26 A 2-4, ST I-II Q 28 A 1, 4. This is also loosely 
alluded to in Augustine himself. See, DCD, Book I, Chapter 16. 
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The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for 
instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. The second is union of 
affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding 
apprehension; since movement of the appetite follows apprehension. Now 
love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of 
these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved 
with the lover… 
The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves 
man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something 
suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused "formally" by 
love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says 
(De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking to unite two 
together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" 
he refers to the union of affection, without which there is no love: and in 
saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union.72 
As I shall later unpack, real union, the object of desire in desire for God, requires 
both our presence to God (for God, being omnipresent, is presumably already 
present to us), and also an ‘apprehension’ of God; a knowledge of who God is. In 
recent work, Stump has interpreted this ‘apprehension’ as (comprehensive) 
knowledge of the other person’s mind.73 This being the case, it follows that 
knowledge of God is necessary for real union with Him. And, if real union with God 
is necessary for, in some sense, ‘having’ Him, and in some sense ‘having’ Him is 
necessary for the emergence of proper enjoyment, by the transitivity of causation, 
it seems knowledge of God is necessary for the emergence of proper enjoyment, 
and so for flourishing and the good life. 
Earlier, I outlined one concern for Augustine’s view, namely, that it seemed to entail 
that joy could never properly emerge in those who do not know of God. However, 
upon reflection, this requirement looks problematic even for those who claim 
                                                          
72 ST I-II Q 28 A 1. 
73 See, Stump, 2010: 108 – 128. 
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knowledge of God. For, if Augustine is right, God is in some significant sense 
ineffable.74 Augustine writes: 
Have I spoken of God, or uttered His praise, in any worthy way? Nay, I feel 
that I have done nothing more than desire to speak; and if I have said 
anything, it is not what I desired to say. How do I know this, except from the 
fact that God is unspeakable? But what I have said, if it had been 
unspeakable, could not have been spoken. And so God is not even to be 
called unspeakable, because to say even this is to speak of Him. Thus there 
arises a curious contradiction of words, because if the unspeakable is what 
cannot be spoken of, it is not unspeakable if it can be called unspeakable. 
And this opposition of words is rather to be avoided by silence than to be 
explained away by speech. And yet God, although nothing worthy of His 
greatness can be said of Him, has condescended to accept the worship of 
men's mouths, and has desired us through the medium of our own words to 
rejoice in His praise. For on this principle it is that He is called Deus (God). 
For the sound of those two syllables in itself conveys no true knowledge of 
His nature; but yet all who know the Latin tongue are led, when that sound 
reaches their ears, to think of a nature supreme in excellence and eternal in 
existence.75 
But if God is indeed ineffable, if He is in some sense beyond knowledge, how can 
anyone have knowledge of Him? And if knowledge is required for union with Him, 
without knowledge how can anyone unite with Him? And if they cannot unite with 
Him, they cannot ‘have’ Him, and in not ‘having’ Him, joy cannot properly emerge. 
But once again, all is not lost, for, it seems, not all knowledge can be captured by 
propositions and by concepts. Connatural knowledge, something akin to a 
knowledge of persons or objects that is irreducible to propositional and conceptual 
knowledge is also available.76 If things can be known connaturally, it seems 
                                                          
74 For a recent attempt to show how the sentence ‘God is ineffable’ does not entail a contradiction, 
see Jacobs 2015. 
75 See, DDC, Book I, Chapter 6. 
76 See Maritain 1951 and Stump 2010 (64-81) for more on connatural knowledge and knowledge of 
persons respectively. 
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compatible with God’s ineffability that we can nevertheless connaturally know God 
and God’s goodness without ever being able to comprehend, or conceptualise or 
commit to propositions anything about God’s nature or mind.77 
And this view has some interesting consequences for the exclusivity concern, for, if 
the only knowledge we can have of God is connatural, enjoyment of God cannot be 
reserved for those who have the most (propositionally) true beliefs about God. 
Indeed, it cannot be reserved for those who have any (propositionally) true beliefs 
about God. It cannot for the simple reason that there are no such beliefs to be had. 
But, this raises a further question. Certainly, it seems that if connatural knowledge 
of God is possible, such knowledge might be available at the beatific vision. But 
could such knowledge be available before the eschaton, too? If not, it seems 
difficult to know what one would be delighting in anticipation of. However, here 
too there is a straightforward answer. For Aquinas, goodness, and beauty, and 
truth, both through the theological and the moral virtues, can also be known 
connaturally. Aquinas writes: 
The theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same 
way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now 
the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or 
intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles which are 
                                                          
77 And Aquinas, for instance, seems committed to this thought, see ST II-II Q 45 A 2. On this point, 
Stump writes:  
 
On Aquinas’s account, the generation of faith is followed by the next step in the process of 
faith’s leading to wisdom. When the intellect of a person, Paula, assents to the propositions 
of faith under the influence of her will’s desire for God and God’s goodness, the resulting 
faith, informed by love of God’s goodness, brings about a mutual second-personal relation 
between Paula and God. In this relationship, personal interaction characterized by trust in 
God and openness to God grows in Paula. In consequence, Paula develops some degree of 
what Aquinas calls ‘connaturality’ or ‘sympathy’ with God. When Paula is in a mutual 
second-personal relation with God, then Paula’s mind is attuned to God’s, to one degree or 
another; and so there is a resonance, a sympathy, between Paula and God. This sympathy 
enables the development of certain dispositions of intellect in Paula. Because she is open to 
God as she is, she understands things and has insight into things in ways she otherwise 
would not have. In the mutual loving relationship between God and Paula resulting from 
Paula’s faith, then, Paula develops certain intellectual dispositions in virtue of her being 
open to the mind of God. In Aquinas’s view, these dispositions are the real or most 
important of the intellectual virtues. (Stump, 2014: 214) 
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known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are reason's 
starting-point, both in speculative and in practical matters. Secondly, 
through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined by 
reason. 
…[as to the former] First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain 
supernatural principles, which are held by means of a Divine light: these are 
the articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will is directed to this 
end, both as to that end as something attainable--and this pertains to hope-
-and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, 
transformed into that end--and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a 
thing is moved and tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this 
movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end. 78 
Thus, in as much as being, goodness, and beauty are in some sense coreferential (as 
Aquinas argued they are79) and inasmuch as God is the greatest being, God 
resembles goodness and beauty. And so, irrespective of the propositional beliefs a 
person might hold about God, a person who cultivates virtue can attain (at least) 
some dim connatural knowledge of God. If this is correct, it seems plausible that a 
virtuous person who has never seen a religious text may nevertheless have more 
connatural knowledge of God than a vicious person who has memorised lengthy 
passages of scripture. Thus, the virtuous person, in conatively desiring those 
connaturally perceived God-resembling-transcendentals, may be thereby also 
(inadvertently) desiring union with God. So, even on Augustine’s seemingly limiting 
account of joy, proper enjoyment is not and cannot be reserved for the lucky few 
who, perhaps through mere happenstance of birth, happen to believe a certain set 
of propositions about God. In delighting in the use of those things that bring a 
person closer to goodness or beauty, or truth, joy can still, it would seem, properly 
emerge. 
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This connection between love and joy can be developed further, too. Recall that for 
Aquinas, love is the product of two desires; the desire for union with the beloved, 
but also the desire for the good of the beloved. If God desires union with all human 
persons, in desiring what is good for God, that is, in loving God, one must desire 
that others also come to union with God, and therefore that you also come into 
union with others. Consider the following from Augustine: 
Whoever, then, loves his neighbor aright, ought to urge upon him that he too 
should love God with his whole heart, and soul, and mind. For in this way, loving 
his neighbor as himself, a man turns the whole current of his love both for 
himself and his neighbor into the channel of the love of God, which suffers no 
stream to be drawn off from itself by whose diversion its own volume would be 
diminished.80 
Even so, this desire for such union with others remains inextricably bound up in the 
language of use. However, it is worth noting Augustine’s nuanced account of use is 
better understood as ‘rightly ordered love’ than it is some form of 
instrumentalization. Not only are all persons things (res), they are also signs 
(signum) pointing to God, in whom only is a sign of nothing else. To love a person 
(res) for their own sake, without qualification, is both to incorrectly indicate they 
are capable of making me finally blessed, and also to ignore the fact they are a sign 
of their maker, thereby taking something from that person’s ‘actual ontological 
complexity and dignity’.81 Given this, inasmuch as use with delight can lead to the 
emergence of proper joy, so might we properly enjoy the rightly ordered use of 
complete human relationships. And indeed, this is the position Augustine takes: 
But when you have joy of a man in God, it is God rather than man that you 
enjoy. For you enjoy Him by whom you are made happy, and you rejoice to 
have come to Him in whose presence you place your hope of joy. And 
accordingly, Paul says to Philemon, Yea, brother, let me have joy of you in the 
Lord. For if he had not added in the Lord, but had only said, Let me have joy of 
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you, he would have implied that he fixed his hope of happiness upon him, 
although even in the immediate context to enjoy is used in the sense of to use 
with delight. For when the thing that we love is near us, it is a matter of course 
that it should bring delight with it. And if you pass beyond this delight, and 
make it a means to that which you are permanently to rest in, you are using it, 
and it is an abuse of language to say that you enjoy it. But if you cling to it, and 
rest in it, finding your happiness complete in it, then you may be truly and 
properly said to enjoy it. And this we must never do except in the case of the 
Blessed Trinity, who is the Supreme and Unchangeable Good.82 
Might this mean, however, that relationships not so intentionally used with delight 
necessarily fail to lead to a person’s flourishing? Perhaps not. For, plausibly, just as 
one might have knowledge of God and desire for God without propositional 
knowledge of God, so, too, I suspect one might be able to love someone ‘in the 
Lord’, noting in them the sign of goodness and beauty, without having propositional 
knowledge ‘of the Lord.’ 
In the following sections I will engage in more depth with what I have outlined here; 
however, for now it is sufficient to note that on Augustine’s account of joy, joy is a 
systems-level feature properly emerging when the following conditions are met, or 
anticipated, or worked towards: (i) a person desires God, where (ii) this desire for 
God is for no further reason, and where (iii) this desire is fully realised, or in other 
words, when a person in some sense is united with God.  
I suggested that despite framing proper enjoyment in the context of a relationship 
with God, joy can properly emerge from relationships shared between human 
persons, if it is the case that such enjoyment is also done in the context of the 
desire for God (even if one is not fully aware of such context). Furthermore, 
granting God’s ineffability, propositional knowledge of God cannot be required for 
union with God Himself (for such knowledge is impossible), and therefore, joy may 
also properly emerge in the relationships of those who profess no knowledge of 
God. 
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Aquinas on Peace and the Will 
So, for Augustine, proper joy emerges when one has (or anticipates) what one 
should appropriately desire, namely, union with God. 
This much being said, as I shall argue, to actually unite with God, in order for this 
desire to be efficacious, this desire must be unconflicted, that is, it must be 
wholehearted. On Aquinas’s account, this state of psychological integration, 
alongside the attaining of what one desires, are the twin components from which 
inner peace emerges. And, like Augustine’s account of joy, Aquinas’s celebrated 
account of peace offers a further insight into the nature of union with God.  
Concerning peace, Aquinas writes: 
Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence wherever peace 
is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever there is concord, if we 
give peace its proper meaning.  
For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so far 
as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the same thing. 
Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse things, and this in 
two ways. First, in respect of the diverse appetitive powers: thus the 
sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational 
appetite, according to Galatians 5:17: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit." 
Secondly, in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to diverse 
objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same time: so that 
there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the 
union of such movements is essential to peace, because man's heart is not 
at peace, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, 
there still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at 
the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to concord: 
wherefore concord denotes union of appetites among various persons, 
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while peace denotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appetites 
even in one man.83 
And then again: 
Peace implies a twofold union... The first is the result of one's own appetites 
being directed to one object; while the other results from one's own 
appetite being united with the appetite of another: and each of these 
unions is effected by charity--the first, in so far as man loves God with his 
whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires tend to one 
object--the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as ourselves, the result 
being that we wish to fulfil our neighbors’ will as though it were ours: hence 
it is reckoned a sign of friendship if people "make choice of the same things" 
(Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says (De Amicitia) that friends "like and dislike the 
same things" (Sallust, Catilin.)84 
On this view, attaining inner peace requires not only getting what you desire, or 
being in concord with others, but also possessing an integrated mind. And given this 
focus on the mind, it will prove prudent to turn to Aquinas’s own account of mind, 
an account, as already alluded to, that builds upon Augustine’s own, and an 
account, too, that has proven to be influential within the Christian tradition.85 
According to Aquinas, the mind consists of an intellect (the power of apprehension) 
and will (the power of intellectual appetition).86 The will, however, is not neutral,87 
but is rather an appetite or inclination for goodness in general (where goodness is 
used in an attributive rather than referential sense). However, although the will is 
                                                          
83 ST II-II Q 29 A 1. 
84 ST II-II Q 29 A 3. 
85 I will be primarily approaching Aquinas account of the mind through the work of Stump. There is 
some debate as to whether Stump’s account is an accurate representation of Aquinas’s position 
(Stump thinks, for instance, that Aquinas is a libertarian about free will). Regardless of whether her 
interpretation is historically faithful, I take the position she sets out to be both compelling and 
instructive. 
86 For Aquinas on the will see ST I Q 82 A 4. 
87 By neutral I mean acting in some capacity as an independent arbitrator, with only the capacity to 
toggle between “accept”, “reject” and “off” (Stump, 2002: 280). Neutrality implies that the strength 
of desires and volitions must come from somewhere other than the will. A non-neutral will, on the 
other hand, is capable of willing one course of action more strongly than another course. 
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capable of being disposed88 to certain kinds of goods over other kinds of goods, 
Aquinas states that the will cannot determine what is good on its own.89 It is the 
role of the intellect to determine what is good,90 and then present to the will this 
apprehension of what is good under some certain description, at a given time or 
circumstance. Stump writes: 
On Aquinas's account, the will wills only what the intellect presents at that 
time as good under some description. Acts of will, then, are for something 
apprehended or cognized as good at a particular time in particular 
circumstances, as distinct from something which is good considered 
                                                          
88 Stump writes,  
 
If we remember this part of Aquinas's account and take seriously his identification of the 
will as a hunger or appetite, we will be less likely to identify the will on his account as 
nothing more than a toggle switch with three positions: accept, reject, and off. Aquinas's 
account of the will is more complicated than such an identification implies. Because it is an 
appetite, the will can have dispositions, so that it can be readily inclined to want something; 
it can will something with more or less strength.” (Stump, 2002: 280) 
 
So, for instance, presented with the choice of paying to enter an art gallery or giving money to a 
homeless family (two good things), the will might be disposed to enter the art gallery rather than 
give money to the homeless family. Because the will is a disposition and not a toggle switch, it can 
will one thing more strongly than another thing, therefore allowing for ineffective (mere desires) 
and effective desires (volitions). Furthermore, the intellect can present various actions as being 
comparatively more good or less good than other actions. The intellect need not have a rational 
reason for its presentation of the relative goodness of certain actions. Stump suggests that the 
intellect is merely a computational process. She states,  
 
By ‘an agent’s intellect’ I just mean the computing faculty of an agent. So understood, an 
agent’s intellect may formulate a reason for an action in a manner that is hasty, 
thoughtless, ill-informed, invalid, or in any other way irrational. (Stump, 1988: 399) 
89 Stump states that ‘By itself, the will makes no determinations of goodness; apprehending or 
judging things as good is the business of the intellect.’ (Stump, 2002: 276) It should be noted that 
this ‘apprehension’ need not capture in propositions the fundamental essence of goodness (if God is 
both good and propositionally ineffable, what goodness refers to, just like what God refers to, must 
be in some important sense also propositionally ineffable). 
90 Stump suggests that this can be done either consciously or subconsciously. She writes,  
 
It is important to understand that an agent’s reason for an action may also be only implicit 
and not an explicit or conscious feature of his thought….On this view, then, it is possible 
that an agent’s intellect have gone through some process which contributes to a certain 
action on the agent’s part, without the agent’s being aware of that process as it is 
occurring….So to hold, as Aquinas does, that an agent wills to do some action p only if his 
intellect represents p as the good to be pursued does not entail that an agent does an 
action willingly only in case he first engages in a conscious process of reasoning about the 
action. Aquinas’s view requires only that some chain of reasoning (even if invalid and 
irrational reasoning) representing p as the good to be pursued would figure in the agent’s 
own explanation of his action. (Stump, 1988: 400) 
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unconditionally or abstractly. Besides happiness and the vision of God, all 
other things are such that they can in principle be considered good under 
some descriptions and not good under others, so that there is nothing about 
them which must constrain the will of any agent always to want them. So, 
for example, the further acquisition of money can be considered good under 
some descriptions in some circumstances—e.g., the means of sending the 
children to school—and not good under others—e.g., wages from an 
immoral and disgusting job.” 91  
It is only when the intellect has presented to the will some course of action as being 
good that the will will be inclined to act in that way at that time.92 
With this in view, an act of will is only ever an efficient cause to some state of 
affairs.93 The final cause of a state of affairs is always the intellect. In other words, 
every act of will is necessarily preceded by a (voluntary or involuntary) act of 
                                                          
91 Stump, 2002: 280. 
92 Thus, the intellect can act as a final cause on the will. The intellect can move the will to will 
something (rather than not willing that thing), and it can also move the will to select one thing over 
another thing (where both are considered good). 
93 In fact, the intellect determining the goodness of some action is only the first of five sets of 
interactions between intellect and will that lead to an action, however once the goodness of the 
action is determined, the next four interactions follow. In the interest of completeness, however, 
Stump summarizes the interactions between intellect and will in the following order: 
 
In general, then, Aquinas sees the hierarchically ordered interaction between will and 
intellect involved in producing a voluntary human action in this way: 
I1 The intellect’s determination that a particular end, under a certain description, is good 
now in these circumstances. 
W1 A simple volition for that end. 
I2 The intellect’s determination that that end can be achieved by the willer, that the 
achievement of the end through some means is now and in these circumstances in the 
power of the willer. 
W2 Intention: an act of will to try to achieve the end through some means.  
I3 Counsel: the intellect’s determination of the means suitable to achieve the end wanted. 
[If there is only one such means, then W3 collapses into W4, and I4 is omitted.] 
W3 Consent: an act of will accepting the means the intellect proposes. 
I4 The intellect’s determination that this means is the best at this time in these 
circumstances. 
W4 Electio: an act of will selecting the means the intellect proposes as best. 
I5 Command: the intellect’s imperative, “Do this!” 
W5 Use: an act of will to exercise control over one of the things subject to the will, for 
example, a part of the body, the intellect, or the will itself.” (Stump, 2003: 290).  
 
 It is worth noting that this process is often entirely tacitly processed, and only discernible upon 
introspection. 
48 
 
intellect. However, although the intellect alone presents to the will what is good, 
the intellect can be moved to do this in several ways. Firstly, the intellect can reflect 
on some knowledge it has of what is good.94 Secondly, the intellect can reflect on 
some revelation that it has received to determine what is good. Thirdly, the 
passions (what Aquinas describes as the ‘sensitive appetite’) can present the 
intellect some action to be considered, which the intellect can choose to affirm as 
good (and pass on to the will), or can choose to reject. Fourthly, reflection on the 
‘natural appetites’ (as Aquinas describes them) can inform the intellect of what is 
good.95 Finally, the will itself can direct the intellect to reflect on certain things and 
ignore other things.96 
This last ability of the will is very important.97 By this ability, the will can turn itself 
off to certain desires or strengthen others. If the will directs the intellect’s attention 
                                                          
94 Aquinas describes this natural knowledge as the ‘sensitive appetite’ and the reflection on the 
sensitive appetite the ‘rational appetite.’ 
95 Stump defines natural and sensory appetites in the following way:  
 
Because all things are created by a good God who wills what is good for his creatures, all 
things are created with an inclination of their own to the good, but of very different sorts. 
Some, like plants or even inanimate things, have a built-in inclination to the good apart 
from any cognition of the good. Aquinas sometimes calls this inclination a natural appetite. 
(The sort of thing he has in mind is exemplified by plants naturally turning toward sunlight.) 
Higher up the ladder of being are animals of certain sorts which are naturally inclined to the 
good but with some (sensory) cognition. They can cognize particular goods, although they 
lack the ability to reflect on them or to think of them as good. Inclination dependent on 
limited cognition of this sort Aquinas calls 'sensory appetite'. Higher still are human beings 
whose inclination to the good is dependent on intellect, which allows them not only to 
cognize particular goods but to think about them reflectively as good. This inclination is 
rational appetite, and it is what Aquinas takes the will to be. So close is the association 
between intellect and will for Aquinas that he often speaks of the will as being in the 
intellect, and he thinks that anything which has intellect must also have will.” (Stump, 2002: 
278) 
96 This is possible when the will is disposed to certain kinds of goods over other kinds of goods, and it 
is presented with multiple goods by the intellect. Aquinas describes this function as the will’s 
“efficient causality” of the intellect and explains that the will is a “moved mover”. (Stump, 2002: 
277) 
97 Stump writes,  
 
Most important for our purposes, the will exercises some degree of efficient causality over 
the intellect. In some circumstances, it can command the intellect directly to adopt or to 
reject a particular belief. It can also move the intellect by directing it to attend to some 
things and to neglect others, or even to stop thinking about something altogether. So, for 
example, -while you are reading a magazine, you come across an advertisement asking for 
money for children, with an emotionally powerful picture of a starving child. Your intellect 
recognizes that if you look at the ad for very long, you are likely to succumb to its emotional 
force. Intellect sees the goodness of contributing to the charity, but it also recognizes that if 
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away from one good to another, or directs it to reconsider whether the good is in 
fact good, or directs the intellect to stop considering the matter at hand, then the 
intellect will not present that action to the will as being good, and therefore the will 
will not will it. However, as Stump makes clear, this is only a limited ability on behalf 
of the will. Whilst all acts of will require an act of intellect, not all acts of intellect 
require an act of will, and some outside stimuli might compel the intellect to 
continue to present to the will that action as being good, even if the will tries to will 
the intellect not to do so.98 
According to Aquinas’s account, if the intellect presents to the will some action as 
being good (under some description, at that time), then the will will be inclined to 
will that action.99 Human experience, however, suggests that the intellect is often 
double-minded.100 Because the intellect presents the will something as good at that 
time, under some description, it could well be the case that under some other 
description that same action is also not good, and therefore that an opposing action 
                                                          
you give money to this charity, you won't have it for the new computer you have been 
coveting. Your desire for the new computer is strong and influences intellect to rank saving 
money for the computer as best for you now. In consequence of the finding on intellect's 
part, and with this influence from the passions, will directs intellect to stop thinking about 
the charity, and (after a further interaction of intellect and will) you turn the page of your 
magazine. (Stump, 2002: 277) 
98 Stump writes,  
 
This is only a limited ability on the part of the will, however, since the apprehensions of the 
intellect can occur without any preceding act of will and so in some cases may force the 
issue back on the agent's attention. That is why, for example, the prisoner who wants not 
to think about what is happening next door where other prisoners are being tortured will 
find that their screams make him recur to what he wants to stop thinking about.” (Stump, 
2002: 278) 
99 This will may present itself as either a mere desire or a volition (an effective desire). The fact that 
one may have conflicting desires will be addressed fully in chapter two. 
100 Stump affirms this intuition writing,  
 
Cases of incontinence illustrate the further complicating fact that intellect need not present 
one simple, unified result to will. Sometimes an agent is entirely of one mind about 
something, and what intellect presents to will is one unified message that a particular thing 
is good. But what is no doubt also often the case is that an agent's intellect is not entirely 
unified. The doctor has recommended x-raying the agent's head to check for a sinus 
infection. On the one hand, the agent's intellect may recognize, the doctor is an expert in 
her field, and her advice for that reason should be followed. On the other hand, the 
intellect may be aware that even lowlevel x-rays are carcinogenic, and the intellect may 
wonder whether the doctor's ordering the x-ray reflects her concern to avoid malpractice 
lawsuits rather than her own view about what is necessary for the health of her patient.” 
(Stump, 2002: 281) 
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is, under some other description, also presented to the will as being good.101 For 
instance, imagine Jim, an obese man on a doctor imposed diet. If Jim were to walk 
past a bakery, he might see a cake he wants to eat, and his intellect might present 
to his will the goodness of eating the cake under the description of ‘being delicious’ 
or ‘satisfying hunger’; however, his intellect, recollecting his doctor’s instruction, 
might also present to his will the goodness of refraining from eating the cake, under 
the description of ‘being healthy’. 
According to Aquinas, this double-mindedness has several causes. Firstly, the 
intellect could simply have made a mistake in its deliberations. Secondly, either the 
natural knowledge it has may have been wrong, or the revelation of the good it had 
received have been deceitful or misunderstood, or the passions may have caused 
some irrational desire to be presented, or the will may have prevented the intellect 
from fully reflecting on the matter.102 Alternatively, it really could be the case that 
both conflicting courses of action are good, such that the will must incline itself 
more toward that which it deems the greater good.103 
                                                          
101 One assumes that ethical thought experiments often fall into this category, where both courses 
of action seem good and bad dependent on their corresponding description. For instance, it is 
presumably good under one description to push an obese man under a moving trolley to save the 
lives of five people who would otherwise be killed by the trolley. However, under another 
description, it would be good not to push the obese man under the trolley. 
102 Stump writes concerning the passions,  
 
Furthermore, the influence of the passions may also complicate the case. It might be that a 
patient's intellect supposes some medical tests are in fact medically required, but his 
passions might recoil strongly from the tests. In that case, his aversion may influence the 
intellect to give a divided verdict: on the one hand, it would be good to undergo the tests, 
because they are important for health; on the other hand, it would be bad to undergo the 
tests because they are painful or disgusting. In such cases, there may be considerable 
interaction among intellect, will, and passions, until, in consequence of such iterated 
interaction, one side or another of the divided intellect becomes strong enough to override 
the other. This is a process familiar enough to anyone who has had to talk himself into 
doing something he originally feared or disliked. (Stump, 2002: 282) 
103 Stump writes,  
 
For this reason, too, although Aquinas's account of the will assigns a large role to intellect, 
he isn't committed to seeing immoral actions simply as instances of mistakes in 
deliberation, since intellect's deliberations are in many cases dependent on the will's 
influence. In cases of incontinence, where the intellect seems to be representing something 
as good which the will isn't willing, Aquinas would say that the intellect, influenced by the 
will, is in fact being moved by opposed desires to represent the thing in question as both 
good (under one description) and not good (under a different description), so that the 
intellect is double-minded). (Stump, 2002: 281) 
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Obviously, where the intellect is double-minded, the will cannot effectively will both 
of the conflicting ‘good’ actions same time. As a result, a distinction is required 
between a mere inclination and an effective inclination in the will. In her 
representation of Aquinas’s account of the will, Stump describes the will’s mere 
inclination toward some good as a ‘desire’. However, it is quite clear that just 
because someone desires to do something, this does not mean that desire will 
actually be acted upon. One might desire to stop smoking and also desire to smoke 
at the same time. Clearly, only one of these desires can be effective at a given time. 
Stump labelled an effective desire, that is, a desire which is actually acted upon, a 
‘volition.’ If one actually smokes, even if one really did have a concurrent desire to 
stop smoking, one actually has a volition to smoke. One’s intellect can theoretically 
present to the will the goodness of a limitless array of conflicting actions concerning 
a certain situation, but despite the fact that each of these would form a desire of 
some strength in the will, on any given decision, a person can only have a maximum 
of one volition.104 
A desire becomes a volition when that desire is sufficiently stronger than any other 
conflicting desire, such that the will is sufficiently inclined to act on that desire, 
moving ‘the agent all the way to action’.105 The strength of the desire is a product of 
the comparative goodness the intellect places on an action, and the inclination of 
the will toward the description of the goodness of that kind of action. Therefore, a 
desire can be strengthened or weakened by altering the disposition of the will, or 
by causing the intellect to reassess the ‘goodness’ of a certain position (or ignoring / 
reassessing the badness of another position).106 
Although in recent years Frankfurt has reintroduced the idea of a hierarchy in the 
will, Aquinas articulated the idea well before him.107 Because the will has the 
                                                          
104 One may also fail to decide between desires. In such a case, one is indecisive and will have no 
volition. 
105 Stump, 1988: 401. 
106 Stump suggests than on Aquinas’s account, the intellect can ‘rank’ certain options such that the 
will is more inclined to the higher ranked ones. She writes, “If there is more than one means that the 
will consents to, then the intellect ranks the alternatives and calculates which of these means would 
be best now in these circumstances.” (Stump, 2003: 288) 
107 The principal difference between Frankfurt’s account and Aquinas’s account is Aquinas’s stress on 
the role of intellect in the process of willing. (Stump, 1988: 400) 
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capacity to move the intellect, which can in turn move the will, Aquinas proposed 
the existence of different orders of the will (wanting something, wanting to want 
something, and wanting to want to want something).108  
First-order desires (or volitions) occur when the intellect presents some good to the 
will, which the will desires (or effectively desires). A first-order desire is the desire 
to do some action. A first-order volition (of which there can be a maximum of one 
for any decision) is an effective desire to do some action. 
So, a first-order volition looks like this: 
{some stimuli} -> Intellect -> Will -> Action 
Second-order desires (or volitions) occur when the intellect presents to the will 
some previously established first-order desire as good.109 The will responds to this 
presentation by desiring (or effectively desiring) to move the intellect to ‘upgrade’ 
its estimation of the goodness of this first-order desire, or downgrade or ignore 
conflicting first-order desires, and present this reassessed good to the will to act 
upon.110 A second-order desire is the desire to (somehow) strengthen a first-order 
desire. A second-order volition is an effective desire to strengthen a first-order 
                                                          
108 Stump writes,  
 
In fact, Aquinas confronts a problem that has troubled some contemporary hierarchical 
accounts of the will, namely, that there may be an infinite regress of higher-order willings. I 
can will that I will something, and I can also will that I will that I will something, and so on, 
apparently ad infinitum. But in such an apparently infinite series, the will is not actually 
taking ever-higher orders of volition as its object. At some point, Aquinas thinks, the 
apparently higher-order volitions collapse, and the object of the will is just whatever action 
was at issue at the beginning of the series of volitions. (Stump, 2002: 280) 
109 Stump writes,  
 
An agent has a second-order volition V2 to bring about some first-order volition V1 in 
himself only if the agent’s intellect at the time of the willing represents V1, under some 
description, as the good to be pursued. A second-order volition, then, is a volition formed 
as a result of some reasoning (even when the reasoning is neither rational nor conscious) 
about one’s first-order desires. (Stump, 1988: 400) 
110 Stump writes,  
 
An agent forms a second-order desire by reasoning (rationally or otherwise, consciously or 
not) about his first-order desires; and a second-order desire is a direct result of an agent’s 
intellect representing a certain first-order desire as the good to be pursued. Given this 
connection between intellect and second-order desires, an agent cannot be a passive 
bystander to his second-order volitions. To be a second-order volition, a volition must be 
the result of reasoning on the agent’s part. (Stump, 1988: 403) 
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desire.111 Like first-order volitions, there can only be one second-order volition for a 
given decision. A second-order volition does not necessarily entail a first-order 
volition, it merely entails the strengthening of a first-order desire (which may lead 
to a first-order volition). 
So, a second-order volition looks like this: 
{some stimuli} -> Intellect -> Will -> Intellect -> Will -> Action (or mere 
strengthened desire) 
Third-order desires (or volitions) only occur when one has conflicting second-order 
desires, and involve the intellect presenting some second-order desire as good to 
the will, which in turn moves the intellect to reassess or ignore previously 
considered goods.112 This third-order volition will either produce a strengthened 
second-order desire, or a second-order volition (by sufficiently strengthening a 
second-order desire, or by removing some conflicting second-order desire). If the 
third-order volition produces a second-order volition, this new presentation of the 
                                                          
111 Stump writes that “second-order desires represent an agent’s reasoning since they stem from the 
reflection of an agent’s intellect on her state of will. Therefore, an agent is to be identified with her 
second-order desires as much as with her reasoning; her second-order desires represent what her 
intellect assents to (and so what she assents to) among her first-order desires Consequently…it is 
correct…to hold that second-order desires represent what an agent really wants. [this is because] 
the second-order volition stems from [the] reasoning faculty and, in virtue of that connection, 
indicates what [that person] really wants.” (Stump, 1988: 411) 
112 Stump writes,  
 
in forming a third-order volition, the agent is not reiterating the process gone through to 
formulate a second-order volition...forming a third-order volition consists in reasoning 
about and either accepting or rejecting a second-order volition. So an agent has a third-
order volition V3 to bring about some second-order volition V2 in himself only if his intellect 
at the time of the willing represents V2 , under some description, as the good to be 
pursued. But since V2 is a desire for a first-order volition V1 generated by a reason’s 
representing V1 (at that time) as the good to be pursued, V3 will consist just in reaffirming 
the original reasoning about V1 which led to V2. In forming a third-order volition and 
considering whether he wants to have the relevant second-order volition, the agent will 
consider whether a desire for a desire for some action p (or state of affairs q) is the good to 
be pursued. But a desire for a desire for for p (or q) will be a good to be pursued just in case 
the desire for p (or q) is a good to be pursued, and that in turn will depend on whether the 
agent considers p (or q), under some description, at that time, a good to be pursued. So a 
third-order volition that supports a currently held second-order volition is in effect just the 
expression of a reevaluating and affirming of the reasoning that originally led to V1. And, in 
the same way, a third-order volition that rejects a currently held second-order volition will 
just be an expression of the reevaluation and rejection of the reasoning that led to the 
second-order volition. A third-order volition, then, is a result of a recalculation of the 
reasoning that originally underlay a second-order volition. (Stump, 1988: 405) 
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goodness of a first-order desire moves the will to reassess or ignore previously 
considered goods, which leads either to the strengthening of a first-order desire, or 
a first-order volition. A third-order desire is a desire to strengthen a second-order 
desire whilst a third-order volition is an effective desire to strengthen a second-
order desire. This does not necessarily entail the forming of a second-order volition, 
it merely entails the strengthening of a second-order desire (which may lead to a 
second-order volition). Third-order desires typically are the product of some new 
revelation or some deep reflection about conflicting second-order desires, and are 
in this way distinguished from mere second-order desires. 
So, a third-order volition looks like this:  
{some stimuli} -> Intellect -> Will -> Intellect -> Will -> Intellect -> Will -> 
Action 
Could there be further orders of volition? Well, there appears to be a qualitative 
difference between a first and second-order volition (or desire), and a qualitative 
difference between a second and third-order volition (or desire),113 however there 
is only a quantitative difference between a third-order and a (hypothetical) fourth-
order volition (or desire).114 As a result, Aquinas can avoid the possibility of an 
                                                          
113 As I shall suggest, first-order volitions ground moral responsibility, second-order volitions ground 
freedom of the will, and third-order volitions are necessary to ground what Stump describes as 
‘strenuous freedom of the will’. Stump writes,  
 
I do not mean to suggest that third-order volitions must always collapse into second-order 
volitions. It is possible for an agent to have third-order desires that are not only distinct 
from, but even discordant with, his second-order desires. This is so because volitions and 
desires, like emotions, are not always immediately responsive to reasoning. Even after we 
are quite sure that a danger is entirely past, we may nonetheless continue to feel some 
fear; and for a while, until the emotion subsides, we may need to remind ourselves 
recurrently that there is no cause for fear. Similarly, a second-order desire may take time to 
fade even when the agent has repudiated the reasoning that generated it. (Stump, 1988: 
405)  
 
On this account, we identify with our second-order volitions, however we may identify with things 
we do not agree with, or know to be false. A person who has just found out the religion he has 
followed since childhood is false, it is unlikely he will be able to give up all his second-order desires 
that relate to his previous religious practice immediately. Such giving up might take time. During this 
time, a person’s second-order desires might be in conflict with his recently acquired third-order 
desires. 
114 Third-order volitions and (hypothetical) fourth-order volitions would both contribute to 
grounding strenuous freedom of the will. 
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infinite regress in the will, as the reasoning behind fourth and higher order volitions 
collapse into second or third-order desires and volitions.115 
One useful consequence of this hierarchy of the will is its ability to separate 
freedom of the will from moral responsibility. On Aquinas’s account, one is morally 
responsible for one’s actions if and only if there is no internal coercion between 
intellect and one’s first-order volitions. 
On this account, even if one’s second-order volitions conflict with one’s first-order 
volitions, one remains morally responsible for one’s actions. For example, imagine a 
man, Sam, who is normally very peaceful and has a second-order volition to reject 
violence. Imagine if Sam comes home and finds his wife is cheating on him. In the 
heat of the moment, Sam’s passions take over and his intellect presents as good to 
the will some violent action toward the lover. This passion is so strong that Sam 
forms a first-order volition to attack his wife’s lover. In such a situation, he may still 
have a second-order volition to reject violence, and yet form a first-order volition to 
accept violence. It ought to be clear, however, that even if Sam has some excuse for 
his action, he nevertheless remains morally responsible for it.116 
Alternatively, freedom of the will emerges from a specific series of interactions 
between the intellect and will. For Aquinas, a person only acts with freedom of the 
                                                          
115 Stump writes,  
 
apart from [cases where a second-order desire lingers after the reasoning behind it has 
been repudiated], a third-order (or any higher order) desire or volition will collapse into a 
second-order desire or volition…any attempt, then, to describe his state in terms of a 
fourth-order (or even higher-order) volition will collapse into the formulation of a second-
order volition. So, on the revised Frankfurt account, the number of levels of higher-order 
desires is not infinite but is rather limited to two or three. (Stump, 1988: 406)  
116 Stump uses the example of a man beating his wife. She writes,  
 
Consider, for instance, some Christian Patricius who beats his wife Monica. On the revised 
Frankfurt account, we will say that, because Patricius believes it is wrong for him to beat 
Monica, he forms a second-order desire to make the first-order desire not to beat his wife 
his will. But when the fit of wrath is on him, he acts on his first-order desire to beat her. 
When the fit has passed, he laments his action and recognizes that by his own lights he 
should have acted on his general prohibition to himself not to beat her. Patricius does not 
have control of himself; he does not have the strength of will to make his first-order desires 
conform to his second-order desires, and he is not able to make himself have the will he 
wants to have. (Stump, 1988: 412) 
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will if their second-order volitions translate to first-order volitions, and their 
second-order volitions are not externally coerced.117 
This claim needs some qualification, however. Although second-order desires and 
volitions are those things that, all things considered, you choose to identify with 
(and therefore freely acting on what you choose to identify with qualifies as free 
will), what is meant by ‘second-order volition’ in this context must be made very 
clear.118 The will is, after all, only ever an efficient cause, rather than a final cause, 
of any volition. It is the intellect’s presentation to the will of some good under some 
description that reflects the final cause of some action.119 Thus, it is only when 
second-order volitions are seen as a product of intellect and will that second-
volitions (and desires) can be said to represent what you choose to identify with.120 
                                                          
117 Stump interprets this in the following way,  
 
we should say that an individual has freedom of the will just in case he has second-order 
desires, his first-order volitions are not discordant with his second-order desires, and he has 
the first-order volitions he has because of his second-order volitions. (Stump, 1988: 401) 
118 Stump defends this point by writing,  
 
It will not be quite right to say that an agent is to be identified with his second-order 
volitions. An agent wills what he really wants and is thus free when his first-order volitions 
are not discordant with his second-order desires, not because the agent is simply declared 
to be more truly identified with his second-order than with his first-order desires, but 
rather because the agent’s second-order desires are the expressions of his intellect’s 
reflection on his will, and the agent is to be identified with his intellect….In this sense of 
identification, then, for an agent to identify herself with some part of herself, such as 
certain of her first-order desires, is for her to form a second-order volition that accepts or 
assents to that part of herself. On this sense of identification, it is clear that an agent may 
identify herself with any of her first-order desires, no matter how savage or irrational they 
may in fact be; and what an agent identifies herself with is clearly up to her and depends on 
her reason and will. But it is important to see that…this conclusion in no way undermines 
the hierarchical account of the self. (Stump, 1988: 407) 
119 Stump writes,  
 
An agent wills what he really wants and is thus free when his first-order volitions are not 
discordant with his second-order desires, not because the agent is simply declared to be 
more truly identified with his second-order than with his first-order desires, but rather 
because the agent's second-order desires are the expressions of his intellect's reflection on 
his will, and the agent is to be identified with his intellect.” (Stump, 1988: 408) 
120 Stump continues,  
 
second-order desires represent an agent’s reasoning since they stem from the reflection of 
an agent's intellect on her state of will. Therefore, an agent is to be identified with her 
second-order desires as much as with her reasoning; her second-order desires represent 
what her intellect assents to (and so what she assents to) among her first-order desires. 
(Stump, 1988: 411) 
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Second-order desires are not just your desires, they are first-order desires your 
intellect has reflected on and has presented to your will as good to desire. They are 
desires you desire to desire in virtue of some affirming position your intellect takes 
up with respect to them.  
There are two consequences to this account of free will. Firstly, it is possible that 
one can be morally responsible for one’s actions and yet not act with freedom of 
the will. In certain cases, for instance, acts of passion or of nature, one might not 
have time to reflect upon whether you desire to desire a certain course of action. 
Secondly, it is possible for one not to produce any second-order volitions at all. If 
you are so internally fragmented and your second-order desires are so conflicted, 
you may be incapable of producing second-order volitions. Frankfurt described such 
an individual as a ‘wanton’. I’m not certain whether Stump would agree with this 
description, but she would certainly agree that a person incapable of second-order 
volitions was also incapable of acting with freedom of the will.121 
Finally, Stump draws a distinction between ordinary freedom of the will (which 
occurs when any second-order volition translates to a first-order volition) and what 
she describes as ‘strenuous freedom of the will’.122 According to Stump, one acts 
with strenuous freedom of will if one has a wholehearted second-order volition. In 
other words, one has a second-order volition that has no conflicting second-order 
desires. 
If second-order desires are those desires you identify with in intellect and will, and 
you have conflicting second-order desires, then it is the case that a part of you 
desires a certain action, and a part of you desires some conflicting action. If you are 
in such a situation, Stump suggests, you are internally fragmented and unable to 
wholeheartedly desire either action. No matter how weak the conflicting desire, or 
                                                          
121 Stump writes, ‘If [a person] were incapable of emotion, or if she were to become apathetic 
through depression, it would still be possible to consider [her] a person.’ (Stump, 1988: 410) 
122 Stump, 2010: 131. 
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how strong the volition is, if there are conflicting second-order desires also present, 
one cannot act with strenuous freedom of the will.123 
In most circumstances, there is no practical difference between acting with ordinary 
freedom of the will and acting with strenuous freedom of the will. However, as I 
shall suggest, not only is perfect peace only possible in the case of strenuous 
freedom of the will, so too is union with God only possible if willed strenuously. 
So, in summing up, the Thomist theory of mind can be explained in the following 
way. A person’s mind is composed of a will and an intellect. The will is an appetite 
or inclination for (attributive) goodness in general; however, the will cannot 
apprehend what is good on its own. Apprehending something as being 
(referentially) ‘good for x’ is the responsibility of the intellect. Every act of will is, 
therefore, necessarily preceded by an act of intellect, such that the will (the ‘moved 
mover’) is always an efficient cause and the intellect is always the final cause. 
Because it is also possible for the will to move the intellect (so long as there is a 
preceding act of intellect), this Thomist account of the mind fits well with Harry 
Frankfurt’s account of the hierarchy of the will, such that there are first-order 
intellect-will moves, second-order intellect-will-intellect-will moves and (quite 
rarely) third-order intellect-will-intellect-will-intellect-will moves. 
The intellect is capable of, and in fact does, apprehend numerous actions as being 
‘good for x’ at any given time. The will, naturally, will incline itself toward anything 
apprehended by the intellect as being ‘good for x’. However, the will is not a digital 
on / off switch. As an appetite, the will can incline itself further towards those 
desires to which it is most disposed, and to act on the desire it is most disposed 
toward to form an effective desire (i.e., a volition). A first-order volition produces 
action, a second-order volition strengthens or weakens the first-order act of 
intellect, and a third-order volition strengthens or weakens a second-order act of 
intellect.  
                                                          
123 If one has conflicting second-order desires, and one desires to have strenuous freedom of the 
will, then one must form a third-order volition that somehow removes a conflicting second-order 
desire. 
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On this account, first-order desires are always apprehended by the intellect (a first-
order act of intellect), but they can be involuntarily prompted by a whole series of 
causes external to either the intellect’s reflection on some knowledge or a second-
order act of will. For instance, the intellect’s involuntary apprehension of the 
sensitive appetites (for Aquinas, passions) or the natural appetites can also prompt 
a first-order desire in the will. Second-order desires, however, cannot be 
involuntarily apprehended, for they represent an act of reason concerning first-
order desires (namely, a second-order act of intellect). As a result, these second-
order desires represent the desires with which a person would choose to identify.  
Given this account of the mind, for a person to will strenuously (i.e., 
wholeheartedly), they must be psychologically integrated, and for that, two 
conditions must obtain: 
1. all their second-order desires must be internally integrated around the 
good, and 
2. all their first- and second-order volitions must align. 
Regarding the first condition, as the will is an inclination for the good in general, 
these second-order desires cannot be integrated around evil,124 but can only ever 
be integrated around the good. Furthermore, because (so says Aquinas) goodness 
and being are convertible, and because God is the greatest being, and because the 
greatest goods for humans involve relationships, union with God is the greatest 
good for a person. Given the evident possibility that two good desires might conflict 
without some unifying reason for decisively choosing between them, and given that 
unifying reasons are themselves capable of being more or less good than other 
unifying reasons (and thereby that unifying reasons are also liable to 
fragmentation), a person’s mind can only ever be unchangeably integrated around 
a desire for their greatest good, that is, their union with God.125 Furthermore, on 
                                                          
124 According to Frankfurt, the will is capable of integrating around evil; however, Frankfurt does not 
employ the same intellect / will distinction Stump uses, and so on Frankfurt’s account, the will is 
more than just an inclination for the good for it is also responsible for apprehending the content of 
its desires. See Stump (2010: 138) for further discussion. 
125 For instance, a person could become internally fragmented over the ‘desire to go to Africa to save 
orphans’, or ‘the desire to go Asia to save orphans’, given neither one is obviously better than the 
other. In his commentary on Buridan’s ass F.T.C. Moore (1990), suggested that so long as there is a 
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Aquinas’s account, desire for union with another is an integral element of love 
(along with the desire for their good). Therefore, the desire for one’s greatest good 
(viz., union with God) is always commensurate with a desire for loving God. Finally, 
given that God desires to unite with all people, desiring God’s good also entails 
desiring that other people, (i.e., your neighbours), come to union with God. Given 
that this desire that your neighbours come into union with God is akin to the desire 
that your neighbours attain their greatest good, and given that such a desire entails 
love for your neighbour, a desire for union with God encapsulates love for your 
neighbour. 
With regard to the second condition, freedom of the will is only possible when first- 
and second-order volitions agree (and strenuous freedom of the will when a first- 
and an psychologically integrated (i.e., ‘wholehearted’) second-order desire agree); 
however, so long as your first-order intellect, first-order will and the connection 
between the two are not internally manipulated by a third party, you remain 
morally responsible, and therefore prima facie blameworthy or praiseworthy for all 
first-order volitions.126 If you have an unconflicted second-order volition for union 
with God,127 but do not act on it, how can you be united with God? On this account, 
you cannot, and you are indeed blameworthy for this state of affairs. 
 
Love and Real Union 
So, joy emerges when one gets what one (appropriately) desires and peace 
emerges when one gets what one (appropriately) desires, and one is wholehearted 
                                                          
unifying reason for action, two conflicting desires can be conflated into one desire, namely, a ‘desire 
to go to Africa or Asia to save orphans’, as this singular desire can satisfy the unifying desire. 
However, any unifying reason for action that is less good than another reason for action will always 
remain liable to internal fragmentation. As a result, to remain internally integrated, a person 
requires a unifying reason for action that is also their greatest good. 
126 Importantly, given that first-order desires can be involuntary, a person cannot be morally 
responsible for having conflicting first-order desires. A person is, however, morally responsible for 
their action if one of these first-order desires becomes a first-order volition. 
127 Stump describes such an unconflicted second-order desire as a ‘wholehearted’ desire and 
explains to act on such would be to act with ‘strenuous freedom of the will’ (Stump, 2010: 131). 
Second-order volitions can only ever strengthen or weaken a first-order desire. As a result, they do 
not necessarily result in first-order volitions (as a first-order might still prove stronger, or the will 
might just be more inclined to another first-order desire). 
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in this desire. In both cases, the appropriate object of desire is the desire for union 
with God, and it is to this desire, one of what Aquinas’s describes as the twin 
desires of love, that this thesis will now turn. To be clear, whilst there are, of 
course, many alternative accounts of love available, not only is Aquinas’s account 
one of the most influential in the (western) Christian tradition, I also, as with his 
theory of mind, happen to find it deeply plausible. 
On the Thomist account, love has what Stump calls different ‘offices’.128 The love I 
might have for my wife is necessarily different from the love I might have for family, 
or friends, or humanity in general. What is appropriate in one office of love may be 
entirely inappropriate in another. Furthermore, as an ‘office’ is merely the function 
of the extrinsic relational characteristics of the lover and the beloved, so long as the 
different offices are clearly labelled, love has a place in all personal and group 
relationships.  
Furthermore, love (in whatever office it is found) just is the function of two desires: 
the desire for the good of the beloved and the desire for union with the beloved.129 
If Peter desires the good for Jack, and Peter desires union of some sort with Jack, 
then, Peter loves Jack. But note here that what can be shared within an office of 
love is contingent on the intrinsic features of the beloved – the reason Peter loves 
Jack is not because Peter shares that office of love with Jack. And so, both what is in 
fact good for the beloved, and the nature and extent of the union possible with the 
beloved might change with time, even if the office of love does not. 
On this Thomist account, the relationship shared between a person and God falls 
under one such office of love. When this office of love is fulfilled, God and his 
beloved desire the good for each other and they desire union with each other. The 
fulfilment of this love in union, purportedly completed at the beatific vision, also 
happens to be the very best thing for a person.130 
As mentioned previously, desiring the (all things considered) good for the beloved is 
straightforward to understand. If union with God is the greatest good for a person, 
                                                          
128 Stump, 2010: 98. 
129 ST II-I Q 28 A 1. 
130 ST I-II Q 3 A 8. 
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desiring that which will lead to their union with God just is desiring the good for 
that person. However, understanding the other desire of love, the desire for union 
with the beloved, is by no means as straightforward.  
Concerning such union, recall what Aquinas wrote:  
The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for 
instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. The second is union of 
affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding 
apprehension; since movement of the appetite follows apprehension. Now 
love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of 
these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved 
with the lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as 
belonging to our well-being. In like manner when a man loves another with 
the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: 
wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills 
good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's "other self" 
(Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his 
friend: Thou half of my soul."  
The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves 
man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something 
suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused "formally" by 
love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says 
(De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking to unite two 
together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" 
he refers to the union of affection, without which there is no love: and in 
saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union.131 
The most developed attempt to explore the nature of (Thomist) union can be 
found, again, in the work of Stump. She suggests union is best understood as a 
product of two wills each desiring union with the other, where the desire for union 
is outworked in a desire for personal closeness with the other (a union of minds 
                                                          
131 ST II-I Q 28 A 1. 
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built upon (i) personal need for and ii) personal revelation to the other) and a desire 
for significant personal presence with the other (comprised of (iii) unmediated 
causal and cognitive contact, (iv) some second personal encounter, and (v) joint 
attention).132 If significant personal presence is inhibited (due, for instance, to 
(literal) distance, or due to something inhibiting the possibility of joint attention, for 
instance, psychological or physical pain), only affective union is possible. However, 
if personal presence is not inhibited, then the union between persons can be real. 
And it is this ‘real’ union that is desired when it comes to union with God at the 
beatific vision. 
With respect to possible inhibitors to such union, to the extent that a person is 
(metaphorically) distant from themselves, or from someone else, to the extent that 
they refrain from revealing their mind to the other, or to the extent that their mind 
is conflicted, and so difficult to be close to, to that extent will union between this 
person and the other be limited. Likewise, to the extent that a person refrains from 
second-person encounter or joint attention with the other, to that same extent is 
real union between such persons limited. On this account, then, if Peter’s desire for 
union with Jack is unrequited, there will be no (real) union between Peter and Jack 
(and the same is true for a person and God).133 Likewise, if Peter’s will is conflicted 
about the desire for union with Jack, to the extent that Peter’s will is conflicted, to 
that extent will union with Jack be limited (or indeed, impossible).134 With this in 
                                                          
132 Stump, 2010: 109-128. Concerning the importance of dyadic attention, Stump writes:  
 
In my view, for mentally fully functional adult human beings, full‐fledged dyadic joint 
attention is required for significant, as distinct from minimal, personal presence. If Jerome 
were to say of Paula, “She was distracted all through dinner and was never really present to 
me,” one of the things he would be complaining about would be Paula's failure to share her 
attention with him. Conversely, if Paula was more present to her daughter Julia after she 
had given away her fortune than she was while she was wealthy, then Paula in her poor 
state would be more often or more deeply attentive to Julia, where the attentiveness in 
question requires shared attention of the dyadic sort. Finally, once we see that shared 
attention is required for personal presence, we can see why someone's having direct and 
unmediated cognitive and causal connection with another person is insufficient for her 
being present to him… (117) 
133 On Aquinas’s account, unrequited desire can lead to affective (formal) union, but I take it this is 
not the sort of union sought in Atonement. 
134 Any desire Peter has that conflicts with his desire for union with Jack entails that part of Peter 
does not want to unite with Jack. So long as that desire persists, no matter what else happens, that 
part of Peter cannot be united with Jack. 
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mind, there are precisely four ways a person’s union with another, or with God, can 
be limited or prevented. If: 
1. that person does not desire union with the other, or 
2. that person has a desire that conflicts with the desire for union with the 
other, or 
3. that person is unable to (dyadically or triadically) share attention with 
the other, or 
4. the other person remains hidden (i.e., they refrain from revealing their 
mind to the other), such that another person cannot be (maximally) 
personally close to them. 
It is part of orthodox Christian belief that sinful action necessarily entails either (1), 
(2) or (3) with respect to God,135 and that prior sin can also act as a catalyst for both 
(1), (2) and (3),136 limiting or preventing union with God, even when no sinful action 
is currently being undertaken. It is also part of Christian tradition that, whilst 
(partially) hidden now, at the beatific vision, God will be fully revealed, such that (4) 
no longer obtains with respect to God. 
The first way is fairly easy to understand. If someone does not want union with 
God, they cannot be united to God. Likewise, with the second way, it is fairly easy 
to see how (at least conceptually) psychological fragmentation might lead to an 
ordinary, rather than wholehearted, second-order desire for union with God. The 
third way, however, requires a little more explanation. 
Recall for Stump, shared or joint attention is an integral part of significant personal 
presence. It is therefore, in theory, possible to be wholehearted in your desire for 
union with another (i.e., that it be the case that (1) and (2) do not apply to you) and 
yet still fail to (dyadically) attend to the person you wholeheartedly desire union 
with (for instance, due to psychological or psychical pain, or even due to distance, 
say, being in a different room to them!).  
                                                          
135 See, for instance, 1 John 1:5-6. 
136 See, for instance, Genesis 3:8. 
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So, what exactly is joint attention, and why is it so important? According to Peter 
Hobson, joint attention involves ‘sharing an awareness of the sharing of focus’.137 
This is the sort of phenomena that happens when I know that you know that I know 
that you are looking at me (dyadic attention) or when I know that you know that I 
am focusing on the same object (triadic attention). Adam Green notes that 
Shared attention occurs when one is engaged in an act of attending to 
something and in doing so one is consciously coordinating with another on 
what both will attend to. As such, shared attention involves coordinated 
‘attentionfocusing’. Shared attention can be dyadic or triadic. In dyadic 
shared attention, both participants focus attention on the other, and in 
triadic shared attention, both participants focus on an independent object. 
Take the following three-stage example of a ten-month old and its mother 
interacting. First, the child looks the mother in the eye. Second, the child 
turns and points to a bright object. Third, the child looks back at the mother 
to see that she has followed the direction of the point. If the mother has co-
operated with the gaze-direction of the child, then the child and the mother 
had dyadic shared attention at stage 1, and achieved triadic shared 
attention at stage 2. As Ingar Brinck points out, shared attention is more 
than ‘mutual objectfocusing’ because ‘the subjects will have to attend to 
each other as capable of attending in a goal-intended way, that is, in a way 
that is not controlled by the object of attention’. In the pointing example, 
the awareness of the bright object is evidenced by the point, and the 
mother attends to the bright object because the child manifested a desire 
for both persons to attend to the bright object. If the child tries to check the 
gaze of the mother in stage 3 only to ﬁnd that the mother has silently left 
the room, the child’s experience of attending to the object in stage 2 will 
seem to have been a diﬀerent experience than it initially appeared to be. 
The co-operation of the other in attending is a felt part of the experience 
itself.138 
                                                          
137 Hobson, 2005: 185. 
138 Green, 2009: 460. 
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Although dyadic attention requires two people actively attend to each other, the 
doctrine of divine omnipresence suggests that God is always ready to (dyadically or 
triadically) attend to us. Thus, whether or not we (dyadically or triadically) attend to 
God is squarely up to us. Stump writes again: 
Given divine omnipresence, the only thing that makes a difference to the 
kind of personal presence, significant or minimal, that God has to a human 
person is the condition of the human person herself. If Paula wants Jerome 
to be significantly present to her, she alone will not be able to bring about 
what she wants, because the relationship she wants is up to Jerome as 
much as it is up to her, and, for one reason or another, Jerome may fail to 
meet the conditions requisite for significant personal presence. But, on the 
doctrine of omnipresence, things are different when it comes to God's being 
significantly present to a human person. If Paula wants God to be 
significantly present to her, what is needed to bring about what she wants 
depends only on her, on her being able and willing to share attention with 
God. Because God is omnipresent, then, if Paula is able and willing to share 
attention with God, the presence omnipresent God has to her will be 
significant personal presence. If she is not able and willing, then God will 
have only minimal personal presence with respect to her…139 
However, it is one thing for two material beings to jointly attend to each other. It is 
a lot harder to see how a material being might jointly attend to an immaterial 
being. Nevertheless, Stump writes: 
It is not surprising that Donne (and many others) point to interlocked gaze 
as the prime indicator and vehicle of shared attention in memorable 
romantic encounters. For adults as for infants, mutual gaze is a powerful 
mechanism for producing shared attention. Although vision is the most 
common or the ordinary mode of sharing attention, however, it is obviously 
not the only mode, since congenitally blind children can learn to share 
attention, too. Plainly, for mentally fully functioning adults, as well as for 
                                                          
139 Stump, 2010: 118. 
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infants, shared attention can occur through modes of perception other than 
vision. In appropriate circumstances, any of the other senses can also be 
employed for the sharing of attention. In fact... it is even possible that one 
person be presently aware of another and sharing attention with that other 
without having perception of him. As far as that goes, whatever means God 
uses to achieve shared attention with human beings, on theological views of 
God's presence to human beings, it presumably does not involve mutual 
gaze in any literal sense either. So shared attention does not require mutual 
gaze; but it does require mutual awareness among persons, whether or not 
it is awareness through a particular sensory modality.140 
So, if sin entails (1), (2), and (3), and (1), (2), and (3) inhibit union with God, the 
Christian doctrine of the Atonement must explain how (1), (2), and (3) are dealt 
with such that the person for whom (1), (2) and (3) previously applied can come to 
full and complete union with God at the beatific vision.  
Whatever the explanatory mechanics, something about the Atonement makes it 
possible for a sinful person to both wholeheartedly desire union with God, and to 
engage in dyadic attention with God, and therefore make it possible for that same 
person to enter such union with God.  
 
Freely Willed Union and Grace 
The desire for, and attainment of, union with God is therefore essential to (proper) 
joy, peace, and love, and in as much as this is true, is also essential for maximal 
personal flourishing and thriving.141  
However, it is also part of the Christian tradition that such union is the product of 
two wills willing in unison. If only one will is operative, that is, if God somehow 
forces us to desire union with Him, the sort of personal union wanted between God 
and us cannot obtain. Furthermore, it is part of the Christian tradition that God is 
                                                          
140 Stump, 2010: 118. 
141 Union with God is, after all, on the model provided, the best thing for a person. 
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love, and as love, is always open to union with us, but as love, will not force us 
against our will to desire union with Him. Instead, God can motivate us, or 
encourage us, to desire union with Him. In the Christian tradition, this motivation or 
encouragement comes in the form of the gift first of operative and subsequently, 
cooperative grace. In later chapters I will show how this gift of grace might fit into 
an account of the Atonement, but for now, I will briefly address the nature of such 
grace.  
Given that on the Thomist account of mind we have been discussing, a person’s will 
is already inclined to goodness in general, and, given that most theists (and 
certainly all Thomists) are committed to the belief that God is good, and that union 
with God is the greatest good for a person, it seems that all God needs to do to 
motivate a desire for Him in a person is simply to reveal, partially or fully, His 
goodness to them.142 If a person appropriately attends to God’s revelation of 
goodness, there is reason to think this person would come to desire union with 
God, that is, they will come to have saving faith.143 
This view of the nature of operative grace has an interesting implication for the 
doctrine of the beatific vision. From at least the mid thirteenth century onwards, 
the Western Christian tradition has asserted that at the beatific vision humankind 
will see God in His essence, that is, that he will be fully revealed. As the greatest 
being, and so, the greatest good, His great goodness will be seen fully and 
completely. If operative and cooperative grace typically involves the partial, veiled 
revelation of God’s goodness, which motivates an (initially non-wholehearted) 
                                                          
142 If God is good, and God is fundamentally (propositionally) ineffable, whatever it is that goodness 
refers to must be in some sense fundamentally (propositionally) ineffable, that is, goodness is 
therefore propositionally undefinable, too. See the next section for more on this point. 
143 For an account of saving faith as a second-order desire for union with God, see Efird and Worsley 
2015. Although, of course, such a revelation might come through a divine encounter, or through 
reading divine revelation, such a revelation of divine goodness need not require an instance of 
special divine action. According to the Apostle Paul in Romans 1:19-20, God placed evidence of His 
divine nature, that is to say, His goodness, into His creation at the point of creation, and that this 
revelation can still be seen. He writes, 
 
For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever 
since the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they 
are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made. So they are without 
excuse. 
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desire for union with God, it is very possible that the full revelation of God’s 
goodness will lead to the beholder’s wholehearted desire for union with God 
(thereby seemingly rendering moot the first, second and fourth ways in which 
union with God could be thwarted).144 
 
Divine Ineffability and the Beatific Vision 
But why think we will see God fully and completely? The Eastern Church, which has 
adopted the apophatic belief in divine ineffability, has long rejected this belief, 
opting instead for a vision of God’s energies (i.e., the activity of God), rather than 
God’s essence. According to the doctrine of divine ineffability, God is, broadly 
speaking, beyond description and comprehension. The belief in this doctrine is one 
of the hallmarks of apophatic theology, a system of negative theology endorsed 
during the Synod of Side in 383,145 reaffirmed, at least in the Eastern Church, at the 
Fifth Council of Constantinople between 1341 and 1351 (the ‘Hesychast’ or 
‘Palamite’ councils), and common to most major Church theologians during the 
early years of the Church.146  
                                                          
144 In a paper published in the Journal of Analytic Theology I develop this argument further, 
suggesting that this vision of the divine essence is the basis for heavenly impeccability, and also, 
coupled with the necessity of two-willed union, the reason why God could not reveal Himself fully 
and completely today. See Worsley (2016) for more details. 
145 Commonly referred to as the Messalian (or Euchite) Condemnation (the Messalians thought that 
God could be perceived through the carnal senses, a thought formally rejected at the Synod of Side). 
146 For a fuller defence of this claim, see John Hick, 2000: 36. This view was adopted by Western 
Fathers, including St. Ambrose (c. 340-397), St. Jerome (c. 347-420), Primasius (d. 560) and Isidore of 
Seville (c. 560-636). Amongst the Greek Fathers only Origen (c. 183/4-253/4), St. Gregory Nazianzus 
(329-390), the ascetic mystic Evagrius of Ponticus (c. 345 - 399) and St. Cyril of Alexandria (c. 378-
444) argued that a person could know God as He is at the vision of God. However, after the 
Messalian (or Euchite) condemnation of 383, condemning, amongst other beliefs, the belief that the 
essence (or ousia) of the Trinity could be perceived by the carnal senses, St. John Chrysostom (c. 349 
- 407), St. Basil (c. 330-379), St. Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335-394), Theodoret of Cyrrhus (c. 393-457) and 
many others argued for the unknowable nature of the essence of God. What was eventually settled 
upon, at least in the Eastern Church, was a position initially described by St. Basil and St Gregory of 
Nyssa, before being developed by Pseudo Dionysius the Areopagite in the 5th and 6th centuries and 
further codified by Maximus the Confessor (c. 580 - 662), St. John Damascene (c. 676-749) and St. 
Gregory Palamas (c. 1296-1359); namely, the distinction between God’s supposedly unknowable 
essence (his ousia), and his knowable energies (attributes and actions). Although the Western 
Church took adopting this position to come at the cost of rejecting a robust account of divine 
simplicity, this position, that the essence of God cannot ever be the object knowledge or vision, was 
confirmed at the Fifth Council of Constantinople between 1341 and 1351 (and then again in 1368). 
70 
 
So, for example, one of the most influential apophatic theologians, the fifth century 
Neo-Platonist Pseudo-Dionysius, referred to God (‘the Transcendent One’) in the 
following way: 
It is not soul or mind, nor does it possess imagination, conviction, speech, or 
understanding.... It cannot be spoken of and it cannot be grasped by 
understanding.... It has no power, it is not power, nor is it light. It does not 
live nor is it life. It is not a substance, nor is it eternity or time.... It is neither 
one nor oneness, divinity nor goodness.... It is not sonship or fatherhood 
and it is nothing known to us or to any other being. It falls neither within the 
predicate of nonbeing nor of being.... There is no speaking of it, nor name 
nor knowledge of it.... It is beyond assertion and denial. We make assertions 
and denials of what is next to it, but never of it... for it is ... free of every 
limitation, beyond every limitation: it is also beyond denial.147 
And on the same theme, the fourth-century theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, wrote in 
his Against Eunomius, 
The simplicity of the True Faith assumes God to be that which He is, namely, 
incapable of being grasped by any term, or any idea, or any other device of 
our apprehension, remaining beyond the reach not only of the human but of 
the angelic and all supramundane intelligence, unthinkable, unutterable, 
                                                          
To believe that one could know the essence of God at the beatific vision was, in the East, to hold to 
what had now became known as the Messalianist heresy. 
On this point, St. Damascene would write: 
 
Neither men, nor the celestial powers, nor the cherubim and the seraphim can know God 
other than in his revelations. By nature he is above being and therefore above knowledge. 
We can only designate his nature apophatically, by negations. What we say of God 
affirmatively does not indicate his nature, but his attributes - that which is near to his 
nature. (Lossky, 1971: 112) 
Whilst St. Gregory Palamas wrote: 
 
The divine nature must be called at the same time incommunicable and, in a sense, 
communicable; we attain participation in the nature of God and yet he remains totally 
inaccessible. We must affirm both things at once and must preserve the antimony as the 
criterion of piety…while saying that the divine nature is communicable not in itself but in its 
energies, we remain within the limits of piety.’ (Theophanes, PG. 150, col. 932D & 937D) 
147 Pseudo-Dionysius, 1987: 141. 
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above all expression in words, having but one name that can represent His 
proper nature, the single name being 'Above Every Name'.148 
Drawing upon 1 Timothy 6:16 (‘God dwells in unapproachable light, whom no one 
has ever seen or can see’), St. Didymus the Blind (another fourth century 
theologian) wrote that God’s essence (ousia) is: 
invisible, incomprehensible even in the eyes of the seraphim, not to be 
contained either in a thought or a place, in no way divided in its powers, 
intangible, without dimensions, without depth, without amplitude, without 
form… far surpassing in brilliance the whole light of the heavens, how much 
more sublime than all that is on high, infinitely passing also all spirit by its 
spiritual nature. 
Whilst a further fourth-century theologian, St. Hilary of Poitiers, wrote: 
This a true statement of the mystery of that unfathomable nature which is 
expressed in the Name ‘Father’: God invisible, ineffable, infinite. Let us 
confess our silence that words cannot describe him, let sense admit that it is 
foiled in the attempt to apprehend, and reason in the effort to define.149 
And according to the fifth century liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, God is  
ineffable, inconceivable, invisible, incomprehensible, ever existing and 
eternally the same, thou and thine Only-begotten Son and thy Holy Spirit. 
Moreover, Augustine wrote that ‘God transcends the mind’150 whilst Aquinas noted 
that ‘by its immensity, the divine substance surpasses every form that our intellect 
reaches. Thus, we are unable to apprehend it by knowing what it is’.151 Indeed, it is 
supposed that prior to either writing or preaching, Aquinas would recite a prayer 
that began with the line ‘O creator ineffable…’ And, of course, this brief survey 
barely scratches the surface of the support this position has received.152 
                                                          
148 Gregory of Nyssa, 1957: 99. 
149 St Hillary, De Trin. 2.6. 
150 St Augustine, 1953: 259. 
151 Thomas Aquinas, 1955: 96. 
152 See, for instance, Ayers, 2004 on the place of divine incomprehension in Orthodox tradition. 
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However, despite such protestations, according to the doctrine of the beatific 
vision, a doctrine also accepted by many (but not all) of these same apophatic 
theologians, we will, as already alluded to, one day know God as God knows us.  
Contra to the position taken by the previously quoted Church fathers, Eunomius of 
Cyzicus, writing in the fourth century, argued for the full comprehensibility of God’s 
essence (ousia) by the human intellect during this vision (although it must be noted 
this was a position he was soon after condemned for holding). According to 
Eunomius, God’s simplicity ruled out partial knowledge of him. Either he can be 
known fully, or not at all. Commenting on Eunomius the sixteenth-century Jesuit 
scholar, Gabriel Vasquez, wrote: 
Eunomius was after all not mad in maintaining that the idea he could have 
of God was equal to the idea and knowledge God has of Himself. The 
equality of knowledge which he upheld as opposed to the Fathers was 
related solely to the object of this knowledge. He meant that the whole 
formal content of the divine nature, since it formed the object of divine 
knowledge, could also be seen by himself, Eunomius. But this must 
necessarily be conceded to the blessed who see God as He is, for all that is 
in God formally is God, being identical with his essence; therefore nothing 
that is in God and forms the object of His knowledge can remain hidden to 
the blessed.153 
Fast-forwarding to a few centuries after the Schism of 1054, talk about the nature 
of the beatific vision (at least in the Western Church) was once again brought into 
sharp focus when, in 1223, Alexander of Hales adopted Peter Lombard’s Sentences 
(written between 1155 and 1158) as the basic textbook for theological teaching at 
the University of Paris.154 For the next three centuries, Lombard’s compilation of 
material from the Church Fathers remained there, and in Oxford, the standard 
theological textbook. And, as Lombard began his Sentences with a discussion of 
                                                          
153 Vasquez, 1621: 195 
154 Alexander was not alone in doing this; the Dominican Richard Fishacre soon did the same at 
Oxford. 
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Augustine’s account of beatific enjoyment,155 theological reflection on the beatific 
vision blossomed.156 
Indeed, by 1241, less than 20 years after Lombard’s book had been adopted in 
Paris, the view that the divine essence could not be seen was, at least amongst the 
Western Churches, decisively condemned. The first of ten propositions in what 
became known as the Parisian Condemnation of 1241 read:  
This first [error] is, that the divine essence itself will not be seen by either a 
man or an angel. We condemn and we excommunicate those who assert or 
defend it by authority of William, the Bishop. We firmly believe and assert 
that God in His essence or substance will be seen by angels and all the 
saints, and it is seen now by all glorified souls.157 
Indeed, by the mid-fourteenth century, around the same time as the Palamite 
Councils of Constantinople (1341-1351), the same councils in which the Eastern 
Church condemned all those that believe that one could know the essence of God 
at the beatific vision as Messalianist heretics, the Western Church had settled upon 
the seemingly opposite position. In 1336 the Western Pope Benedict XII wrote: 
after the passion and death of our Lord Jesus Christ, they (the elect) will see 
and do see the divine essence (ousia) in an intuitive and face to face vision, 
without any created intermediary which would interpose itself as an object 
of vision, the divine essence appearing to them immediately, without a veil, 
                                                          
155 Augustine famously starts his On Christian Doctrine with a distinction between use (uti) and 
enjoyment (frui), where he argues that beatific enjoyment, that is, the beatific vision, is the only 
proper object of enjoyment. 
156 Kitanov writes:  
 
Once the Sentences themselves became the theologian’s proper object of study, the topics 
and problems addressed in them became the theologian’s main concern. The topic of 
beatific enjoyment, in particular, since it was one of the first topics of examination in 
Lombard’s Sentences and was closely related to the question of the status of theology as an 
academic and scientific discipline, became the focus of vigorous dialectical investigation 
and the source of one of the greatest and most enduring debates in medieval scholastic 
theology. (Kitanov, 2014: 16) 
157 In a complete reversal of an earlier view attributed to them both, Guerric of St. Quentin (Albert 
the Great’s master at the University of Paris) and Alexander of Hales both helped write the 
condemnation. 
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clearly and openly; so that in this vision they might enjoy the divine essence 
itself.158 
Amid this theological milieu, Aquinas, a later regent master in Theology at the 
University of Paris, and the same scholar who, before writing or preaching would 
recite his Creator Ineffabilis prayer, wrote the following concerning the knowledge 
we have of God at the beatific vision: 
…final and perfect beatitude can consist in nothing else than the vision of 
the divine essence. To make this clear, two things must be considered. First, 
man is not perfectly happy so long as something remains for him to desire 
and seek. Secondly, the perfection of any power is determined by the nature 
of its object. The object of the intellect is ‘what a thing is,’ i.e. the essence of 
a thing, as is stated in De anima, book 3 (ch. 6). It follows that the intellect 
attains perfection, insofar as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an 
intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to 
know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause ‘what it is’; that 
intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able 
to gather from the effect the knowledge that the cause exists. 
Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, 
there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause, 
‘what it is.’ And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated 
in the beginning of the Metaphysics (1.2). For instance, if a man, knowing 
the eclipse of the sun, considers that it must be due to some cause, and yet 
not know what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering 
proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he arrives at 
knowledge of the essence of the cause. If therefore the human intellect, 
knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than 
‘that He is’; the perfection of his intellect has not yet directly [simpliciter] 
attained the First Cause, and so the natural desire to seek the cause still 
remains for him. On account of which he is not yet perfectly happy. 
                                                          
158 Lossky, 1971. 
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Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to attain to the very 
essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union 
with God as with that object, in which alone man’s happiness consists.159 
Following this same line of reasoning, Aquinas wrote in his Summa Contra Gentiles: 
No desire leads so high as the desire to understand the truth. For all our 
other desires, whether of delight or anything else that is desired by man, 
can come to rest in other things. However, the afore-mentioned desire does 
not come to rest until it reaches God, the supreme foundation and maker of 
all things. For this reason Wisdom aptly says: “I dwelt in high places, and my 
throne was in a pillar of cloud” (Sir 24:4). And in Prov 9:3 it is said that “She 
has sent out her maids to call from the highest places in the town.” Let them 
therefore be ashamed who seek the beatitude of man, so highly situated, in 
base things.160 
And finally, drawing from Augustine, Aquinas (or his redactor) concluded the 
supplement to his Summa Theologica with the following: 
Now all knowledge by which the created intellect is perfected is directed to 
the knowledge of God as its end. Wherefore he who sees God in His 
essence, even though he know nothing else, would have a perfect intellect: 
nor is his intellect more perfect through knowing something else besides 
Him, except in so far as it sees Him more fully. Hence Augustine says 
(Confess. v.): "Unhappy is he who knoweth all these" (namely, creatures), 
"and knoweth not Thee: but happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know 
not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for 
them but for Thee only."161 
In essence, Aquinas thought God invested humans with a natural ability to seek an 
explanation for the things they perceive, which, when followed through, inevitably 
leads them to inquire about the First Cause, namely, God. If this desire for full 
                                                          
159 ST I-II Q 3 A 8. 
160 SCG Book 3 Chapter 50. 
161 ST Suppl. Q 92 A 3. 
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knowledge of the First Cause was incapable of fulfilment, God would have created 
humans with a natural desire that could never be met – and this is something 
(Aquinas thought) a good God would not do. 
However, despite this prima facie tension, I think the apophaticist can reconcile the 
doctrine of divine ineffability with the doctrine of the beatific vision, and do so, I 
think, without needing to abandon divine simplicity, but only if the doctrine of 
divine ineffability is qualified in a certain way. A qualification that based on the 
distinction between what we referred to in the introduction as ‘Franciscan 
knowledge’ and ‘Dominican knowledge’. 
It is easy enough to say roughly what it is to be ineffable, namely, to be ineffable is 
to be beyond description, or beyond human concepts. However, saying precisely 
what it is to be ineffable is notoriously difficult, since even in saying that something 
is beyond human concepts we have described it and applied a human concept to it. 
This insight is, of course, not new. As we have already seen, Augustine, for instance, 
made this point in On Christian Doctrine, writing: 
God should not be said to be ineffable, for when this is said something is 
said. And a contradiction in terms is created, since if that is ineffable which 
cannot be spoken, then that is not ineffable which is called ineffable.162  
Nevertheless, by employing this distinction between Dominican knowledge and 
Franciscan knowledge, I will tentatively propose two different ways in which we can 
think about what it is to be ineffable.163 
If we recall that according to Stump, Dominican knowledge is propositional 
knowledge, that is, knowledge-that. Franciscan knowledge, on the other hand, is 
neither propositional knowledge nor is reducible to propositional knowledge.164 
                                                          
162 DDC Book 1, Chapter 6. 
163 Stump, 2010: 40-63. 
164 As a terminological aside, I am unsure why Stump does not use the available category of 
‘connatural’ knowledge in her discussion here, as it seems that connatural knowledge does almost 
all the work Franciscan knowledge is supposed to do. See, for instance, Aquinas in ST II-II, Q 45 A 2. 
See also Maritain 1951, Suto 2004, and White 1944. In addition, it seems to me as though Franciscan 
knowledge can help explain the phenomena of ideasthesia, the idea that concepts can somehow be 
sensed or perceived. See, for instance, Nikolic (2009). 
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Such knowledge might include knowledge gained from phenomenal experience and 
from experience of persons, or so she suggests.165 This much is easy to say. 
However, in virtue of the irreducibility of Franciscan knowledge to Dominican 
knowledge, finding a way to illustrate the differences between each kind of 
knowledge is challenging, since, while Dominican knowledge can be expressed 
propositionally, for example, Donald Trump knows that Barack Obama was his 
predecessor, Franciscan knowledge cannot be expressed propositionally – that is 
the very point of Franciscan knowledge. Stump explains this thought in the 
following way:  
I want to claim [she writes] that there is a kind of knowledge of persons, a 
Franciscan knowledge, which is non‐propositional and which is not reducible 
to knowledge that. What could that possibly be?, a skeptical objector may 
ask. But, of course, if I give an answer to the skeptic's question, I will have an 
incoherent position: in answering the question, I will be presenting in terms 
of knowledge that what I am claiming could not be presented that way.166 
But although she cannot answer the sceptical objectors question, she can present 
some thought experiments in which Franciscan knowledge is manifested – she can 
show the distinction, but she cannot describe it, in other words. 
To begin, phenomenal knowledge, according to Stump, falls under an aspect of 
Franciscan knowledge. She illustrates this with Frank Jackson’s (in)famous thought 
experiment about Mary, the super smart colour scientist: 
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate 
the world from a black and white room via a black and white television 
monitor. She specialises in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us 
                                                          
165 Stump distinguishes ‘knowledge-of-persons’ from the ‘knowledge-how’ ability hypothesis that 
Laurence Nemirow (1990), David Lewis (2004) and Paul Churchill (1989) discuss. The knowledge-how 
ability hypothesis suggests that experience gives us an ability and nothing more; an ability to 
remember, imagine or recognize what it is like to have that experience. There is no new knowledge 
gained at all in this process. The position that Stump takes up, then, is closer to Earl Conee’s 
‘acquaintance’ hypothesis (1994). For Conee, there is no new propositional knowledge gained by 
experience, but there is something gained beyond mere know-how, namely, acquaintance with the 
thing known. 
166 Stump, 2010: 52. 
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suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on 
when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 'red', 'blue', and 
so on. She discovers, for example, just which wave-length combinations 
from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the 
central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of 
air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence 'The sky is 
blue'… 
What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or 
is given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems 
just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual 
experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was 
incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to 
have than that, and Physicalism is false.167 
What is important for Stump’s purposes is that, controversially, Mary’s epistemic 
position is improved on her departure from her black and white room, when she 
sees colour for the first time. Either she learns something new or she learns 
something old in a new way.168 And this improvement in her epistemic position is 
the Franciscan knowledge she gains by experiencing colour for the first time, this 
phenomenal knowledge she now has.  
Modifying Jackson’s thought experiment, as already noted in the introduction, 
Stump asks us to imagine another Mary who has been locked in a room since birth. 
Whilst Mary has with her encyclopaedias containing every piece of non-narrative 
propositional information about her mother, she has neither shared a second-
                                                          
167 Jackson, 1982: 130. 
168 On Paul Churchland’s view, Mary merely learns something old in a new way (Churchland, 1985). 
In other words, Churchland would want to say that Franciscan knowledge (the something new) is in 
some sense captured by what was previously known, namely, pertinent propositional knowledge 
(the something old). Churchland writes, for instance,  
 
the difference between a person who knows all about the visual cortex but has never 
enjoyed a sensation of red, and a person who knows no neuroscience but knows well the 
sensation of red, may reside not in what is respectively known by each (brain states by the 
former, qualia by the latter), but rather in the different type of knowledge each has of 
exactly the same thing. The difference is in the manner of the knowing, not in the nature(s) 
of the thing known. (Churchland, 1989: 24) 
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personal encounter with her, nor accessed any narrative account of her mother. 
Stump writes: 
When Mary is first united with her mother, it seems indisputable that Mary 
will know things she did not know before, even if she knew everything about 
her mother that could be made available to her in non‐narrative propositional 
form, including her mother's psychological states. Although Mary knew that 
her mother loved her before she met her, when she is united with her 
mother, Mary will learn what it is like to be loved. And this will be new for 
her, even if in her isolated state she had as complete a scientific description 
as possible of what a human being feels like when she senses that she is loved 
by someone else.169 
Just as the super smart colour scientist Mary’s epistemic position is improved upon 
leaving her black and white room, so is the daughter Mary’s epistemic position 
improved upon leaving her lonely room: either daughter Mary learns something 
new or she learns something old in a new way upon meeting her mother. With 
these thought experiments in hand, we have a way of showing what Franciscan 
knowledge is, even if we cannot describe it. Now, on my view, this kind of 
knowledge, and its distinction from Dominican knowledge, is crucial for 
understanding the doctrine of divine ineffability and how it can be held consistently 
with the doctrine of the beatific vision. To show this, I turn to explaining the nature 
of divine ineffability using this distinction. 
If Franciscan knowledge is indeed by its very nature beyond description, and if, 
roughly speaking, to be ineffable is to be beyond description, all Franciscan 
knowledge must be in some sense ineffable. Let us call this sort of ineffability 
‘propositional ineffability’ – the impossibility of capturing something through 
propositional description. Divine ineffability, where ‘ineffability’ is understood as 
‘propositional ineffability’, seems fairly straightforward. If knowledge of other 
persons can be propositionally ineffable, (in Stump’s modified thought experiment, 
the knowledge Mary gains as she learns what it is like for her mother to love her 
                                                          
169 Stump, 2010: 52. 
80 
 
would be propositionally ineffable), it is easy to see how God, too, could be, in 
some comparable sense, propositionally ineffable (we can simply replace Mary’s 
mother with God in Stump’s modified thought experiment).170  
Now, there is one important difference between knowledge of God and knowledge 
of persons. On Stump’s thought experiment of daughter Mary, Franciscan 
knowledge could lie in her learning something old in a new way. But, for the 
apophaticist, that is simply not possible for our knowledge of God. It cannot be the 
case that what we learn of God at the beatific vision is something old in a new way, 
for if the doctrine of divine ineffability is correct, there is a sense in which we can 
know nothing old (i.e., nothing fundamental that is reducible to propositional form) 
about God.171 And this usefulness, I think, gives us one reason to at least pay 
serious consideration to Stump’s account.172 
But at this point a putative objector might respond: surely divine ineffability is all or 
nothing, at least with respect to propositions. It is not just that there are aspects of 
God that are propositionally ineffable. If the doctrine of divine ineffability is true, 
unlike Mary’s mother, God is (at the very least) entirely propositionally ineffable. 
And yet, surely we do want to attribute to God certain propositional claims. Does 
divine ineffability require that we jettison propositional beliefs such as ‘God is good’ 
or ‘God is three in hypostasis, one in ousia’? Jonathan Jacobs tackled this objection 
in a recent paper, arguing that these beliefs need not in fact be jettisoned. Indeed, 
Jacobs argued, we can, without contradiction, believe that it is literally, mind-
independently true that God is good, and at the same time believe that it is true 
                                                          
170 Given this, it is only a matter of degree that separates total propositional ineffability (supposed in 
God) from partial propositional ineffability (in you or me). One could, for instance, imagine a world 
where some (and perhaps all) propositionally effable knowledge of some person is subtracted. 
171 In this case, it might be true in one sense that Mary knows all propositionally reducible 
knowledge of God whilst in confinement, it just so happens there is no (fundamental) propositional 
knowledge of God to be had. Of course, Stump has a story about how Franciscan knowledge can be 
transferred through testimony, and through narrative, so Stump requires the qualification that all 
information she has be in non-narrative propositional form. Were Mary to have access to narrative, 
for instance, biblical narrative, she might possess certain limited (or ‘dim’, as certain older 
translations of 1 Corinthians 13:12 read) Franciscan knowledge of God, but that this is possible 
serves only to reinforce the argument we are presenting. 
172 For a further defence of Stump’s position, see Wolterstorff (2016). Note that Wolterstorff 
describes ‘Franciscan’ knowledge as ‘object-knowledge’, and he too distinguishes ‘object-
knowledge’ from ‘know-how’. 
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that God is ineffable. How can this be so? Well, a proposition, he argued, can be 
fundamentally true (actually carving reality at its joints) or non-fundamentally true 
(representing an artificial or gerrymandered structure of reality). On Jacobs’s view, 
any positive claims we might make about God can only ever be non-fundamentally 
true. 
Jacobs, following Sider, thinks all truths have two elements, a truth-bearer and a 
truth-maker. A truth-bearer represents supposed metaphysical structure, whilst a 
truth-maker is the feature(s) of reality that make the truth bearer correct. Truths 
thus consist in the relationship between these two elements. Having said this much, 
Jacobs suggests that truth-bearers can be made true in more than one way. If a 
truth-bearer actually does ‘carve reality at its joints’ it is a fundamental truth-
bearer. If it proposes an artificial or gerrymandered structure on reality (if it is 
‘ontologically imperspicuous’) it is a non-fundamental truth-bearer. So, for instance, 
when we describe God in propositional terms, Jacobs concludes, all our descriptions 
are grounded in God (as an object), but they also all fall into the latter category. 
With this in mind he writes: 
We can, using non-fundamental propositions, describe God correctly. We 
can say lots of true things about how God is intrinsically. He is wise, loving. 
He is three in hypostasis, one in ousia. Such propositions need not be 
metaphorical. They can be strictly, literally true. And they can be 
importantly true. We can know them, and understand them. Some may be 
more fundamental than others, but God is ineffable because no matter 
what we say truly, we have failed to assert a perfectly fundamental truth. 
God is non-fundamentally effable, and fundamentally ineffable.173 
Having said this much, might Jacob’s solution resolve our initial tension between 
divine ineffability and the beatific vision? Could this artificial or gerrymandered 
propositional knowledge of God be sufficient for the sort of knowledge wanted at 
the beatific vision? There is at least one good reason to think not. Recall that at the 
beatific vision, it seems that the Apostle Paul teaches that we will come to know 
                                                          
173 Jacobs, 2015: 167. 
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God as God knows us. Whilst it might seem plausibly the case that we can only 
come to artificial or gerrymandered knowledge of God, it seems very strange 
indeed to say that God’s knowledge of us, His creation, is only artificial or 
gerrymandered, however these terms are to be understood. But if God’s knowledge 
of us captures fundamental truths about us, whilst our knowledge of God captures 
only non-fundamental truths about Him, I do not see how it could be the case that 
we would know God as God knows us.174 
However, even if we can sensibly talk about God being (non-fundamentally) 
propositionally ineffable, there is another sort of ineffability, reserved for those 
who do not (or cannot) make themselves open to any sort of second-personal 
interaction. For want of a better expression, I will call this ‘personal ineffability’.175 
Could God be personally ineffable? Simply put, to qualify for personal ineffability 
God would have to refrain from making himself open to any second-personal 
experience (or more strongly, that God’s creation would be necessarily incapable of 
second-personal experience of God). Furthermore, God would have to refrain from 
any revelation of Himself through narrative (or again more strongly, that it is 
impossible for God to reveal Himself through narrative), for, Stump argues, 
Franciscan knowledge can be conveyed through narrative as it can through 
unmediated second-personal experience.176 
With respect to the divine, in both propositional and personal ineffability, 
ineffability involves propositional (or ‘Dominican’) ineffability.177 The difference 
between them is that in the case of propositional ineffability, what it is to be 
                                                          
174 One might quibble that I am putting too much weight on one verse; however, I also feel the force 
of Aquinas’ argument here as well (see SCG Book 3 Chapter 50). Could our desire to know the 
essence of God, our cause, be satisfied with only non-fundamental truths about him? I am not sure it 
would. 
175 Note that I recognise this personal effability sounds quite strange, given that what is personally 
effable cannot be communicated propositionally; however, we take it to be that what is personally 
effable can still be communicated, albeit communicated non-propositionally. 
176 Stump makes clear to qualify in her recasting of the Mary thought experiment that it is for this 
reason, that is, that Franciscan knowledge can be transmitted through narrative, it is essential all 
previous information Mary has of her mother is presented in non-narrative propositional form. 
177 There is, of course, a third option: where something is effable in a Dominican sense but ineffable 
in a Franciscan sense (this might apply, for instance, in the case of an atom or quark); however, it is 
difficult to see how propositional effability could ever sensibly cohere with the doctrine of divine 
ineffability, so we mention this only to leave it to one side. 
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ineffable does not include ‘Franciscan’ ineffability, whilst in the case of personal 
ineffability, it does. 
So, I have proposed two kinds of ineffability. Certainly, there is nothing logically 
preventing God from being both propositionally and personally ineffable. However, 
if God was indeed personally ineffable, it seems difficult to see how we could come 
to know God as God knows us (or at least, without suggesting that God does not 
know us very well), and so the doctrine of the beatific vision would remain in 
tension with the doctrine of divine ineffability.  
Preserving the doctrine of the beatific vision certainly seems like a good reason to 
favour propositional ineffability over personal ineffability; however, is this reason 
alone sufficient to defend the idea that God is in fact personally effable? Perhaps, 
but it need not do all the work. To the doctrine of divine ineffability may be added 
the doctrine of divine revelation, that is, the doctrine that through creation, the 
incarnation178, and through scripture, God has in fact revealed something of Himself 
to humankind. If Franciscan knowledge can be transmitted through second-
personal experience and narrative as Stump maintains, and if God has indeed 
revealed something, indeed anything, of Himself in a creation we can experience, 
through second-personal interaction in the incarnation, or through the narratives in 
scripture, it looks like God cannot be personally ineffable.179 The cost of defending 
personal ineffability is seemingly, therefore, that both the doctrine of the beatific 
vision and the doctrine of divine revelation are false – and this is, to my mind, a 
substantial enough cost to justify associating divine ineffability with mere 
propositional ineffability alone.180 
                                                          
178 See John 14:9: ‘Jesus answered: “Don't you know me, Philip, even after I have been among you 
such a long time? Anyone who has seen me has seen the Father…”’ Note that if the doctrine of 
divine ineffability is true, it may be the case that all such revelation is Franciscan in character. In the 
case of the incarnation, one might have to concede that all pieces of seemingly Dominican 
knowledge we have of Christ pertain to his human and not his divine nature. What such a concession 
entails, or whether this concession even makes sense, is beyond the scope of this paper.  
179 Adding to doctrine of the beatific vision and the doctrine of divine revelation, are the testimonies 
of those who claim to know God (even if the knowledge is presently ‘dim’). If divine ineffability 
entailed personal ineffability, such people could not, in fact, know God, and would therefore be 
mistaken in their claims.  
180 I recognise that this is not a particularly strong argument; however, I cannot see any other way 
around this. As I see it, given the seeming logical possibility of each, arbitration between these two 
84 
 
If we say that God is (fundamentally) propositionally ineffable but personally 
effable, God remains both beyond (fundamental) description and beyond 
(fundamental) human concepts, in that knowledge of him can never be fully 
comprehended by or captured in (fundamental) descriptions or concepts, and in 
this way, the doctrine of divine ineffability can be upheld (and, if Jacobs is correct, 
this remains true even if we can speak truthfully of God in non-fundamental ways). 
Nevertheless, through some sort of intense second-personal experience at the 
beatific vision,181 God can still be personally known, fully and completely, just as we 
are taught in the doctrine of the beatific vision. To see how this might be the case, 
recall Stump’s previously mentioned Mary thought experiment. When it comes to 
Mary’s knowledge of her mother, both Franciscan and Dominican knowledge ally 
together. However, both kinds of knowledge are not simultaneously required for 
Mary to have some knowledge of her mother. We can see that this is the case as 
prior to meeting her, I take it that Mary had only Dominican knowledge of her 
mother. But Mary’s knowledge need not be limited to Dominican/Franciscan or 
Dominican only. Nothing in this thought experiment requires that Mary has access 
to every piece of Dominican knowledge about her mother. And, if the thought 
experiment still works (albeit without some of its rhetorical force) if one of Mary’s 
encyclopedias was missing a few pages, it can also work if we subtract from Mary’s 
room all of Mary’s encyclopedias. Mary now has no Dominican knowledge of her 
mother.182 If we substitute Mary’s mother for a (fundamentally) propositionally 
ineffable God, and have this (fundamentally) propositionally ineffable God 
somehow reveal Himself to Mary, we might say that Mary now knows God, but her 
knowledge is purely Franciscan.183 And so, if this limited conception of divine 
                                                          
positions comes down to which position incurs the greatest cost, where the cost is measured in 
terms of accepted doctrines one must sacrifice, and the route we are defending sees us sacrifice the 
fewest accepted doctrines. 
181 See Worsley (2016) for one way in which to view the form such intense second-personal 
experience might take. Somewhat analogously, this second-person experience would be a more 
intense version of Mary’s initial meeting with her mother in Stump’s earlier described thought 
experiment. 
182 Besides, perhaps, a vague inkling that her existence was probably caused by something. 
183 Of course, Mary may have an inkling that God caused her to be, and so she might come to have 
some (non-fundamental) propositional knowledge of God before the fact, but we could also imagine 
that she is completely ignorant of this fact. One does wonder what sort of experience she would 
have of God in this case, the sort of experience that left her (at least to begin with) with no 
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ineffability is accepted, the doctrines of divine ineffability and of the beatific vision 
can be both simultaneously upheld and indeed therefore reconciled by the 
apophatic theologian. 
If what I have argued about how to interpret divine ineffability is correct, then even 
in the beatific vision God remains ineffable, in that, our full and complete 
knowledge of Him will not be stateable propositionally. But that is no great 
objection to the (merely propositional) view of divine ineffability I am proposing, 
since (i) it is part of the beauty of our richest and most intimate relationships that 
they go beyond what we can say in words, and (ii) just as God remains ineffable in 
the beatific vision, so do we, since even God cannot fundamentally capture what it 
is to know us propositionally.184 Thus, on this view of ineffability, persons are, in 
some sense, perhaps, essentially ineffable, both God and us. ‘There are then’, 
Stump suggests, 
more things in heaven and earth than are captured by analytic philosophy. 
The knowledge of persons conveyed to us through our own second‐person 
experiences and narratives about such experiences can, however, help us to 
apprehend them. There is a story told about Aquinas that seems to me just 
right here. Aquinas is the quintessential Dominican, in the literal as well as 
the typological sense, and he was one of the greatest philosophers and 
theologians in the Western tradition. But after a religious vision he quit 
writing. He said that, by comparison with what he had seen of God, the 
theories and arguments in his work were nothing but straw. This Dominican 
is contrasting (typologically understood) Dominican and Franciscan kinds of 
knowledge and decidedly privileging the Franciscan as regards the deity.185 
                                                          
propositional knowledge of God! But maybe all we need to assert is that Mary has no fundamental 
propositional knowledge of her mother, or of God. Perhaps this thought experiment retains its force 
if Mary merely possesses (or, in some second-personal interaction, comes to possess) some degree 
of non-fundamental propositional knowledge of her mother, or of God. 
184 This raises an interesting question: if a fundamental truth ‘carves nature at its joints’, and if all 
propositional truths about God do not (being instead ‘ontologically imperspicuous’, see Jacobs 
2015), how are we to think about the ‘natural’ joints at which fundamental propositionless personal 
knowledge of God carve? Do such joints exist? If they do, what must they be like? And if they do not, 
can this position escape the label of theological anti-realism? 
185 Stump, 2010: 61. 
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The Requirements for Union with God 
In this chapter, I have suggested that the attainment of (theologically appropriate) 
joy, peace, and love all require a person to have a desire for union with God, that 
this desire be wholehearted, and that this desire be fulfilled. I then suggested that, 
given the Thomist account of mind, all three can be satisfied at the beatific vision, 
when a person sees God face to face, and God’s full goodness is revealed to them. 
As I see it, and as I shall argue in the following chapter, the Atonement makes this 
union possible by enabling a person to behold the beatific vision. 
However, I have also suggested that any union with God must be freely willed if real 
union is indeed to obtain. Given what I have suggested about the relationship 
between the revelation of God’s goodness and operative grace, assuming the 
Thomist account of mind I have been using, should God reveal His full goodness to 
someone who is either neutral to the idea, or does not want union with Him, all 
things being equal, they will inevitably come to desire union with Him. But this sort 
of inevitable union cannot be freely willed, and so cannot be the sort looked for by 
a loving God. God revealing His full goodness to a person who is either neutral or 
resistant to union with Him is in many ways analogous to a person creating a robot 
that will say ‘I love you’ if a certain pre-programmed button is pushed. If that 
button is pushed, the robot will say ‘I love you’, but clearly the robot has had no 
choice in the matter. Even if this robot was complex enough that it could mimic the 
sort of things a person who is in love does, given that these things are done at the 
push of a preprogrammed button, whatever relationship subsequently ensues 
cannot be a serious relationship. 
As a result, in order for the beholder to see God fact to face and come out with the 
sort of union that can be taken seriously, they must at the very least first freely 
form an effective higher-order desire for union with God. Although to be united 
with Him, this desire must be wholehearted, I have suggested that seeing God’s 
essence, that is, his full goodness, may be sufficient to change an ordinary desire for 
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union with God into a wholehearted desire for union with Him, and do so whilst 
preserving the free will of the beholder. 
So, one requirement for union with God involves having an ordinary effective 
higher-order desire for such union, with the thought that this ordinary desire will 
become wholehearted when one sees God’s unveiled goodness. 
However, as mentioned, we can unpack this desire for union a little further. On the 
Thomist account of union, union requires both significant personal presence and 
also personal closeness with the other. When it comes to significant personal 
presence, in addition to freely desiring union with God, a person must be able to 
dyadically share attention with God. Likewise, when it comes to personal closeness, 
a person must be able to reveal who they are to God, and to do this, they cannot be 
psychologically fragmented. For if God is to unite with them, and they are 
psychologically fragmented, with what or with whom would God be uniting? 
In the next chapter, I will look at possible inhibitors to union with God, and 
therefore inhibitors that any account of the Atonement must overcome. 
Specifically, I will focus on those things that: 
1. prevent freely willed desire for union with God (namely, the consequence of 
original sin; a disordered mind whereby one comes to prefer one’s own 
power and pleasure to the greater good of union with God), and 
2. prevent shared attention with God (namely, those things that cause 
sufficient psychological or psychical pain, that might prevent a person from 
sharing attention with God, such as the self-reflexive reactive attitudes of 
guilt and shame). 
In chapter three, I will address ways in which each of these inhibitors might be dealt 
with through a general account of atonement, before, in chapter five, developing 
one way in which Christ’s life, passion, death and resurrection might be used to 
remove these inhibitors.  
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Chapter 2 
Separation: God and Humanity 
 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that real union with God was both the end-
point of the Christian faith, and the focus of the Christian doctrine of the 
Atonement. Furthermore, I suggested that as beholding the beatific vision was 
necessary for the greatest real union with God, and so, necessary for achieving joy 
and peace, that is, for the blessed life, the Christian doctrine of the Atonement 
must also focus on making possible a person’s beholding of the beatific vision. 
In this chapter, I will explore what I take to be the inhibitors to union with God (and 
specifically, inhibitors to beholding the beatific vision) that any account of the 
Atonement must therefore address. These will include the following: 
1. an unwillingness to behold the vision (connected to the doctrine of original 
sin),  
2. an inability to wholeheartedly will to behold the vision (caused by 
psychological fragmentation), and  
3. an inability to behold the vision at all (caused by an inability to dyadically 
share attention with God). 
Once again, I will be calling upon both scripture and tradition in addition to reason 
in isolating and examining these inhibitors. I will look first at the nature of 
psychological fragmentation and its connection with sin, particularly both primal 
and original sin. I will then look at how reflection on past sin can promote self-
reflexive attitudes that can both prevent dyadic attention and serve as a source of 
psychological fragmentation. I will conclude by suggesting that each of the 
inhibitors mentioned at the end of the previous chapter do in fact prevent union 
with God. In the following chapters, I will address how each of these inhibitors 
might be dealt with. 
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Psychological Fragmentation and Sin: Primal and Original 
In the previous chapter I suggested psychological integration was necessary for 
union with God. I suggested this was the case because for God to unite with you, 
you must be psychologically integrated, for if your mind is divided, with which mind 
will God be uniting? 
As mentioned, psychological fragmentation refers to the fragmentation of the 
mind. Given the Thomist account of the mind outlined in the previous chapter, for a 
person to be psychologically integrated, two conditions must obtain: 
1. all their second-order desires must be psychologically integrated around the 
good, and 
2. their first- and second-order volitions must align.186 
And so, given this, if a person has conflicting second-order desires, or acts on a first-
order volition that conflicts with a second-order volition (but, importantly, not if 
they merely have conflicting first-order desires), then that person is psychologically 
fragmented, and that person’s complete union with God prevented. 
In establishing the inhibitors to union that the Atonement is supposed to deal with, 
it will prove helpful to analyse in a little detail the first instance of psychological 
fragmentation, namely, the primal sin. 
In looking at the primal sin, I mean to refer only to the first instance of internal 
fragmentation. Whilst I will use the traditionally accepted story of Lucifer’s fall in 
exploring explanations of the primal sin, whether or not the primal sin was in fact 
coincident with Lucifer’s fall as traditionally understood is not relevant to the 
strength of the proceeding analysis. What is relevant is whether we can explain the 
primal sin in a way that satisfies a certain set of desiderata without suggesting that 
it was in some way inexplicably arbitrary; for if the primal sin was arbitrary, what 
                                                          
186 Although I will not address this any further here, in Religion within the bounds of mere reason (6: 
32) Kant also discusses the problem of psychological fragmentation, suggesting that it only takes one 
evil action to demonstrate a fragmentation of the will. 
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guarantee do we have the Atonement can secure permanent psychological 
integration? 
The desiderata for any explanation of primal sin must (a) render God blameless for 
Lucifer’s internal fragmentation, and (b) put the blame for that internal 
fragmentation on Lucifer.187 The most obvious way of satisfying these desiderata is 
to hold that Lucifer has what Richard Swinburne describes as ‘serious free will’,188 
such that he had the ability to freely will some lesser good, but that this free choice 
was in no way influenced by some defect created in him by God (i.e., God created 
Lucifer morally good, intellectually flawless and supremely happy prior to the 
primal sin).189 Such ‘serious free will’ requires that even when Lucifer was internally 
integrated around the good, Lucifer was capable of choosing between conflicting 
desires.190 But how could Lucifer have had conflicting desires if his mind was 
integrated around the good and he was morally good, intellectually flawless, and 
supremely happy? 
Traditionally, there have been two schools of thought that attempt to explain how 
this internal fragmentation happened in the pre-primal sin paradisiacal state 
without holding God blameworthy for its happening.191 Both approaches suggest 
                                                          
187 If (a) obtains but (b) does not, then internal fragmentation looks like it can only be explained by 
some random chance event, and is therefore arbitrary. 
188 Swinburne writes,  
 
…if reasons alone influence action, an agent inevitably does what he believes to be the 
best, so if desires alone influence action, an agent will inevitably follow his strongest desire. 
Free choice of action therefore arises only in two situations. One is where there is a choice 
between two actions which the agent regards as equal best which the agent desires to do 
equally; which . . . is the situation of very unserious free will. The other is where there is a 
choice between two actions, one of which the agent desires to do more and the other of 
which he believes it better to do . . . the more serious the free will and the stronger the 
contrary temptation, the better it is when the good action is done. (Swinburne, 1998: 86-
87) 
189 See Pini 2011 (62) for discussion of why it is important to affirm this. Note that the claim 
‘supremely happy’ is highly contentious and open for interpretation (Anselm, for instance, did not 
believe Lucifer was supremely happy, Aquinas thought he was only supremely happy according to a 
natural, but not supernatural order, whilst Scotus believed him to be supremely happy in a natural 
and supernatural order). However, the assumption of Lucifer’s ‘supreme happiness’ sets the 
problem of primal sin in its strongest form.  
190 That is, Lucifer must be created not just to have one desire (where the best option, by that desire, 
is always chosen), but to have more than one desire (where the best options for each desire might 
seemingly conflict). 
191 For slightly different variants on these two, see John Pecham on the will corrupting the intellect, 
Giles of Rome and Peter Auriol on the indirect self-specification of the will, Godfrey of Fontaines on 
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that Lucifer was created with an integrated second-order desire for justice192 (i.e., 
the second-order desire that his first-order desires were properly ordered) and a 
first-order desire for benefit (i.e., the desire for those things that will lead to his 
happiness).193  
The first explanatory approach to the primal sin suggests that the cause of Lucifer’s 
internal fragmentation occurred in Lucifer’s will (the ‘voluntarist account’, 
suggested by Anselm in De casu diaboli and most recently advocated by Katherin 
Rogers.194 The second explanatory account suggests that the cause of Lucifer’s 
internal fragmentation occurred in Lucifer’s intellect (the ‘intellectualist account’, 
best typified by Scott MacDonald’s interpretation of Augustine’s account of primal 
sin).195 According to Kevin Timpe, however, both responses are susceptible to the 
charge of arbitrariness.196 And again, if the primal sin was arbitrary, what might 
prevent those benefiting from Christ’s Atoning work from committing a similarly 
arbitrary, yet internally fragmenting, sin? 
On the voluntarist account, although Lucifer’s second-order desire for justice 
remained integrated, for some reason he was more disposed to a (perhaps 
involuntary) first-order desire for his own perceived benefit than a conflicting first-
order desire for the greater good of union with God.197 But why would Lucifer’s 
morally good will be inclined to a sub-optimal first-order desire? Now, the will can 
                                                          
a variant of the intellectualist account, Duns Scotus on Lucifer’s abandonment of Eudaemonianism, 
Aquinas on (alleged) intellectualist determinism, and Henry of Ghent on volitional determinism. 
Further accounts of each can be found in Hoffmann 2007 & 2012 and Pini 2013. 
192 Also described as ‘rectitude’, although given Stump’s previous account, this can perhaps more 
usefully be considered a second-order desire for union with God, which entails a desire for ‘justice’ 
or ‘rectitude’. 
193 As I explore these two positions, please note that this is not an attempt to do serious historical 
scholarship, rather, for the purposes of this paper, I am more interested in the arguments as 
presented. 
194 See Rogers, 2008: 98. For further treatments of Anselm’s work, see also Adams 1992, King 2012, 
and Williams 2002. 
195 See MacDonald 1998. See also King 2012. 
196 See Timpe 2014. 
197 It is worth mentioning that on Stump’s account, one acts with freedom of the will if and only if 
one’s first-order volition corresponds to a second-order volition. As a result, Lucifer could not (on 
Stump’s account) be said to have acted with freedom of the will. Nevertheless, Stump believes that 
one can act with the moral responsibility required to be blameworthy if one acts on a first-order 
volition (but only so long as the connection between first-order intellect and will, or the disposition 
of the will is not internally manipulated). 
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be changed by habit, such that over time it prefers lesser goods than greater goods, 
but prior to the primal sin, Lucifer had presumably always opted for the greater 
good. So, what can explain this change in the will’s disposition, beyond either a 
fault in the will created by God (at which point God is perhaps blameworthy for 
Lucifer’s actions) or a sheer, inexplicable (and seemingly random) act of will? And if 
it is a sheer, inexplicable act of the will, what is to prevent it happening again?198 
Given the inexplicability of a change in the will, the inability to distinguish Lucifer’s 
morally good will from the likewise morally good will of those redeemed in 
paradise, and given that, on the Thomist account of the mind, every act of will is 
preceded by an act of the intellect, an intellectualist explanation for the primal sin 
is much more promising, or so I argue.  
On the intellectualist account, at some point in time Lucifer failed to think through 
fully the reasons for desiring justice (a failure in the second-order intellect). By 
omitting to fully consider the reasons for desiring justice, some (perhaps 
involuntary)199 first-order desire for a misperceived benefit was allowed to grow 
stronger than it would otherwise have been allowed to grow,200 because the 
second-order desire that would otherwise weaken such a desire was itself too weak 
to weaken it sufficiently.201 As a result of this ‘carelessness in practical 
reasoning’202, Lucifer’s (first-order) intellect presented to his (first-order) will this 
misperceived lesser good as being the best perceived benefit for Lucifer, and 
Lucifer’s will quite naturally inclined itself to this good.203 Just as with the 
                                                          
198 Indeed, is it right to hold Lucifer blameworthy for this seemingly random change in his will? 
199 For all we know, Lucifer could have involuntary passions (via an angelic sensitive appetite).  
200 On Stump’s account, first-order acts of intellect can be involuntary (an involuntary apprehension 
of a passion, for instance), and so Lucifer cannot be blamed for having such first-order-desires. He 
can be blamed for letting that first-order desire become a first-order volition, however. 
201 It is important to note that second-order volitions only strengthen or weaken a first-order desire. 
A mere second-order volition is not enough to ensure a corresponding first-order volition, as any 
addict could tell you. What is required is a particularly strong second-order volition to ensure the 
second-order desire’s object become a first-order volition. The intellectualist suggestion is not that 
there is internal fragmentation in the second-order will, just that through inattention (or some such 
occurrence) the second-order volition is not sufficiently strong to deal with a, potentially 
involuntary, first-order desire. 
202 MacDonald, 1998: 121. 
203 One tradition holds that Lucifer was given a glimpse of the incarnation, and received the 
revelation that he would be asked to serve creatures (i.e. humans) lowlier than himself. In failing to 
sufficiently consider God’s love and goodness, Lucifer chose that which seemed more fitting to him 
at the time; rejecting the call to what he saw as servility. Whether this first-order volition can be 
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voluntarist account, however, what caused Lucifer to omit sufficient consideration 
for justice? Was it a lapse in memory or some other created fault in himself (at 
which point perhaps God is perhaps blameworthy for Lucifer’s fall)? Or was it just 
an arbitrary act of the intellect? And again, if it was an arbitrary act of intellect, 
what is to prevent it happening again? 
So, it would seem that the charge of arbitrariness can be leveled at some point in 
either the voluntarist or intellectualist explanations. In a previously published 
paper, however, I argued that the primal sin can be best explained by Lucifer acting 
on a desire for that which was his greatest good, namely, obtaining the knowledge 
of God available at the beatific vision, before God wanted (or was able) to reveal it 
to him.204 And this explanation, I think, can also help to explain the original sin, 
which, as I read the Genesis narrative, mirrors the traditional account of the primal 
sin. Furthermore, I will suggest that by looking at the original sin narrative (as 
before, taking it to be an instructive narrative, rather than a historical truth), it 
becomes clear that the problem of both primal and original sin can be better 
explained by the intellectualist account rather than by the voluntarist account. 
My claim, then, is that there are many background similarities between the primal 
and the original sin. I previously suggested that in the case of the primal sin, the 
most plausible fragmentary desires are those that pertain to the primal sinner’s 
desire for the beatific vision, that is, for knowledge of God not currently held (be 
that desire naturally achievable, as Anselm thought, only supernaturally achievable, 
as Aquinas thought, or even supernaturally impossible, as Scotus thought). And 
with that in mind, notice, too, how the story of the original sin unfolds (Genesis 3:1-
6): 
Now the serpent was more crafty than any other beast of the field that the 
Lord God had made. 
                                                          
attributed to pride, or lust, or envy or some other such passion (or even, whether angelic beings are 
capable of passions) is left for others to discuss. 
204 See Worsley 2016. Plausibly, as suggested at the end of the previous chapter, God could not give 
the beatific vision immediately without rendering whatever relationship that then ensued unserious. 
94 
 
He said to the woman, “Did God actually say, ‘You shall not eat of any tree in 
the garden’?” And the woman said to the serpent, “We may eat of the fruit 
of the trees in the garden, but God said, ‘You shall not eat of the fruit of the 
tree that is in the midst of the garden, neither shall you touch it, lest you 
die.’” But the serpent said to the woman, “You will not surely die. For God 
knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like 
God, knowing good and evil.” So when the woman saw that the tree was 
good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to 
be desired to make one wise, she took of its fruit and ate, and she also gave 
some to her husband who was with her, and he ate.” 
According to the Genesis account, the serpent promised Eve that her eyes would be 
opened, and that that she would be like God, knowing good and evil. And, we are 
led to presume, it was this desire for knowledge, knowledge that would make her 
like God, knowledge that is not wrong in itself (for, we are told, it is knowledge God 
possesses), that caused the fragmentary desires that eventually led to the original 
sin. Just as the primal sinner might have inappropriately desired knowledge of God 
they did not have, so too did Eve inappropriately desire knowledge (of God, for we 
are told, God is good) she did not have. 
But, we can say more than just this. For, how was it that Eve’s (natural first-order) 
desire became a volition? In my previously published paper on the primal sin, I 
argued that the primal sinner came to what we might describe as a wanton 
omission to consider their second-order desires for rectitude (i.e., for justice), that 
then allowed for the primal sinner’s first-order desire for knowledge of God to 
become a first-order volition for knowledge of God, but I could not go any further 
than this.205 Without any further information on the primal sin, I could not explain 
this wanton omission. But, in the case of the original sin, we can go one better, for 
we do have access to further information; we have access to the narrative account 
of the fall. 
                                                          
205 See Worsley 2016. 
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According to this narrative account of the fall (before which Adam and Eve were 
presumably psychologically integrated, and remained so through sanctifying grace, 
that is, appropriate reflection on the revealed (if partial) goodness of God), the 
serpent probed Eve's intellectual understanding of God's commands by 
misrepresenting the command God gave to Adam; ‘did God actually say you must 
not eat the fruit of any tree in the garden?’ In response to the serpent’s obvious 
misrepresentation, Eve subtly misinterpreted what Adam had presumably told her 
about God's command (for it appears in Genesis 2:17 that God told only Adam not 
to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil). Eve adds ‘you must not 
touch it’ to the command God gave Adam not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of 
good and evil. As a result, when Eve touched it (the touching of which was nowhere 
prohibited by God, but either misunderstood by Eve or incorrectly passed on by 
Adam) and did not die, she might well have believed the serpent's claim that eating 
from the tree would also not kill her, but make her ‘like God’. This intellectual 
misinterpretation, combined with the desire to be like God in knowledge, could, 
plausibly, have been the root cause of Eve’s internal fragmentation, inasmuch as it 
aroused a natural desire for knowledge obtainable in the beatific vision, and also 
caused her to think God's command was odd (..."so eating the fruit can only be 
done deliberately, but what if I accidentally brushed the fruit? Would God really kill 
me? That seems too harsh!"...). 
We might, of course, suppose that some similar intellectual misinterpretation could 
have happened to the primal sinner (albeit without anyone tempting them), and 
this might have been why the primal sinner knew to exploit this in his temptation of 
Eve. However, this explanation is still susceptible to the arbitrariness claim since we 
now need some explanation for how a perfect intellect would come to such an 
intellectual misinterpretation. However, without access to a narrative account of 
the primal sin, I am not sure such an explanation will ever be forthcoming. 
Having said so much, inasmuch as this plausible solution to the primal sin might 
shed light on the cause of original sin, further reflection on the original sin can shed 
light on the primal sin, too. Specifically, it can help us understand how both the 
primal sin and the original sin lead to further internal fragmentation. According to 
96 
 
Aquinas, the original sin was an occasion for God to withdraw his grace from the 
original sinners, grace with had hitherto integrated their wills. Aquinas writes: 
Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also 
something through the gift of grace, so may something belong to the nature 
as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and something 
too through the gift of grace. In this way original justice… was a gift of grace, 
conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first 
man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as that original justice together with the 
nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its 
disorder. Other actual sins, however, whether of the first parent or of 
others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that 
person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins 
are not transmitted.206 
In the previous chapter I discussed how God’s grace can be understood in terms of 
the revelation of God’s goodness, either as revealed through God’s creation, or 
through some form of second-personal encounter with Him. In as much as 
appropriately attending to God’s grace can integrate a person’s will, the removal of 
this grace, or no longer attending to it, can cause the sort of psychological 
fragmentation and an unwillingness to dyadically attend to God that leads to the 
preference for personal power and pleasure over the greater good of union with 
God. And indeed, this seems exactly what is recorded in the Genesis passage that 
follows (Genesis 3:7-13, 22-24): 
And they heard the sound of the Lord God walking in the garden in the cool 
of the day, and the man and his wife hid themselves from the presence of 
the Lord God among the trees of the garden. But the Lord God called to the 
man and said to him, “Where are you?” And he said, “I heard the sound of 
you in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked, and I hid myself.” 
He said, “Who told you that you were naked? Have you eaten of the tree of 
which I commanded you not to eat?” The man said, “The woman whom you 
                                                          
206 ST I-II Q 82 A 2. 
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gave to be with me, she gave me fruit of the tree, and I ate.” Then the Lord 
God said to the woman, “What is this that you have done?” The woman 
said, “The serpent deceived me, and I ate.” Then the Lord God said, “Behold, 
the man has become like one of us in knowing good and evil. Now, lest he 
reach out his hand and take also of the tree of life and eat, and live 
forever—” therefore the Lord God sent him out from the garden of Eden to 
work the ground from which he was taken. He drove out the man, and at 
the east of the garden of Eden he placed the cherubim and a flaming sword 
that turned every way to guard the way to the tree of life. 
The original sinners are recorded as withdrawing and hiding from God’s presence in 
shame, and God’s response is likewise to send them out from His garden. Inasmuch 
as shame causes a person not to attend to the revelation of God’s goodness, and 
inasmuch as God sends a person away from His revealed presence, the integrating 
effect of grace will be weakened, and it becomes easier and easier for the will to 
become disordered.207 This withdrawal, coupled with their supposedly new 
knowledge of good and evil (which suggests that there are more decisions one can 
become fragmented over than merely whether one eats from a tree), perhaps helps 
explain the progression from Genesis 4:1-7, where God tells Cain that whilst sin is 
crouching at the door, he can control his fragmentary desires to murder his brother: 
Now Adam knew Eve his wife, and she conceived and bore Cain, saying, “I 
have gotten a man with the help of the Lord.” And again, she bore his 
brother Abel. Now Abel was a keeper of sheep, and Cain was a worker of the 
ground. [In the course of time], Cain brought to the Lord an offering of the 
fruit of the ground, and Abel also brought of the firstborn of his flock and of 
their fat portions. And the Lord had regard for Abel and his offering, but for 
Cain and his offering he had no regard. So Cain was very angry, and his face 
fell. The Lord said to Cain, “Why are you angry, and why has your face 
fallen? If you do well, will you not be accepted? And if you do not do well, 
                                                          
207 This phenomenon is not just limited to the story of the fall. We see it reappear time and again in 
both Old and New Testaments. For instance, in Isaiah 6, we see Isaiah fall on his face before a vision 
of God, because, he says, he recognises his guilt before God. 
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sin is crouching at the door. Its desire is contrary to you, but you must rule 
over it.” 
To the interaction God and Cain have after Abel’s murder (Genesis 4:8-16):  
Cain spoke to Abel his brother. And when they were in the field, Cain rose 
up against his brother Abel and killed him. Then the Lord said to Cain, 
“Where is Abel your brother?” He said, “I do not know; am I my brother's 
keeper?” And the Lord said, “What have you done? The voice of your 
brother's blood is crying to me from the ground. And now you are cursed 
from the ground, which has opened its mouth to receive your brother's 
blood from your hand. When you work the ground, it shall no longer yield to 
you its strength. You shall be a fugitive and a wanderer on the earth.” Cain 
said to the Lord, “My punishment is greater than I can bear. Behold, you 
have driven me today away from the ground, and from your face I shall be 
hidden. I shall be a fugitive and a wanderer on the earth, and whoever finds 
me will kill me.” Then the Lord said to him, “Not so! If anyone kills Cain, 
vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold.” And the Lord put a mark on 
Cain, lest any who found him should attack him. Then Cain went away from 
the presence of the Lord and settled in the land of Nod, east of Eden. 
Where God withdraws further and further from Cain (note in verse 14 that Cain is 
now hidden from God’s face, the partial revelation of God’s goodness, and in verse 
16, he is also sent away from the presence of the Lord). And how, after this divine 
withdrawal, Cain’s descendants grow progressively worse and worse, until we find 
written in Genesis 6:5-6: 
The Lord saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that 
every intention of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. And 
the Lord regretted that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him to 
his heart.  
Thus, the disordering of the will leads to the further withdrawal from God’s 
presence, as those who have sinned hide themselves from God, and how God, in 
response, withdraws his presence from them. But, in turn, this withdrawal only 
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prompts the further disordering of the will until the ‘intention of the thoughts of [a 
person’s] heart was only evil continually’. To rephrase that in terms familiar to the 
Thomist moral psychology we have been using, this mutual withdrawal prompts 
ever more conflicting second-order desires, and also prevents second-order desires 
aligning with first-order desires. 
The corruption that follows original sin, then, can be explained in terms of the 
withdrawal of God’s grace (i.e., the revelation of His goodness), in response to 
man’s shame and guilt, combined with the knowledge of good and evil that 
presents more occasions for fragmentary desires (for, prior to both the primal and 
the original sin, it seems the only occasion for fragmentary desire was in response 
to a desire for knowledge pertaining to God). Without appropriate attendance to 
God’s grace, the revelation of His goodness, helping the correct ordering of a 
person’s will, I suggest that it is inevitable a postlapsarian person will come to 
desire their personal power and pleasure over the greater good of union with God. 
And inasmuch as this might be true for the original sinners, it is likely also true for 
the primal sinner, too.  
Given this, there is an obvious dilemma present. As I suggested at the end of the 
previous chapter, if a person is to behold the beatific vision and be united with God, 
they must, at the very least, act on a desire to behold this vision. If such a person 
does not desire to do so, whatever union that might subsequently follow cannot 
satisfy the two-will requirement for real union. However, the further God 
withdraws from a person, or the further a person withdraws from God, the less 
likely it is a person will ever have that desire.  
One helpful way to understand this process of internal fragmentation is through an 
analogy to seed germination.208 Though we may be born internally integrated, 
continued integration requires continued openness to the grace of God. However, 
this grace is, necessarily, partial.209 Without adequate reflection (possible due to 
the fact this revelation is partial), our wills will become disordered. If we live long 
                                                          
208 This analogy was inspired by personal correspondence with Stump. 
209 If it were complete, we would remain impeccable, and so, incapable of making a serious free 
choice to be united with God. 
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enough, as happened with the primal and original sinners, this will happen. The 
seed will germinate and take root. And like a kudzu plant, once it has taken root, it 
is invasive, difficult to control, and grows rapidly, damaging everything around it. 
Eventually, it takes over, and we become internally fragmented: no longer desiring 
what is ultimately good for us, or even desiring to desire what is ultimately good for 
us, but rather desiring the lesser goods of power and pleasure. Because we lack this 
second-order desire, that is, because we fail to desire to desire union with God, we 
are incapable of the mutual closeness required for that union. In consequence, 
scriptural revelation suggests that all that is left for us is the worst thing possible for 
us, namely, our permanent separation from God.  
Furthermore, this same defect in the will that results in internal fragmentation also 
prevents humans from willing their own internal integration. And because humans 
do not want to become internally integrated,210 they also do not want to accept 
further gifts of grace that might help them become psychologically integrated.  
So, if we are to provide an account of union with God, we must explain how it is 
that such an internally fragmented person can come to desire union with God (i.e., 
to behold the beatific vision), without God interfering with their free will. 
 
Shame, Guilt and ‘Willed Loneliness’ 
In addition to this lack of desire, in the previous section, I mentioned that shame 
and guilt over previous wrongdoing was also problem, causing further distance 
between God and a person. Concerning this guilt and shame the theologian T.F. 
Torrance writes of the Genesis narrative:  
Then we discover that the bond of fellowship between God and man is 
broken by rebellion and sin. It belongs to the nature of sin to divide, to 
create disorder, to disrupt, to destroy fellowship. What are the 
consequences of sin? Not only is the bond of communion between God and 
                                                          
210 If a person really did want to be internally integrated, she would be, and this problem would be 
moot. 
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man broken, issuing in man’s guilty fear of God, but the bond between man 
and woman is impaired: guilt and shame come in between them, and even 
the symbol of wearing clothes is interpreted in terms of the hiddenness of 
man from woman and of woman from man. The man-woman relationship is 
involved in the broken relation with God. With the bond between them 
broken, man and woman are individualised, and each is turned in upon 
himself or herself. But even the unity of man as male, and the unity of 
woman as female, within the individual heart is disrupted, in the knowledge 
of good and evil. Each knows that he or she is no longer what he or she 
ought to be.211 
In an influential paper on the nature of the Atonement, Stump suggests that guilt 
and shame should each be taken to focus on the belief in the appropriateness of 
the other repudiating, with respect to you, one of the twin desires that together 
form the Thomist account of love.212 Shame, she says, contrasts with the desire for 
union with the beloved, whilst guilt with the desire for the good of the beloved. 
Shame and guilt can limit or prevent union inasmuch as if Peter believes it is 
appropriate for Jack to reject him, or for Jack to desire something Peter thinks is in 
some sense bad for him, Peter is motivated to withdraw himself from Jack; to avoid 
second-personal encounter or dyadic joint attention, and to refrain from personal 
closeness with him, and perhaps to an extent with himself, too. In as much as this 
happens, Peter’s union with Jack is limited or prevented entirely. 213 These union-
defeating consequences of guilt and shame therefore motivate Peter’s ‘willed 
loneliness’.214  
                                                          
211 Torrance, 2008: 38-9. 
212 Stump, 2012: 132. 
213 Stump, 2012: 132. Note that ‘appropriate’ is distinct from ‘ought’. If I forgive you, it very well 
might be the case that I ought not desire to reject you, but this does not imply that it would have 
been inappropriate for me to do so.  
214 Stump writes: 
 
The love Aquinas describes, and the union desired in that love, with the closeness requisite 
for union, can have its full actualization only in case the person who loves is internally 
integrated.  This is union, closeness, and love in the strenuous mode; and the lack of 
internal integration around the good undermines or destroys it. Shame is an obstacle to it 
as well. (Stump, 2010: 150) 
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Furthermore, Stump suggests that whilst there might be an objective fact of the 
matter about whether it would be appropriate for another to reject you, or desire 
your hard treatment, there is also a subjective state of feeling shame or feeling 
guilt, where this subjective state actually leads to an inclination away from or an 
inability to dyadically attend to the other.  
In the case of both objective and subjective shame, shame stems from a failure to 
meet a standard you accept as being in some sense authoritative over you. In the 
case of subjective shame, this is a standard that you believe a community that you 
take yourself to be a member of holds, and that you, as a member of that 
community, can be judged against.215 So, the person experiencing subjective shame 
recognises the standard they judge themselves to have fallen short of as being in 
some sense authoritative over them, such that they come to believe it would be 
appropriate for other members of this community to (in some sense) reject them, 
because they have not met this standard.  
Consider, for instance, the guest who absentmindedly turns up to a wedding in a 
white dress, or the lawyer who turns up to their first day at a prestigious new job 
wearing jeans and a tee-shirt. In each case, we can imagine them realising they 
have failed to meet a certain standard upheld by the (perhaps very local) 
community they are in, a standard they nevertheless take to be authoritative on 
them (for instance, that wedding guests in certain communities in England avoid 
white dresses, and that lawyers working at a certain prestigious company wear suits 
to work). In such an instance, we can imagine the wedding attendee wanting to 
avoid the bride, and the lawyer avoiding their colleagues, believing in each case 
that it would be appropriate for the other(s) to reject them (in some sense of 
‘reject’). 216 However, there is no necessary connection between the standard a 
subjectively shamed person thinks they have failed to meet, and an actual standard 
held by the community. A person can think they have failed to meet a certain 
community standard without having actually done so. For instance, among some 
                                                          
215 With this being the case regardless of the merits of the standard. 
216 Clearly, I do not mean to imply that those who feel subjective shame have in fact done something 
wrong, or are to be blamed. ‘Subjective shame’ is merely a descriptive label, not a normative claim. 
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communities in Indonesia, it is polite to leave food on one’s plate at the end of the 
meal, to show you are full, whilst among some communities in England, it is polite 
to finish one’s meal. We can imagine that, due to feeling full, an English person on a 
first-time business trip to Indonesia feeling subjective shame over failing to clear 
their plate at a dinner held in their honour. What matters for the experience of 
subjective shame is that the person concerned accepts what they take to be a 
community standard as being in some sense authoritative over them (regardless of 
what this standard turns out to be, regardless of whether the community in fact 
endorses said standard). Subjective shame is therefore descriptive, tracking the 
experience of shame, rather than normative, tracking whether one ought to feel 
shame. 
Objective shame, on the other hand, occurs only when one fails to meet an actual 
(typically, morally justified) community standard, that is, it occurs when it is in fact 
appropriate for another to reject you. Unlike subjective shame, however, one can 
be objectively shamed without realising it, and so, shamed without immediately 
coming to the belief that it is appropriate that another reject you as a person. 
Likewise, one can think one is objectively shamed when one is in fact merely 
subjectively shamed. And, of course, one can be both objectively and subjectively 
shamed at the same time.217 
Whilst these objective and subject states do not always necessarily match up (as 
suggested, one might feel subjective shame without being objectively shamed, or 
one might not feel subjective guilt whilst being objectively guilty), I will assume 
that, when presented with the beatific vision, when all the facts of the matter are 
known such that one has ideal information, subjective shame and guilt will align 
with objective shame and guilt.218 
                                                          
217 A helpful way to think about objective shame is to consider whether a person would feel 
subjective shame given all relevant information, from behind something like a Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance. If they would, they are also objectively shamed. If they would not, it is likely objective 
shame and subjective shame have come apart in this instance. It might be the case that, given these 
conditions, nobody can be objectively shamed, for there are, in fact, no actual morally justifiable 
community standards. I take up this possibility a little later in this chapter. 
218 As a result, I will be focusing primarily on ways of defeating objective shame, as given these 
circumstances, if objective shame and subjective shame always align, and one’s objective shame is 
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As well as there being objective and subjective shame, Stump offers a further 
taxonomy. Shame, she suggests, is an existential problem that arises from reflection 
on one of four states of affairs:  
(1) reflection on one’s own individual moral wrongdoing,  
(2) reflection upon wrongs that have been done to you, 
(3) reflection upon some impairment or defect of nature, and  
(4), reflection on your communal participation in a certain community that 
has perpetrated significant wrongdoing.219 
By way of a brief justification for this division; with respect to (1), Linda Radzik 
suggests that wrongdoing is communicative. 220 A person who wrongs another 
communicates disrespect for that person. Whilst that communication of disrespect 
continues, it is appropriate for the other to reject the wrongdoer as a person. 
With respect to (2) and (3) Stump notes that victims of serious crime and those who 
have been born (or later developed) certain impediments often talk of the helpless 
shame they feel over what has happened to them. 
With respect to (4), Stump notes that communal shame is often felt by those 
associated with serious wrongdoers. Parents may feel shame over the actions of 
their child, citizens of a country (say, Germany during the Nazi regime) may feel 
shame over the association with their nationality. And perhaps, too, Stump 
suggests, there is a certain kind of shame that arises from membership in the 
human race.221 
                                                          
defeated, then one’s subjective shame will also be defeated. Were I not starting with this set of ideal 
circumstances, this alignment could not be taken for granted, as I am doing. 
219 Stump, 2016: 111-129. 
220 Radzik writes,  
 
To wrong another person is to insult and threaten that person. To do nothing (or to fail to 
do enough) to correct that action is to allow the insult and the threat to stand. It is to 
condone their continued influence. When one fails to atone, one suggests that one still 
views the victim as inferior and that one remains a threat to the victim. The obligation to 
atone, then, amounts to an obligation to cease wronging the victim. (Radzik, 2008: 77). 
221 Stump, 2016: 111-129. 
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As I shall later argue, whilst one can feel subjective shame with respect to (1), (2), 
(3), or (4), objective shame is typically limited to (1) (and, although this is not as 
clear cut, plausibly (4), too). Nevertheless, unless rectified, subjective shame has 
the same effect as objective shame, namely, willed loneliness, and so, whilst it may 
be the case that ways of rectifying subjective shame are radically different to ways 
of rectifying objective shame, the relational damage caused by subjective shame 
still requires undoing. 
Contrasted with shame, guilt is explained as a moral attitude directly stemming 
from reflection upon the damage caused by one’s wrongdoing. Similar to shame, 
guilt is objective just in case one truly wronged the other person, and it is subjective 
to the extent that you believe you have wronged the other person (regardless of 
whether you have in fact done so). 
As I shall use them, shame will serve as a placeholder for the belief, however it 
arises, that it would be appropriate for the other to reject you as a person, that is, 
appropriate for the other not to desire union with you.  
Guilt, on the other hand, will serve as a placeholder for the belief that it would be 
appropriate for the other to desire something that is in one sense bad for you, 
namely, some reparation for the damage caused by your wrongdoing. 
In using these as placeholder terms, I am deliberately avoiding the question of 
whether ‘guilt’ and ‘shame’, as I use them, map on to the way guilt and shame are 
put to everyday use. No doubt guilt and shame are significantly more complex, and 
the boundaries between them far more blurred, than I am giving credit for. 
However, accurate definitions of guilt and shame are unavailable, and I do not have 
the expertise to fill in this gap. Nevertheless, I am persuaded that there is significant 
enough overlap between the placeholder definitions and the theological (and also, 
real world) definitions to warrant their use in such a manner. 
Both guilt and shame, as I use them, then, can be thought of as in some sense self-
reflexive reactive attitudes. Whilst original sin leads to psychological fragmentation 
through the disordering of the higher-order desires, guilt and shame can lead to 
psychological fragmentation through contrary first-order desires for what Stump 
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describes as a state of ‘willed loneliness’. And inasmuch as guilt and shame might 
both cause fragmentary first-order desires, they can also inhibit joint attention. A 
person who is subjectively guilty or shamed is liable to avoid sharing significant 
personal presence with the one with respect to whom they are guilty or shamed, 
just we saw alluded to in the biblical narrative of the fall, and as we see elsewhere 
in the scriptural text, for instance: 
1 John 2:28 ‘And now, little children, abide in him, so that when he appears 
we may have confidence and not shrink from him in shame at his coming.’ 
Daniel 12:2 ‘And many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall 
awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting 
contempt.’222 
Concerning this connection between joint (or shared) attention and shame, Stump 
writes: 
Many different things can disrupt or prevent shared attention. Obviously, 
simple physical distance between mutually close persons can have this 
result. To take a small and homely example, when a loving father sends his 
misbehaved two-year old to her room, she and he are in this condition. 
There is mutual closeness between them, but, momentarily anyway, there is 
no shared attention and therefore no personal presence or union either. 
Distraction can have the same effect. If the father and daughter were 
together but the father’s attention was only on his work and not on his 
daughter, shared attention would be precluded then too.  
In fact, anything that diminishes or takes away one person’s ability or 
willingness to meet another person face-to-face will hinder shared 
attention. Shame, for example, will do so. A shamed person typically finds it 
very difficult to meet the gaze of others, even if the shamed person is in no 
                                                          
222 For more references about shame, see Jeremiah 17:13, Isaiah 45:17, Revelation 6:15-16, and Ezra 
9:6; for more about guilt, see Isaiah 6:1-6 and Ezra 9:15,  
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way culpable for her shamed state; and so shared attention can fail to occur 
in such cases too.  
Great pain, physical or psychological, can have the same effect. A person in 
great pain might be unable to meet another person face-to-face, with 
shared attention, because it is difficult for her to focus on anything besides 
her pain. Instructions to labor coaches helping women during the pain of 
childbirth emphasize that if a laboring woman is in great pain, shared 
attention between her and her coach may be interrupted unless there is 
insistent intervention on the part of the coach. As these instructions imply, a 
person in pain may find it difficult to attend to another, even with the help 
of that other, even if she had antecedently planned on attending to that 
other. In cases such as this, there can be mutual closeness between two 
persons, but the normal manifestation of this closeness in significant 
personal presence is blocked because shared attention is disrupted by 
something external, such as pain, which gets in the way.223 
So, as I take it, unless a person’s (objective) guilt and shame are dealt with, that 
person will be unable to unite with God, for, I suggest, they will be unable to jointly 
attend to God at the beatific vision.224 Likewise, unless a person freely wills union 
with God, that person cannot unite with God. So, if either of those two 
circumstances obtain, it is part of the Christian tradition that for such a person, they 
are unable to behold the beatific vision, and so, they are consigned to the worst 
thing for them, permanent separation from God, that is, to hell.  
In the next section of this chapter I will articulate one consequence this view has on 
the doctrine of hell, namely, that those in hell may be there because they are 
unable to dyadically share attention with God, that is, they unable to behold the 
beatific vision, and that in fact, given this, hell could, despite being in one sense the 
worst place for them, also be the most loving place God could place them. 
                                                          
223 Stump, 2012a: 3. 
224 In this way, a parallel can be drawn to something like spiritual autism. For more on the analogy 
with spiritual autism, see Pinsent, 2016. 
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The Doctrine of Hell 
In the Gospel according to Matthew (13:49-50), Jesus appears to tell his disciples 
that hell will be a ‘grim’225 place filled with what we might describe as ‘maximally 
bad suffering’ – suffering that in some sense constitutes the worst thing for the 
sufferer.226 The Gospel author records Jesus as saying, ‘So it will be at the end of the 
age; the angels will come forth and take out the wicked from among the righteous, 
and will throw them into the furnace of fire; in that place there will be weeping and 
gnashing of teeth.’  
Such suffering is evidently not of garden-variety ‘toe-stubbing’ form. Rather, it is 
part of the orthodox tradition that the sufferings of hell – whatever it is that causes 
the weeping and gnashing of teeth – are exactly the kinds of suffering proponents 
of the argument from evil might point to as exemplar defeaters for the existence of 
an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good God.227 
And inasmuch as this argument from evil is persuasive when one considers 
suffering in this earthly life, it seems it ought to be similarly persuasive when one 
considers the reported possibility of maximally bad suffering in the life to come. 
And so, there is a problem of hell that follows the model of the problem of evil.228 
Consider, then, the following grim-hell-modified version of the argument from evil: 
1. If an omni-God exists and there is maximally bad suffering in hell, then God 
has a morally sufficient reason for allowing this maximally bad suffering in 
hell. 
                                                          
225 I use ‘grim’ here in a technical sense, as opposed to ‘mild’ varieties of hell employed in various 
degrees of ‘mild’ by Swinburne 1983, Stump 1986, and Walls 1992. ‘Grim’ is used to refer to the fact 
that such a hell truly is (or is among) the worst thing(s) that could happen to you. 
226 Adams (1999: 32), uses the term ‘horrendous evil’ to refer to suffering which ‘constitutes a prima 
facie reason to doubt whether the participant’s life could (given their inclusion in it) have positive 
meaning for him/her on the whole.’ This is, perhaps, reflective include maximally bad suffering. 
227 See, for instance, van Inwagen 2000. 
228 Of course, this is not a new observation. See Craig 1989 or Adams 1993 for further discussion on 
forms ‘the problem of hell’ might take. For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on the problem I 
define below. 
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2. There is no morally sufficient reason for allowing maximally bad suffering in 
hell. 
3. So, either an omni-God does not exist or there is no maximally bad suffering 
in hell. 
4. There is maximally bad suffering in hell. 
5. So, an omni-God does not exist. 
Premise one is a conceptual truth, and premise three and five are conclusions 
based upon trivial rules of inference. There are, therefore, two moves the classical 
theist can make in response to this argument.229 They can deny premise four, that 
there is maximally bad suffering in hell (citing either the plausibly mild nature of 
hell, as Stump has done,230 or proposing some form of universalism, like Marilyn 
McCord Adams has done,231 or annhilationism, like Kelly James Clark has done232), 
or alternatively, they can reject premise two by providing a plausible morally 
sufficient reason for why God might allow maximally bad suffering in hell.233  
However, I want to focus on analysis of the second option, that is, to attempts to 
provide a plausible morally sufficient reason as to why God might allow maximally 
bad suffering in a ‘grim’ hell.234 I will start by transposing and evaluating what I 
consider to be the most plausible morally-sufficient-reason responses that have 
been used to counter the argument from evil in this earthly life. These responses 
are namely:235  
                                                          
229 Note that this argument does not show that there could be no God, only that an omni-God, the 
God of classical theism, could not exist. 
230 See Stump 1986. 
231 See, for instance, Adams 1999. 
232 See, for instance, Clark 2001. Note that Thomists reject annhilationism because on the Thomistic 
account, being and goodness are coreferential (see ST I Q 5 A 1). Destroying being (as would happen 
if a person is annihilated) is therefore necessarily bad, and God, being perfectly good (namely, the 
greatest possible being), cannot do that which is bad. 
233 Alternatively, rather than provide a plausible morally sufficient reason, they could also appeal to 
skeptical theism and claim that God does have a reason, but it beyond our ability to discern God’s 
reasons in this matter. I will not address this response at all. 
234 If a response can be found that works in a ‘grim’ hell, a response in the same genus is likely also 
to work in the case of a ‘mild’ hell. 
235 Following Adams 1993, I will suggest that each reason as-used in contemporary literature is still 
unable to account for the possibility of maximally bad suffering in a ‘grim’ hell, and so traditional- 
‘grim’-hell-believing theists remain vulnerable to the modified version of the argument from evil. I 
will then propose a modified morally-sufficient-reason response that I think might be able to 
account for such suffering in hell.  
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(1) an appeal to the justice of such maximally bad suffering in hell,  
(2) an appeal to some positive benefit – that is, some future reward - that 
accrues to the sufferer as a result of their maximally bad suffering, or  
(3) an appeal to some negative benefit – that is, some harm prevented - that 
accrues to the sufferer as a result of their maximally bad suffering. 
The first morally-sufficient-reason response is fairly straight-forward. If one has 
broken a just law, and there is a just punishment set for breaking that law, it is just 
for one to suffer said punishment, even if no other benefit is afforded to you. This 
sort of response can be found, in part, in Augustine’s work on the Fall.236 However, 
this response to the problem of suffering in hell seems on the face of it deeply 
inappropriate. After all, on this story, God is either the author and executor of both 
law and punishment, or else he is bound by some external constraint on what is 
just. An appeal to the justice of the law and the justice of the punishment will not 
absolve God from setting the world up in such a way that justice demands such 
eternal and maximally bad suffering (for if God did set the world up like that, can 
God be perfectly good?), nor can an appeal to some external constraints on justice 
solve the dilemma, at least, not without raising a whole host of other intractable 
questions (for if God is externally constrained by something besides himself, is God 
truly omnipotent?).237 
Now, there may be more to say about this first approach, but I mention it only to 
put it to one side. Instead, for the remainder of this paper, I want to look at the 
other two morally-sufficient-reason responses, and in particular, the way they have 
been employed in what I consider to be the most successful theodicy for the 
problem of evil, the theodicy found in Stump’s Wandering in Darkness.238 
In Wandering in Darkness, Stump offers what we might call a ‘theodicy of union’. In 
short, Stump argues that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing suffering 
if the suffering (1) primarily benefits the sufferer and (2) the benefit of the suffering 
                                                          
236 See Augustine, DCD, Book 14, Chapter 3. 
237 For more on these objections, see Lewis 2007. 
238 Stump, 2010. 
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sufficiently outweighs or defeats the suffering endured.239 Stump suggests that God 
is always justified in allowing a person to suffer if by allowing it either the sufferer’s 
permanent separation from God, what she describes as the objectively and 
subjectively worst thing that can happen to a person, can be prevented or if their 
deeper union with God, what she describes as their objectively and subjectively 
greatest good, can be motivated.240  
In her theodicy, Stump explicitly connects the avoidance of permanent separation 
from God with negative benefit and the securing of a deeper union with God with 
positive benefit.241 Whilst suffering might also bring with it other benefits, such as 
positive character development or a demonstration of human freedom, it is unclear 
whether the benefit gained really does outweigh the sort of (close to) maximally 
bad suffering typically showcased in evidential arguments. To get around this, 
Stump limits suffering to motivating what she takes from Aquinas to be the 
absolute best thing for a person and avoiding its negation, the absolute worst thing 
for a person.242 Finally, Stump notes that at least minimal consent (where such 
suffering is only involuntary secundum quid) is necessary for suffering for positive 
benefit, and so suffering for future reward is a morally-sufficient-reason only in case 
the sufferer has in some sense consented to it.243 
So far, so good; however, Stump’s account runs into a serious problem when faced 
with the traditional doctrine of a ‘grim’ hell. Not only does it seem unlikely that an 
inhabitant of a ‘grim’ hell would ever consent to their maximally bad suffering244 
(seemingly ruling out their suffering for positive benefit), that inhabitant of hell 
                                                          
239 See Stump, 2010: 13. According to Adams 1993, suffering is outweighed when the quantity of 
benefit vastly exceeds the quantity of suffering. Suffering is defeated when the suffering is logically 
related to some great good the person experiences. 
240 See Stump, 2010: 386-417. 
241 Stump, 2010: 392-394. 
242 Stump, 2010: 386-388. 
243 Stump, 2010: 396. 
244 And even if they could, it may be that they are unable to give competent consent, given the 
human mind’s inability to comprehend suffering for eternity. 
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would already be permanently separated from God (seemingly ruling out their 
suffering for negative benefit).245 
Now for Stump, following Aquinas,246 the desire for union, along with the desire for 
good, are the two interconnected desires that together are required for love.247 The 
desire for union is itself a function of what she calls ‘personal closeness’ and 
‘significant personal presence’, where personal closeness involves a need for the 
beloved and some sort of self-revelation and subsequent indwelling of mind, whilst 
significant personal presence involves direct and unmediated causal and cognitive 
contact, second-personal experience and dyadic joint-attention.248 Stump suggests 
an omnipresent God is always significantly present to His creation; however to the 
extent that significant personal presence or personal closeness are impeded on the 
creature’s side, to that extent will union between them and God be likewise 
limited.249  
Furthermore, Stump argues that to the extent that you are yourself psychologically 
fragmented, to the extent that you have conflicting desires for, for instance, union 
with God and for some conflicting power or pleasure, to that extent will you be 
distanced from yourself, and to that extent will it be difficult or impossible for 
another to become close to you.250 For these reasons Stump argues that union with 
God in the life to come must be wholeheartedly desired by a psychologically 
integrated person. If it cannot or will not be wholeheartedly desired, union will be 
impossible, and such a half-hearted or psychologically fragmented person will find 
themselves permanently separated from God.251 
                                                          
245 A similar point can be made with respect to Adams’ account (‘Horrendous Evils and the Goodness 
of God’). For Adams, there are certain kinds of horrendous suffering that can only be defeated in a 
positive afterlife. But for those in hell, those already in a negative afterlife, there just is no positive 
afterlife available to defeat their suffering. 
246 See ST I-II Q 28. 
247 See Stump, 2010: 85-128. 
248 Stump, 2010: 109-128. 
249 For in this life, union can come in degrees. Whilst it can be desired wholeheartedly, it can also be 
desired half-heartedly. And to the extent that there is a part of you that does not desire union with 
another, to that same extent will union between each be constrained. See Stump, 2010: 117 for 
more details. 
250 Stump, 2010: 130-150 for more details on this line of argument. 
251 Stump, 2010: 150. 
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So, the essence of the problem is this: on the traditional account, once in hell the 
worst thing for a person is certain, and the best thing impossible, so what possible 
morally sufficient reason could there be for that person’s suffering? Before I 
propose an answer to that question, I want to address another one. Besides 
tradition, what reason do we have to think that those in hell might be permanently 
separated from God? Why not opt for an ‘escapist’ model like the one suggested by 
Andrei Buckareff and Allen Plug?252 For if an inhabitant of hell can escape (even if 
they never do), might not Stump’s theodicy work in hell just as it might on earth? 
One attempt to respond to this question is ably summarised by C.S. Lewis in The 
Great Divorce: the inhabitants of hell are those who through their own pride are so 
stubbornly set in their fragmentary desires they will not change their will to choose 
union with God over their own power and pleasure. Lewis writes, 
There are only two kinds of people in the end: those who say to God, ‘Thy 
will be done,’ and those to whom God says, in the end, ‘Thy will be done.’ All 
that are in hell, choose it.253 
We can call this the free-will response. In essence, the damned choose both to be 
sent to hell and then continuously choose to remain in hell. They choose to suffer in 
a way that is maximally bad, and God so values their freewill that he respects and 
preserves their freedom by honouring that choice.  
This sort of a response is, however, deeply problematic. Marilyn McCord Adams 
likens this situation to parent leaving a bowl of poisoned candy in front of their 
child, telling the child not to eat any, then leaving the room. Adams writes, if the 
child were to eat the poisoned candy and die ‘surely the child is at most marginally 
                                                          
252 See Buckareff and Plug 2005. 
253 From Lewis, 2015a: 85. See also Lewis, 2015b: 130: 
I willingly believe that the damned are, in one sense, successful, rebels to the end; that the 
doors of hell are locked on the inside. I do not mean that the ghosts may not wish to come 
out of hell, in the vague fashion wherein an envious man “wishes” to be happy: but they 
certainly do not will even the first preliminary states of that self-abandonment through 
which alone the soul can reach any good. They enjoy forever the horrible freedom they 
have demanded, and are therefore self-enslaved just as the blessed, forever submitting to 
obedience, become through all eternity more and more free.  
114 
 
to blame, even though it knew enough to obey the parent, while the parent is both 
primarily responsible and highly culpable.’ Adams concludes that ‘the value of 
human freedom, however great, is not enough to justify God’s allowing creatures to 
make decisions that bring about their own final, irrevocable ruin.’254 Keith DeRose is 
likewise sceptical of this freewill response. DeRose is concerned that God could 
hardly be considered victorious over sin and death if some of his creation manage 
to frustrate him for all eternity.255 Surely, DeRose suggests, an all-knowing all-
powerful God would have the ingenuity to bring it to be that these stubborn 
individuals eventually relent and choose to be united with Him.256 
As it happens, I find both Adams’ and DeRose’s responses persuasive; however, 
their next move, advocating universalism, sidesteps the morally-sufficient-response 
route I am interested in exploring. So instead of following their move to 
universalism, I am going to propose another response, a response based on 
preserving the integrity of a person’s moral psychology rather than on the value of 
their continued free choice. If instead of stubbornly refusing to desire union with 
God, what if those in hell are, for some other reason, unable to wholeheartedly 
desire union with God? 
In this earthly life, the biggest obstacle to union with God, Stump argues, is a kind of 
willed loneliness brought about by what she describes as ‘the backward-looking 
problem’.257 As a person appropriately reflects upon their previous wrongdoings 
they experience guilt (where ‘guilt’ is a placeholder for ‘the belief it is appropriate 
for God or another to desire some hard treatment for you’) and shame (where 
‘shame’ is a placeholder for ‘the belief that it is appropriate for God or another to 
reject you as a person’). These self-reflexive reactive attitudes, Stump suggests, 
                                                          
254 Adams, 1999: 39. 
255 On this point, Talbott 2004 suggests the only way this is possible is if God, in fact, interferes with 
the freedom of those in hell to ensure they continue to eternally reject Him. 
256 Taken from personal correspondence with him at the 2016 St Thomas Summer Seminar. See also 
his website (accessed November 2016): ‘Universalism and the Bible’ particularly Appendix B 
http://campuspress.yale.edu/keithderose/1129-2/ . Note that unlike Adam’s view, DeRose’s position 
is undermined by Aquinas’s claim that after death a person’s disembodied soul is irreversibly fixed 
on a certain course of action (either desire for union with God, or desire for something else one 
considers better for you), such that even when the disembodied soul is re-bodied, so to speak, it can 
no longer change its orientation. See SCG Book 4, Chapter 95 for more details. 
257 See Stump, 2012: 132-134. 
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inevitably cause union-defeating distance between the appropriately reflecting 
wrongdoer and God.258  
A person appropriately reflecting on their shame and guilt will, typically, desire to 
avoid those whom they feel could appropriately reject them or desire their hard 
treatment, that is, those who might reject either of the twin desires of love towards 
them (where by ‘avoid’ I include avoiding dyadic joint attention). Such avoidance 
will inevitably limit a desire for significant personal presence with that person, and 
to the extent that it causes such psychologically fragmentary desires, it will also 
limit the capacity for others to become close to them.259 And indeed, such 
responses are found repeatedly in scripture in the accounts of those who met God 
(or visions of God) face to face. We read, for instance, that upon experiencing a 
vision of God Isaiah fell on his face and wished himself dead until God told him his 
guilt had been atoned for,260 whilst the prophet Daniel writes: 
And many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to 
everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt.261 
Now, Stump argues that in this life we are able to (and through suffering motivated 
to) take advantage of the unique shame-and-guilt-defeating provisions made 
available to us through the life, death, and resurrection of Christ.262 But what if, as 
plausibly appears to be the case, these provisions are not available in the life to 
come for those who did not avail of them in this earthly life?263 In some sense 
compelled to attend to their (objective) shame and (objective) guilt in the presence 
of God, yet unable to deal with either, such persons would be condemned to an 
eternity of willed loneliness. If Isaiah’s response generalises, it may indeed be in 
                                                          
258 See Stump, 2010: 141-144. 
259 Stump, 2010: 144-150. 
260 See Isaiah 6:1-7. 
261 See Daniel 12:2. 
262 See Stump, 2012: 129-130. 
263 That is, that such provisions are one-off and time-limited. See, for instance, Hebrews 6:4-6, 2 
Thessalonians 1:9, Matthew 25:46. A full analysis of whether this is in fact the case would require 
knowledge of the correct account of Atonement. Given that no such account has been settled upon, 
it remains possible that the provisions of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection are unavailable post-
mortem to those who have not availed of them in this life, and, at least in this chapter, I will assume 
this is the case.  
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some sense better for such a person to be away from God’s revealed presence, 
even for them to be in hell, than for them to be significantly present to God. 
But, a putative objector might respond:  
How does this moral psychology route avoid Adams’s poisoned candy 
thought experiment? After all, it was (presumably) the exercise of their 
human freedom that eventuated in that person feeling guilt and shame, and 
in turn, their own ‘final, irrevocable ruin’. If Adams’s point is troubling for 
the free-will route, should it not be troubling for the moral psychology route 
also?  
At this point, the moral-psychology route can offer us something the free-will 
response cannot. Unlike the free-will response, guilt and shame are self-reflexive 
reactive attitudes relying on appropriate reflection on one's actions. It is only when 
one believes that it is appropriate for another to reject you, or when one believes 
that it is appropriate for another to desire you undergo some hard treatment, that 
guilt and shame will reflexively cause union defeating distance. But, if it is the case 
that we truly are like the three-year-old candy lover in Adams’ thought experiment, 
appropriate reflection264 upon one's action would lead one to believe it is in fact not 
appropriate for God to reject you or for God to desire some hard treatment for you, 
and as a result you will not feel guilt and shame.265 This being said, if, given all 
relevant information, appropriate reflection does in fact lead one to believe that 
guilt and shame are appropriate, then Adams’s thought experiment (and variations 
on the theme) will not work, for although we might think, in our current state of 
ignorance, that we are like three-year-old candy lovers, it may turn out that we are 
in fact not. This conclusion, of course, might mean that the actual population of hell 
is very small indeed (perhaps, if we are all like Adams’s three-year-old candy lovers, 
                                                          
264 By using the term ‘appropriate reflection’ I do not mean to imply that people who are, for 
instance, neuro atypical will become neuro-typical in the life to come. 
265 I assume that, if we are like the three-year-old candy lover, God would provide us with all the 
relevant information to assess whether it is appropriate for us to feel guilt and shame. If God does 
not, that is, He hides some piece of pertinent information from us, and we conclude it is appropriate 
for us to feel guilt and shame when this is not actually the case, then God would be engaging in the 
sort of deception incompatible with a perfectly just, perfectly good omni-God. This is, I think, the 
point of Jesus’ comment in John 9:41, where he says ‘“If you were blind, you would have no guilt; 
but now that you say, ‘We see,’ your guilt remains.’ 
117 
 
even nil), but it need not. So, inasmuch as the moral psychology response has the 
resources to navigate both Adams’s and DeRose’s objections, it explains more 
plausibly why those in hell might be permanently separated from God. However, 
this response does not yet explain whether God actually has a morally sufficient 
reason to allow those in hell to suffer in a way that is maximally bad.  
Consider, then, the following possible morally sufficient reason: although it looks as 
though union with God is no longer naturally possible, for those in hell there might 
be new naturally possible states that become that person’s objective and subjective 
greatest good, and new naturally possible states that become the worst objective 
and subjective thing for them. If suffering to avoid the worst thing for a person, or 
to secure the best thing for that person, can be morally justified in this life, there is 
no reason why suffering might not also be justified if it can be used to avoid what 
might become the worst thing for a person, given the possibilities open to them, or 
to secure what has now become the best thing for them, given the possibilities 
open to them. In what remains of this section, I will identify and briefly analyse 
what I consider to be two such plausible ‘new states’, namely, (1) an alternate 
best/worst state (namely, an acquired second nature) and (2) an adapted 
best/worst state. I will take each in turn. 
Once the possibility of union with God has gone, a person can still attempt to 
psychologically integrate themselves around what has become what Stump 
describes a person’s ‘acquired second nature’.266 On the Thomist account Stump 
employs, after death a person’s disembodied soul is irreversibly fixed on a certain 
‘ultimate end’ (either the desire for union with God, or desire for something else 
one considers preferable), such that even when the disembodied soul is re-bodied, 
so to speak, it can no longer change the orientation of this desire.267 Aquinas writes: 
In the same way, also, the souls which immediately after death are made 
miserable in punishment become unchangeable in their wills… 
                                                          
266 See Stump 1986. 
267 See SCG, Book 4, Chapters 93 and 95 for more details. 
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Now, on the ultimate end the entire goodness or wickedness of the will 
depends, for whatever goods one wills in an order toward a good end he 
wills well; whatever evil he wills in an order toward an evil end he wills 
badly. Therefore, there is not in the separated soul a will changeable from 
good to evil, although it is changeable from this object of will to that so long 
as the order to the same ultimate end is preserved. 
It is now apparent that such immutability is not in conflict with the power of 
free will whose act it is to choose, for choice is of the things for the end; 
choice is not of the ultimate end. Therefore, just as there is now no conflict 
with free will in the fact that with an immutable will we desire beatitude 
and fly from misery in general, so there will be no contrariety to free will in 
the fact that the will is unchangeably fixed upon some definite thing as upon 
an ultimate end. The reason: just as there now inheres in us unchangeably 
that common nature by which we desire beatitude in general, so then there 
will persist in us unchangeably that special disposition by which this thing or 
that is desired as ultimate end.268 
Although this second-best state, namely, having a desire for some other ultimate 
end, might pale in comparison to union with God, securing, or getting as close to, 
that ultimate end may nevertheless be in some sense better than all other 
alternative states now open to that person. 
Whilst it may not be possible to wholeheartedly psychologically integrate around a 
desire for such a second nature (and therefore may be harder to keep such a desire 
motivated), such a unifying desire might preserve the greatest possible degree of 
psychological integration for that inhabitant of hell.269 If we can tell a story about 
how God allows a person to suffer to encourage as much psychological integration 
as possible, and how allowing them to fulfil (as best they can) this ultimate end 
might in fact be the best thing for them (given the options open to them), we may 
                                                          
268 SCG Book 4, Chapters 93 and 95. 
269 Contra Frankfurt, Stump suggests wholehearted psychological integration is only possible around 
the (supernatural) greatest good, namely, union with God. See Stump 2010 (125-6) for Stump’s 
engagement with Frankfurt. 
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be able to provide a morally sufficient reason for their suffering, perhaps even their 
maximally bad suffering, in hell. 
This is all the more the case when one considers what appears to be the 
alternatives available to them. The alternative to such suffering appears, given their 
fragmentary second nature, certainly not to be ‘no suffering’ (especially when those 
with fragmentary second natures are likely to tend toward ever increasing self-
inflicted suffering, as one finds in Dante’s Inferno). Rather, it looks like the 
alternative involves total psychological fragmentation. Given that total 
psychological fragmentation is often considered the effect of truly horrendous 
suffering, it seems fair to consider apparently maximally bad suffering that is 
designed to prevent total psychological fragmentation as in some sense better for 
that person.270 
So, if it were the case that suffering, even maximally bad self-inflicted suffering, was 
necessary to motivate psychological integration around this newly acquired 
‘ultimate end’ (or ‘second nature’), just as it may be the case in this earthly life, God 
may have a morally sufficient reason to allow such suffering to occur in hell. 
Having said this much, there is a serious issue with this type of response (at least, 
an issue if you want to preserve premise four, the maximally bad suffering of hell, 
by denying premise two in the opening argument). Whatever one thinks of the 
merits or demerits of this view, it looks like it cannot help but turn into a ‘mild’ hell. 
If one accepts the Thomist view that motivates this account, it looks like the 
mechanism that irreversibly fixes the will on a certain ultimate end might also 
prevent the will from total fragmentation. If this is the case, subsequent suffering 
cannot motivate the best thing for a person, or help that person avoid the worst 
thing. Rather, whatever suffering is endured is caused by the sufferer themselves as 
they try and reach their warped ultimate end. So, it looks like this view ends up 
always collapsing back into Stump’s ‘mild’ hell account.271 The only ways to read 
                                                          
270 Note that total psychological fragmentation in essence destroys the person (or at least, what 
makes the person a person). 
271 Stump writes: 
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maximally bad suffering into this account would involve either lowering the bar for 
what counts as maximally bad suffering, or, alternatively, including some element 
of ‘just’ maximally bad divine punishment, but I am not sure either response is 
worth pursuing, especially given the merits the ‘adapted’ nature account I will now 
turn to. 
One of the motivations for the Thomist view is, of course, a defence of the free will 
of the inhabitant of hell, that is, their freely willed decision to remain in hell. 
However, by adopting the moral psychology response to explain the permanent 
separation from God of those in hell, it does not matter to my account whether a 
person is steadfast in desiring an alternative ultimate end, or whether they in fact 
do still retain (or come to have) a partial desire union with God. 
And why might this be important? Well, at this juncture it will be helpful to recall a 
further way Aquinas qualifies union between persons. Union, Aquinas notes, can be 
real or affective.272 Real union occurs when two people are significantly present to 
                                                          
On Dante’s view, what God does with the damned is treat them according to their second 
nature, the acquired nature they have chosen for themselves. He confines them within a 
place where they can do no more harm to the innocent. In this way he recognizes their evil 
nature and shows that he has a care for it, because by keeping the damned from doing 
further evil, he prevents their further disintegration, their further loss of goodness and of 
being. He cannot increase or fulfil the being of the damned; but by putting restraints on the 
evil they can do, he can maximise their being by keeping them from additional decay. In this 
way, then, he shows love – Aquinas’s sort of love – for the damned. 
 
And in the second place, in hell God provides for the damned a place in which they may still 
act and will in accordance with their nature, their second, self-chosen nature…[by granting 
the damned] a place in which to exercise [their second-nature], God allows [them] as much 
being, and thus, as much goodness, [as they are] capable of…In doing so God treats the 
damned according to their nature and promotes their good; and because He is goodness 
itself, by maximising the good of the damned, he comes as close as he can to uniting them 
with himself – that is to say, he loves them. (1986, 179) 
272 ST I-II Q 28 A 1. See also Pruss 2010 (31-33) (although Pruss talks about ‘formal’ rather than 
‘affective’ union, he is referring to the same thing), and Cleveland and Cleveland 2016 (13-14). Pruss 
writes, for instance: 
 
But love and formal union can exist without any reciprocation, physical presence, or real 
union. I can love someone halfway around the world, with whom I will never have any 
contact, simply because I have read something about this person. (Such a love need not be 
entirely cheap; it might, for instance, include a commitment in favor of this person.) But we 
know that when we love, we are not satisfied with absence, even though we can love just 
as truly in absentia. Absence makes the heart fonder, but it does so precisely by making the 
lover long for presence. This is another way of seeing that love is not about its own growth: 
while absence makes love grow, what the lover desires is not absence, but presence. 
Formal union can be had even with those who are completely absent (note that absence is 
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each other, and are personally close. In this way, real union is necessarily 
reciprocal—the union of the saints and God in heaven, or of a close husband and 
wife might suffice as examples of real union. Affective union, on the other hand, 
only requires a limited kind of personal closeness. Affective union is a union of one 
mind with another; one person needing the other for who they are, and that same 
person somehow inhabiting or indwelling the mind of that other. In this way, then, 
affective union can occur without proximity, and can be unrequited. It is possible, 
for instance, to be affectively united with a distant friend, a pen pal you have never 
met, or even a character in a book (fictional or otherwise). 
Given the psychological barriers of guilt and shame previously mentioned, real 
union between God and an inhabitant of hell looks impossible (even if it is half-
heartedly, or even if, somehow, wholeheartedly, desired by those in hell). Real 
union must be wholeheartedly (at least with respect to God273) reciprocally desired 
to obtain, but it must also be accompanied by significant personal presence, which 
includes dyadic attention with the other. A person with objective guilt and shame 
can, however, never wholeheartedly desire significant personal presence with God 
and be (maximally) significant present to God, as there will always be a part of them 
that either wants to shy away from His presence, or reflexively does so anyway.274 
                                                          
not just a physical distance; there is a sense in which a comatose beloved is largely absent), 
but love impels us toward real union. (33) 
 
Whilst Cleveland and Cleveland write: 
 
Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of union characteristic of love: aﬀective and real. Aﬀective 
union is the union of the lover and the beloved in intellect and in will. Alexander Pruss 
explains that in aﬀective union the lover strives to ‘enter’ the intellect of the beloved in 
order to understand the beloved from the beloved’s point of view. Such understanding 
leads to the union of will wherein the lover shares in the beloved’s joys and sorrows and 
wills her good. Real union is an additional union that lovers achieve through shared activity. 
The appropriate form of shared activity depends upon the form of love, e.g. the love of 
friends, spouses, etc. Since such shared activity involves cooperative interaction between 
the lovers, real union, unlike aﬀective union, requires reciprocity. (14) 
273 See Stump, 2010: 130-150. 
274 Stump writes: 
 
[N]othing about human beings can separate them from the powerful, providential, ever‐
present love of God. But what is desired in love is union. And even omnipotent God cannot 
unilaterally fulfill this desire of love. Even God cannot be united to Jerome if Jerome is 
alienated from himself. Insofar as Jerome is resistant to internal integration, he is in effect 
also resistant to union with God. (2010: 156) 
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But, even though real union might be impossible,275 affective union between God 
and that inhabitant might remain a possibility (even if unrequited). Recall, for 
instance, that on Stump’s account of omnipresence, God is always and everywhere 
– even in hell – available for union with his creation.276 However, the more 
psychologically fragmented a person becomes, the more distant they are from 
themselves, and the harder it becomes to affectively unite with ‘them’ (For who 
would God be uniting with, and which mind would He be indwelling?).277 
In desiring that a person is as integrated as they can be, God is desiring both that 
person’s now greatest good and desiring as much union as is possible with that 
person; in sum, God is loving them as far as it is possible for Him to do so. So, God 
has a reason to want the inhabitant of hell to be as psychologically integrated as 
they can be. But, it also appears in some sense better for that person in hell to be as 
psychologically integrated as they can be, even if this means they endure perhaps 
(self-inflicted) maximally bad suffering.278 
For, why think God desires affective union with those in hell unrequitedly? Nothing 
in the account I have suggested precludes the possibility that those in hell actually 
do desire affective union with God (i.e., desire personal closeness, where personal 
closeness involves a need for the beloved and a desire to, in some sense, indwell in 
the mind of the beloved), and that a significant part of them really does desire real 
union with God (i.e., where they are close to wholeheartedly wanting personal 
closeness with God and where a part of them does in fact want to be significantly 
personally present to God). 
                                                          
275 Recall on Stump’s account, union with God must be desired wholeheartedly and be accompanied 
by significant personal presence. Anything less than wholehearted desire will not lead to union with 
God. (Stump, 2010: 130-150). 
276 And on Zagzebski’s account of omnisubjectivity, God is always and everywhere capable of 
knowing the mind of a person as from that person’s perspective. See Zagzebski 2008. 
277 See Stump, 2010: 156. 
278 This is not only so they can be as (subjectively) good as they can be, but also more objectively, in 
as much as it is good to be loved by God, so that God can love them as fully as it is possible for them 
to be loved. 
123 
 
After seeing the goodness of God prior to inhabiting hell,279 such a person might 
now both desire and also, perhaps reflexively, not desire union with God. They are 
in this sense perhaps necessarily psychologically fragmented; those in hell might 
only have guilt and shame preventing them from dyadically attending to God (all 
other ‘parts’ of them might desire union with God, or at least, can be motivated 
through suffering to desire union with God), where either their fragmentation or 
their inability to dyadically attend to God is sufficient to permanently prevent them 
from real union with God. Indeed, given this possibility, I wonder whether those 
hell-bound (if indeed there are any) choose (if indeed they have to presence of 
mind to choose anything in God’s presence) to go to hell, rather than being forced 
to leave God’s revealed presence, knowing that hell, as a place where God’s 
revealed presence is not, is in some sense better for them. Recognising, perhaps, 
that the fact that it exists is an expression of God’s love for them, as it means they 
do not need to remain in God’s presence in unending (and perhaps more severe) 
psychological distress.280 After all, in this earthly life, we are told we cannot see God 
and live281 (and to that extent we are unable to wholeheartedly unite with God in 
this life). Might not the inhabitants of hell be in a state similar to the one we are in 
presently? The only difference being that they are without the future ability to 
engage in complete dyadic attention with God, yet with the (partial or perhaps even 
wholehearted) desire that they do so, and with the knowledge that such union is 
now impossible.282 
Given this, I suggest that the inhabitant of hell’s ‘weeping and gnashing of teeth’ 
that Jesus refers in the verse I opened with, that is, the very thing that makes the 
sufferings of hell maximally bad, might come from the knowledge that real union 
with God no longer possible for them, that they are to blame for this state of 
                                                          
279 According to Romans 14:11, 'every knee will bow before [Christ]; every tongue will acknowledge 
God.' Perhaps at this point all person’s will come to have some desire for union with God, whilst at 
the same time recognising, through the psychological anguish caused by their guilt and shame, that 
they can never be significantly present to God. 
280 To cite an example Stump uses, it is more loving for the abused spouse to leave (or in this case, to 
send away) the abusive husband than it is for her to remain, and thereby enable and worsen his 
continued psychological fragmentation (2006: 40). 
281 See Exodus 33:20. 
282 To the best of my knowledge, all variants of the ‘mild’ hell thesis reject one or more of these 
three claims. 
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affairs, and therefore that they will be forever frustrated, having lost that desire of 
their heart, a desire they have come to realise was the greatest good for them, and 
the fulfilment of their natural ultimate end.  
Note now that this account of the maximally bad sufferings of hell has a significant 
advantage over the previously discussed second nature account. If Stump and 
Aquinas are right about the worst thing for a person being their separation from 
God (even if it is a willed separation), further physical punishment283 or torture 
would serve no practical purpose for those so separated; it would be otiose, and as 
such, completely unnecessary. Although traditional hell has been associated with a 
pain of loss and a pain of sense, the pain of sense seems, on this account, 
redundant. Whereas on the second-nature account, those in hell do not want to be 
united with God, and so cannot be tormented by that impossibility (and so require 
some further explanation for how and why they suffer), on this adapted-nature 
account, those in hell do (at least partially) want exactly that. The maximally bad 
sufferings of hell, then, might be best understood as a sort of self-inflicted mental 
anguish.284 The anguish and depression that accompanies the knowledge that the 
best thing for you is unattainable. That you can never experience the joy and peace 
that accompanies real union with God, never satisfied with what you achieve, 
consigned to forever having lost your heart’s desire.285 Condemned to the 
knowledge that your life, devoid of its ultimate purpose, may now not be worth 
living.286 This sort of anguish may well cause weeping and gnashing of teeth. 
                                                          
283 The ‘punishment’ of hell just is banishment from God’s revealed presence. However, this 
banishment might also be the most loving thing to do to a person psychologically incapable of being 
in the revealed presence of God. And so even this ‘punishment’ looks like it might serve to 
emphasize the love of God. 
284 In this life, shame and guilt can lead to mental illness, especially depression. In the life to come, 
this same process might be amplified, only with the knowledge that there is no possibility of relief. 
285 Especially if, upon fleetingly seeing God, a person realizes that union with Him, although now 
impossible, is in fact, the greatest of their heart’s desires. 
286 Note here that the worst thing for a person is not permanent separation from God (there is a 
sense in which many people feel separated from God, not even recognising His existence, and seem 
to live lives that do not look like they are full of maximally bad suffering): the worst thing for a 
person is, perhaps, knowing that they are permanently separated from God coupled with the 
knowledge that that union with God was the best thing for them. This is something the second-
nature view cannot accommodate, for on the second nature view, those in hell do not consider 
union with God a good thing, so must be ‘punished’ some other way in if they are at all to suffer in a 
way which is maximally bad (which is, I think, the reason why the second nature view tends towards 
a ‘mild’ hell variant). 
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Nevertheless, it may also be this same anguish, induced by the knowledge that real 
union with God is impossible, that, somehow, may, perhaps, yet encourage a 
reciprocal desire for affective union with God through the remembrance of His 
goodness,287 and so in this way motivate an inhabitant of hell away from their 
further and total psychological fragmentation.  
On this account, the maximally bad suffering of hell, then, involves the (partial or 
indeed perhaps even wholehearted) desire for real union with God, accompanied 
by the knowledge that real union is impossible. Nevertheless, affective union (even 
wholeheartedly willed affective union) with God might remain within an inhabitant 
of hell’s grasp, and this suffering (the mental anguish over the aforementioned) 
that they experience may be justified in as much as it prevents their further 
fragmentation (allowing God to more effectively affectively unite with them, but 
also preventing their total psychological fragmentation and the destruction of their 
personhood) and also inasmuch as it might motivate the desire for their affective 
union with God, just as suffering does for us now on Stump's theodicy, by causing 
them to recall the bittersweet288 memory of God’s goodness as it was revealed to 
them. 289 
Before moving on, there is a general worry for this argument that I want to address. 
I have been trying to preserve a ‘grim’ account of hell, a hell in which maximally bad 
suffering does occur. To do this, I have suggested that those in hell really do suffer 
the worst thing possible for them, their permanent separation from God. But, to 
explain why God might have a morally sufficient reason for permitting such 
suffering, it looks like the justification for this suffering has to involve avoiding 
                                                          
287 To see how this might be the case, note that such suffering would consist in the inhabitant of 
hell’s memory of their wrongdoing, and the guilt and shame that follow this recollection. But guilt 
and shame also drive people to reflect upon the goodness of God (for it is in recognition of God’s 
goodness that their wrongdoing produces guilt and shame), where this reflection on the goodness of 
God is sufficient to motivate desire for affective union with Him. 
288 Sweet as God revealed His goodness to them and the nature of their creator was revealed to 
them, bitter as this prompted the mental anguish that necessitated their habitation of hell. 
289 This ‘memory’ (or, perhaps, working of the conscience) could be ‘the worm that never dies’ of 
Isaiah 66:24 and Mark 9:48. Likewise ‘their fire’ of Isaiah 66:24 could constitute the desire for God, a 
desire that can never be fully quenched. A desire caused and bolstered by the remembrance of 
God’s goodness (an aspect, perhaps, of the ‘worm that never dies’). See Talbott 2004 (218) for more 
on how this might be the case. 
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something even worse for them.290 If this is the case, it looks like their suffering is 
not, in fact, the worst thing for them. And without that, it looks like my account 
might collapse into a ‘mild’ hell. Nevertheless, I can respond to this concern. 
Inasmuch as such suffering might prompt a desire for affective union with God (a 
future benefit that may or may not be consented to), it also wards off that person’s 
total psychological fragmentation (a negative benefit that requires no such consent, 
at least on Stump’s account). Certainly, total psychological fragmentation looks like 
it would be worse for a person, but in this instance, looks are deceiving. For total 
psychological fragmentation in fact annihilates that which makes that person a 
person.291 If we posit that, for an inhabitant of hell, remaining in God’s revealed 
presence would accelerate their total psychological fragmentation, and that God 
not prompting an unfulfillable desire for union with Him through recollection of His 
goodness would also inevitably lead to total psychological fragmentation, we can 
suggest that hell really is the worst thing for that person, as a person. In each of the 
other two cases, total psychological fragmentation removes that person’s 
personhood. And in so removing, in each case, perhaps, there is then no person 
that suffers total psychological fragmentation, for there is no person left at all.292 
On this account, then, hell is a place where its inhabitants are motivated to be as 
good (i.e., as psychologically integrated) as they can be, namely, psychologically 
integrated around an adapted desire for affective union with God,293 and as close as 
it is possible for God to be to them. Already permanently separated from real union 
                                                          
290 Suffering for future benefit alone, as mentioned earlier, requires some form of consent. And it is 
far from clear such consent would be given, or even could be given, by those in a ‘grim’ hell.  
291 See, for instance, Frankfurt 1971 on why this might be the case.  
292 There are two further responses that could be levelled at this account. Firstly, is this making room 
for the possibility of a species of annhilationism (the annihilation of a person)? If so, why think that is 
less preferable to continuous experience of the worst thing for a person? Secondly, it looks like the 
prospect of total psychological fragmentation is in fact the worst thing for a person, not permanent 
separation from a God you desire union with. As a result, it looks like hell is no longer as ‘grim’ as 
first thought. But, if the latter does now not constitute maximally bad suffering (i.e., if hell is no 
longer ‘grim’), there can be no maximally bad suffering in this life either, for in this life we cannot be 
permanently separated from God whilst desiring union with Him. 
293 ‘Adapted’ in as much as, on the Stump/Aquinas account, the only desire you can wholeheartedly 
integrate around is the desire for real union with God. The desire for affective union with God is a 
pale second-best, but it is still within the genus of desire for union with God, and so the work Stump 
has done to motivate union with God as the objective/subjective greatest good for a person still 
applies, and as such, is very likely using this desire as a unifying desire is as close as an inhabitant of 
hell might come to total psychological integration. 
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with God, I suggested that the maximally bad suffering of hell’s inhabitants (the 
mental anguish that accompanies reflection on that very fact) may be sufficiently 
morally justified through an appeal to the negative benefit of avoiding that which 
would destroy their personhood, their further alienation from God and from 
themselves through their total psychological fragmentation, and, perhaps, through 
an appeal to the positive benefit of securing what is now naturally the best thing for 
them, namely, their affective union with God. 
On this model, God can demonstrate his goodness by showing his love for those in 
hell by doing all He can to help them in their fragmentary adapted nature. It may 
well be the case that, in doing this, prima facie maximally bad self-inflicted (mental) 
suffering is inevitable. Such suffering, however, may be necessary to preserve or 
maintain whatever psychological integration remains possible for the inhabitant of 
hell. For in so preserving, that person is able lead a life as worthwhile as it is 
possible for a life to be that has lost its original and ultimate purpose.294  
I have argued that there might be a morally sufficient reason for an omniscient, 
omnipotent perfectly good God to allow the maximally bad suffering of a person in 
hell, namely, for the negative benefit of avoiding further alienation from God and 
from themselves, and possibly, with consent, the limited future benefit of affective 
union with God.295 To defend this account, I have suggested the reason the 
inhabitants of hell remain where they are, unable to wholeheartedly desire union 
with God, is not due to the value of their continued free choice, rather, it is down to 
a respect for their moral psychology. This claim requires a very high estimation of 
Christ’s atoning work, treating it not only as a one-off, but also limiting the ability of 
a person to make use of the provisions of Christ’s work to this earthly life – a point I 
will return to in the final chapter of this thesis.296 However, if the account I have 
                                                          
294 What such a life might look like, and how similar that life might be to our earthly lives, is left an 
open question. 
295 In this case, both negative and future benefit appear to refer to the same thing, so whether or 
not consent is given for their suffering for future benefit, the point is moot. 
296 But as I have mentioned, there is scriptural support for this estimation. 
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presented is successful, it goes a long way to preserving the goodness of an omni-
God, even, I think, if one accepts the traditional account of a ‘grim’ hell.297  
 
Resurrection and the Beatific Vision 
Before I conclude this chapter, it is also worth asking why the beholding of the 
beatific vision is available only in the life to come? Why not make it available now? 
Several previously introduced ideas are at play in the answer to this question.  
First, on Aquinas’s account of mind, a person has both a will and an intellect, where 
the will is an appetite or inclination for goodness in general (but cannot alone 
determine what is in fact good), and where the intellect apprehends what it takes 
to be good and presents this to the will as such.  
Second, on Aquinas’s metaphysics, being and goodness are coreferential. If God is 
the greatest being, then, God is also the greatest good.  
Third, on Aquinas’s account of love, love consists in the desire for (at best, real) 
union with the beloved, and the desire for the ultimate good of the beloved. If the 
greatest good is God, then union with God is the greatest good for a person, whilst 
real union, as mentioned requires mutual personal revelation (such that it is 
theoretically possible, in empathy, to be ‘moved’ by the other such that one comes 
to ‘inhabit’ their mind, in order to see the world as they see it) and, among other 
things, dyadic attention with the other (the sort of unmediated shared attention (or 
meeting of minds) experienced when I know that you know that I know that you are 
looking at me looking at you, looking at me, and so on).  
                                                          
297 Hell is, therefore, a place where God shows as much love to a person as He can, both wanting the 
best for them, and wanting to be united as best He can with them. My view, then, requires that all 
come to desire union with God, but only some are capable of wholehearted desire (i.e., those who 
have dealt with guilt and shame in this life), whilst others (i.e., those who did not deal with their 
guilt and shame in this life) are only capable of half-hearted desire (and therefore, like Isaiah found 
himself, unable to remain in God’s presence), and so are consigned to hell. But make no mistake, on 
this account hell remains a desperate place of willed loneliness, of maximally bad mental suffering, 
of weeping and gnashing of teeth in the knowledge that one can never have the desire of one’s 
heart, and that the best thing for you, real union with God, is forever lost. 
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Fourth, and finally: in order for a union of love to be worth something, in order for 
it to be valuable, it has to be the product of what Swinburne calls ‘serious free will’. 
According to Swinburne: 
…if reasons alone influence action, an agent inevitably does what he 
believes to be the best, if desires alone influence action, an agent will 
inevitably follow his strongest desire. Free choice of action therefore arises 
only in two situations. One is where there is a choice between two actions 
which the agent regards as equal best which the agent desires to do equally; 
which . . . is the situation of very unserious free will. The other is where 
there is a choice between two actions, one of which the agent desires to do 
more and the other of which he believes it better to do . . . the more serious 
the free will and the stronger the contrary temptation, the better it is when 
the good action is done.298  
Given Aquinas’s moral psychology, were God, the greatest good, to reveal Himself 
to a person He had just created, there is no question that that person would 
reflexively desire union with Him – why would they chose otherwise? However, the 
resulting union could never be the product of serious free will. Such a person would 
be acting no differently to the way an automaton would act. Rather, for a person to 
exercise serious free will, they must be placed into a situation where they have two 
truly competing desires, such that they might come to develop an effective higher-
order (or second-order) desire299 for union with God, rather than for the 
alternative. In the case of both the primal and original sin, I have suggested, 
somewhat paradoxically, that this competing desire is for knowledge of God in 
one’s own time (i.e., with more immediacy), rather than on God’s timing. 
So, at least initially, God cannot fully reveal the beatific vision to a person. Rather, 
He would need to engineer a situation whereby that person would come to exercise 
their serious free will to choose between union with Him or to choose something 
opposed to Him, namely, something desirable but bad. Unfortunately, a situation 
                                                          
298 Swinburne, 1998: 86-87. 
299 That is, an intellect-will-intellect-will move. 
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that genuinely allows for the exercise of serious free will also then allow for the 
possibility of that person’s rejecting God (namely, desiring knowledge of God 
before God is ready to give it). And this rejection brings with it two separate but 
equally intractable issues that militate against the future possibility of a person’s 
beholding the beatific vision. 
Willed rejection of God is taken to lead to a general sort of willed loneliness in a 
person. This loneliness is caused in two ways: First, that a person’s ‘shame’ and 
‘guilt’300 over their past bad actions cause their present psychological 
fragmentation, that is, the dividing of their mind against itself in such a way that it 
is then impossible for God to be personally close to them, for they are not even 
close with themselves. Second, that ‘shame’ and ‘guilt’ inhibit dyadic attention. 
Someone who is shamed, or guilty, will, so the theory goes, reflexively avoid sharing 
eye contact, and indeed, where possible, will exhibit a tendency to avoid the other 
person entirely. Given this, it is supposed such reflexive avoidance is sufficient to 
prevent someone from also beholding the beatific vision. So, before a person with 
shame and guilt can behold the beatific vision, each must be dealt with. And whilst 
this process, if it is to obtain at all, must begin in this life, Aquinas thought it could 
only be completed in the life to come.  
So, for these reasons, I suggest, the beatific vision is both the key to a person’s final 
and perfect happiness, but also, that this vision, and therefore that happiness, must 
also wait for the life to come.  
What is therefore minimally required for access to the beatific vision in the life to 
come is that a person in this life (1) forms a serious higher-order desire to behold 
this vision (i.e., to unite with God), and (2) that they, based upon this freely-willed 
higher-order desire, start the process of dealing with their guilt and shame. For, if a 
person does not deal with their guilt or shame, or they do not have a desire to 
behold the beatific vision, it seems that person cannot behold the vision of God, 
                                                          
300 Where, as mentioned, ‘shame’ is taken as a placeholder for ‘the belief that it would be 
appropriate that another reject you as a person’ and ‘guilt’ is taken as a placeholder for ‘the belief 
that it would be appropriate that another desire your hard treatment’. 
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and so the best place for them to be is somewhere where God’s presence is not 
manifest, namely, hell.301 
Leaving the second of these requirements to one side for the moment302, if this 
higher-order desire is to be effective post-mortem, however the Christian conceives 
of their resurrection, this resurrection must, therefore, minimally require some 
form of volitional continuity. 
Although Aquinas does not explicitly make this connection himself, he clearly has 
the resources to have done so.303  
Love, for Aquinas, goes two-ways. It is not just that we might love God; God also 
loves us, and desires union with us – that is, to indwell in our minds as we might 
desire to indwell in His.304 Unlike us, however, Aquinas’s God is both omnipresent 
and omniscient, and therefore, has complete knowledge of and access to a person’s 
volitional complex at the point of their death.305 He has ever before Him something 
like the human version of the beatific vision with respect to us: God knows us fully 
and completely long before we have the opportunity to know Him in the same way. 
And not only does God know whether a person, at the point of their death, has a 
second-order desire for union with Him, He also knows whether they have started 
to deal with their guilt and shame, too. Thus, as I see it given Aquinas’s account, all 
God needs to do ensure that the requirements of minimal resurrection are met is 
reanimate a person’s volitional complex, the complex He has already known 
completely and fully indwelt. 
But, the object of this reanimation need not necessarily be the person’s original 
body, at least, not with just the foregoing in mind.306 On this minimal account, it 
                                                          
301 As suggested, such a place would, arguably, be better for that person. 
302 It is worth noting here that guilt and shame also require significant memory retention of past 
indiscretions, so these, too would need to be preserved. 
303 It must be noted, Aquinas is emphatically not a materialist, believing the soul to be the 
(necessarily immaterial) substantial form of the body. 
304 ST I-II Q 28 A 2. 
305 ST I Q 14 A 9. 
306 Although, of course, it could, if such a body, like Christ’s, were still available. Alternatively, as van 
Inwagen proposes, God could just miraculously preserve a person’s brain stem, and so preserve 
their brain states until the resurrection. 
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seems volitional continuity is all that is necessary for beholding the beatific vision, 
and this can be kept safe inside the mind of God, without needing to invoke 
Thomas’s strange theory of hylomorphic disembodiment.307 Even without the 
presence of a physical body, God has full knowledge of who you are in a far 
superior, but mechanistically similar way to the way we might, through well written 
biographies, and the like, come to partially indwell the minds of long-dead historical 
figures, or even, through reading well written fiction, come to inhabit the mind of a 
fictional character. On this model, then, God remains affectively united with you 
post-mortem, and all He needs to do to secure your resurrection is reanimate your 
previous volitional complex into a hunk of flesh that may or may not look roughly 
like you do, or did.308 
Again, all that is required to meet the criteria for beholding the beatific vision is 
that a person’s volitional complex, kept in, or ‘downloaded’ into, at death, the mind 
of God, be ‘uploaded’ into a body (be it old or new) and reanimated.309  
This view that I am proposing looks, on the face of it, a close cousin to Lynne 
Rudder-Baker’s ‘first-person perspective’ constitution model. On her view, ‘What 
makes a person a person’ she writes: 
Is having a first-person perspective. What makes a human person human is 
being constituted by a human body… the sameness of pre- and post-mortem 
person is the sameness of first-person perspective. 310 
Thus, in resurrection, the same person is resurrected, but they can be constituted 
by a different body.  
As I see it, however, there are two major differences between my account and 
Rudder-Baker’s. First, I do not claim to provide an explanation of the persistence of 
                                                          
307 For more on the problems with Aquinas’s account of hylomorphic disembodiment, see Van Dyke 
2014a. 
308 A ‘hunk of flesh’ that nevertheless has roughly the same brain states (and so forth) as I had 
before I died. 
309 If one is a reductionist, one must concede that it is at least possible to preserve this sort of 
snapshot of a person’s general volitional complex immediately prior to their death because this 
volitional complex must be materially represented in one’s body somehow anyway. 
310 Rudder-Baker, 2007: 334-5. 
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personal identity over time, something her account purports to do, but seem 
unable to provide.311 Instead, I am merely giving an account of what is minimally 
necessary in an explanation of resurrection for the beholding of the beatific 
vision.312 Second, my minimalist account does not require the reanimation or 
‘uploading’ of the full first-person perspective (whatever that is313) in order for the 
beatific vision to be beheld – the full first-person perspective is in that sense surplus 
to my requirements, although, of course, this minimalist account does not rule it 
out.314 
So, although physical continuity might not be necessary, I have suggested that 
volitional continuity is in fact necessary in order to behold the beatific vision.315 
In the final chapters of this thesis, I will, through reflection on the work of Christ, 
look at these requirements for beholding the beatific vision, namely, that a person 
form a freely willed desire to behold it, and that they (at least start to) deal with 
whatever objective guilt and shame they may have. In addition, I will look at the 
possibility that availing of Christ’s work might be a limited one-off, as necessitated 
by the account of hell discussed above. 
Before I get there, however, I will focus on establishing the general lineaments for 
exactly how an account of the Atonement might deal with guilt and shame, and 
how it might deal with the propensity to prefer one’s power and pleasure over the 
                                                          
311 See, for instance, van Inwagen 2017. 
312 To my account might be added any number of further requirements in order to preserve personal 
identity. See, for instance, van Inwagen 1978, or Zimmermann 1999. 
313 I am not convinced that I fully understand what a ‘first-person perspective’ is, at least in the way 
that would allow for it to be preserved over time. I am, however, much happier with understanding 
what a desire is, and also what self-reflexive reactive attitudes (like guilt and shame) might be. 
314 In fact, it may be that the full first-person perspective is required to preserve a person’s guilt and 
shame – I am not sure about this, though. Either way, I think it is plausible that the full first-person 
perspective is contained in God’s mind. 
315 Although, oddly, it may not be sufficient for maintaining personal identity in the resurrection, 
such that what is necessary for beholding the beatific vision is not sufficient for maintaining personal 
identity. See van Inwagen 2017. However, van Inwagen must, on the account I have given, provide 
an account for volitional continuity if his resurrected persons are to behold the beatific vision. I 
cannot see how he can do this without the sort of move I have made, that is, keeping a person’s 
volitional complex in the mind of God until such a time as that person’s ‘naked kernel’ is resurrected. 
Furthermore, this is not completely alien to Christian theology. Certain accounts of deification also 
include the resurrected losing their personhood in their union with Christ. 
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greater good of union with God that the doctrine of original sin teaches that we all 
now share.  
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  Chapter 3 
A Framework for Atonement 
In chapter one, I suggested that whatever problems the Atonement resolves, the 
outcome of this resolution allows a person to unite with God, at the beatific vision. 
In chapter two, I identified three inhibitors to beholding the beatific vision, and 
therefore, inhibitors to union with God, and I suggested that whatever else the 
Atonement does, that the Atonement must therefore also remove these inhibitors. 
The inhibitors I identified included: 
(i) a disordering in the mind that causes a person to prefer lesser goods 
like power and pleasure over greater goods like union with God,  
(ii) psychological fragmentation of the mind that prevents God 
becoming close to you, and  
(iii) guilt and shame, which can cause both psychological fragmentation 
and also inhibit the sort of dyadic joint attention necessary for real 
union with God. 
In this chapter, I will look, in general terms, at how each of these three inhibitors to 
union with God might be dealt with. I will suggest one way in which the view of 
grace I earlier outlined in chapter one might help us understand how to deal with (i) 
(through operative grace) and (ii) (through cooperative grace). I will then address 
various methods for dealing with both shame and guilt, before turning finally to the 
question of forgiveness. 
In the two chapters that follow, I will develop a more pointedly theological account 
of how the life, passion, death and resurrection of Christ might be used by the 
believer to deal with each of these inhibitors, using the general psychological 
framework developed in this chapter. 
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Grace and the Will of Justification 
In chapter two I suggested that it is a consequence of the doctrine of original sin 
that orthodox Christian belief about union with God is tempered by what Kevin 
Timpe has called ‘an Anti-Pelagian Constraint’ (APC): 
(APC) No fallen human individual is able to cause or will any good, including 
the will of her coming to have the will of justification [that is, saving faith], 
apart from a unique grace.316 
This unique, or operative, grace is taken to be a gift from God. Aquinas, for 
example, defines operative grace as: 
An operation which is part of an effect is attributed to the mover, not to the 
thing moved. The operation is therefore attributed to God when God is the 
sole mover, and when the mind is moved but not a mover. We then speak of 
‘operative grace.’317 
On the Thomist account of moral psychology I have been working with, a person is 
said to act with freedom of the will if their first-order and second-order volitions 
align, that is, if that person does what they want to want to do. However, that 
person remains morally responsible for their first-order volitions regardless of 
whether first- and second-order volitions align, assuming there has been no internal 
manipulation between the first-order intellect, will, and action.318 As noted in 
chapter one, for real union to obtain it must be freely willed, that is, God cannot 
internally manipulate either a person’s second-order desires, or the connection 
between their first- and second-order volitions. And so, operative grace, if it is to 
lead to real union, must likewise do so without such internal manipulation. So, how 
can grace be operative and yet not violate a person’s freedom of the will? 
Well, given that on this Thomist account of mind, a person’s will is already inclined 
to goodness in general, and, given that most theists (and certainly all Thomists) are 
committed to the belief that God is good, and that union with God is the greatest 
                                                          
316 Timpe, 2007: 285. 
317 ST I-II A 111 Q 2. 
318 For instance, the sort of manipulation wrought by some future mad neuroscientist. 
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good for a person, it seems that all God needs to do to motivate a desire for Him in 
a person is, as previously mentioned, to simply to reveal, partially or fully, His 
goodness to them. If this person appropriately attends to this revelation of 
goodness, such a person would come to desire union with God, that is, they would 
come to have saving faith.319 
This revelation of goodness could come through some supernatural second 
personal encounter with God (including, for instance, at the beatific vision), or a 
(perhaps triadic) encounter with God through scripture and other instances of 
special divine action; however, this revelation could also come through more 
natural means. According to the Apostle Paul in Romans 1:19-20, God placed 
evidence of His divine nature, that is to say, His goodness, into His creation at the 
point of creation, and that this revelation can still be seen. Paul writes, 
For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown 
it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his eternal power and divine 
nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through 
the things he has made. So they are without excuse. 
So, perhaps, reflecting on the beauty of a spectacular sunset on the ocean, or the 
grandeur of a Himalayan mountain range, or even just the beauty of a tree, or a 
mathematical proof, or one’s spouse, might be sufficient to perceive the goodness 
of their creator. If operative grace can be explained as the revelation of God’s 
goodness, and, if this revelation is readily available to all in God’s creation, then 
operative grace is always and everywhere available to all. 
If operative grace can be explained by the mere revelation of God’s goodness, can 
we offer an account of freely willed union that is compatible with APC? 
Perhaps not just yet. According to the Anti-Pelagian Constraint, no fallen human 
individual can cause or will any good, including the will of her coming to saving 
faith, apart from a unique grace. There is a crucial step between God’s revelation of 
His goodness in creation and a person coming to have saving faith, namely, that 
                                                          
319 For an account of saving faith as a second-order desire for union with God, see Efird and Worsley 
2015. 
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person appropriately attending to this revelation. Since the Anti-Pelagian Constraint 
prevents a person from coming to saving faith by themselves, it would also seem to 
prevent a person from coming to appropriately attend to this revelation. Rather 
than accept such a revelation as being from God, and reflecting His goodness, the 
fallen human individual looks set to reject this revelation. The Anti-Pelagian 
Constraint, then, entails a sort of willed blindness or deafness to God’s goodness by 
the fallen human individual. 
The Thomist account, however, has the resources to respond to this difficulty, too. 
Recall that on Aquinas’s account of the will, the will is not just a binary switch 
between ‘accepting something’ and ‘rejecting something’, for the will is more akin 
to an appetite, and as such, can also be quiescent with respect to something, 
neither accepting it or rejecting it, but rather, neutral to it, that is to say, having no 
attitude toward it. If it is the case that quiescence with respect to God’s revealed-
in-creation revelation of goodness is sufficient for ‘appropriate attendance’, that is, 
omitting to reject that this is a revelation of God’s goodness, all that is needed for 
Anti-Pelagian Constraint compatible saving faith is for the will to become quiescent 
with respect to this operative grace.320  
                                                          
320 There is a debate in the secondary literature over the level of control one has over coming to 
quiescence. For Stump (2003, 389-404), coming to quiescence is not necessarily something that can 
be controlled (that is to say, quiescence is not intentional, not a product of a second-order volition). 
However, Timpe (2007) argues if it cannot be controlled, strictly speaking one cannot be said to have 
had any control over whether one comes to saving faith. For Timpe (and Ragland 2006), therefore, 
coming to quiescence is a state that you have some sort of quasi-control over (i.e., that quiescence is 
intentional, it is the product of a second-order volition). Responding to Timpe’s claim, Simon Kittle 
(2015) argues that, if one can control (quasi or directly) whether one is quiescent or not, then, 
however this is explained, such a view cannot be compatible with the Anti-Pelagian Constraint set 
out at the start of this paper (for if quiescence is intentional, if it is the product of a second-order 
volition, and if one knows one will come to saving faith if one is quiescent, coming to quiescence 
looks very similar indeed to APC incompatible ‘acceptance’). In response to Kittle’s concern, we 
follow Stump’s initial position: you are not in control over whether you are quiescent with respect to 
God’s operative grace. By that we mean that you do not form an intentional second-order volition to 
become quiescent, so quiescence is best considered a first-order wanton omission (first-order 
because one has not formed a second-order volition motivating this desire). However, it may be the 
case that your actions might, unintentionally, make it easier or harder to for God (or natural 
sufferings and blessing) to motivate you to such a wanton first-order omission, and you do have 
control over that. The difference between our position and Stump’s comes in the nature of grace. 
For Stump, grace is infused into a person’s will by God. On our account, grace inspires a quiescent 
person’s intellect to move their will to desire union with God. On our account, it is your intellect that 
presents to your will the goodness of union with God, and the will which then desires this. Unlike on 
Stump’s (and Timpe’s) infusion account, there is no internal manipulation present, there is only 
mere external motivation or inspiration. Although this movement from intellect to will might be a 
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However, if the Anti-Pelagian Constraint entails that a fallen human individual’s 
will’s natural state is to reject this operative grace, either (1) God must internally 
manipulate a person’s will to a state of quiescence, or (2) that person’s will must be 
externally motivated towards such quiescence. Clearly (1) seems to jeopardise the 
possibility of freely willed union. So, might (2) get us what we want?  
Elsewhere, Stump argues that external motivation to quiescence takes the form of 
‘melting’ or ‘cracking’ a person’s heart. Stump argues that (natural or 
supernaturally inspired) suffering, along with the experience of (natural or 
supernaturally inspired) blessings and love, is an important part of this melting or 
cracking process.321 Such natural suffering and blessing, coupled with instances of 
supernatural suffering and blessing might then be sufficient to motivate 
quiescence; however, I will return to how this might be the case in a little more 
detail in the next section. 
A more difficult objection to avoid comes from tradition, where grace is considered 
operative on the will (through ‘infusion’322) as well as on the intellect. In the 
                                                          
subconscious process, it is a process contained entirely within the agent, and recall that on Aquinas’s 
account, one therefore remains morally responsible for this action. Inasmuch as unintentionally 
falling in love with another person does not look problematic to the seriousness of whatever 
relationship ensues (so long as the other has not internally manipulated your brain to so fall in love), 
neither is unintentionally falling in love with God problematic, at least as far as we can see it. Just as 
one’s prior action, action one does in fact control, might influence the sort of person one falls in love 
with, even if one never intends nor foresees this outcome, so it may be with coming to desire union 
(i.e., coming to love) God. Interestingly, coming to have saving faith looks like it might mirror almost 
exactly the primal sin. Whilst the primal sinner had a second-order volition for justice that should 
have made willing lesser goods impossible, they nevertheless somehow still managed a first-order 
volition for a lesser good. For the fallen person coming to saving faith, whilst they have a second-
order volition for lesser goods that should have made willing greater goods impossible, they 
nevertheless somehow still manage to some sort of first-order volition for a greater good. We 
suspect whatever solution we have for the primal sin (for instance, that it occurred due to an 
omission to reflect on second-order volitions) will also come to bear on this problem. 
321 See Stump (2003: 389-404), for more details. Stump writes: 
 
The notion of a heart’s cracking or melting is, of course, a metaphor. To speak of 
something’s cracking or melting is to describe something’s giving way to an external force 
after (or in spite of) some internal resistance or disinclination. To say that a heart cracks or 
melts, then, is to imply that a will which previously was resistant or disinclined towards 
something urged on it by someone (or something) else gives over its dissent and leaves off 
its resistance. (387) 
322 One problem with this ‘infusion’ account comes when one thinks about the nature of union. 
Serious sorts of union must be product of two wills, but on this infusion account, unless one 
intentionally acts to permit such an infusion (the position Timpe (2007) argues must be the case), 
union can only ever be the product of one will, namely, Gods. For God infuses in you the desire to 
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account so far provided, operative grace seems operative on the intellect alone 
(through what we might call ‘inspiration’ or ‘motivation’). It seems less that the will 
changes its disposition and more that it is overpowered by the intellect. The 
concern here, then, is that unless supernaturally changed, the will will just revert to 
its ‘default’ fallen dispositions once the revelatory stimuli is removed, or lessens. 
But note that Stump’s version of Thomist moral psychology has the resources to 
deal with this objection, too. On the Thomist account, whilst both are appetites for 
goodness in general, we can offer a more fine-grained distinction between the 
dispositions of the first- and second-order will. The second-order will is (was) 
ordered around a desire for goodness as justice (‘rectitude’) whilst the first is (was) 
around the desire for pleasurable good (‘concupiscence’). As alluded to in chapter 
two, Aquinas believed that the correct ordering of the second-order will for justice 
was a gift of grace given to Adam by God, and that this was lost after the fall.323 
With justice now un-guided, Adam and those who follow him would do what was 
right in their own eyes, and in such a confused state, their first-order volitions 
would no longer necessarily align with their (now confused) second-order 
desires.324 
With that in mind, we can draw out two responses. The first is just this: if the 
correct ordering of Adam’s second-order will was a gift of grace, such that when it 
                                                          
will union with Him. On our account, God merely inspires this desire, and so there is no such internal 
manipulation in a person’s moral psychology. Without this internal manipulation, intentional control 
is less important for us than it is for Timpe. In as much as Jack unintentionally falling in love with Jill 
does not reduce the seriousness of whatever union then follows between them, neither would Jack 
unintentionally falling in love with God reduce the seriousness of whatever union then follows 
between them. 
323 See ST I- II Q 82 A 2. 
 
Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also something through the 
gift of grace, so may something belong to the nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the 
principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In this way original 
justice.. was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This 
gift the first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as that original justice together with the 
nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual 
sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, 
but only as the nature of that person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and 
consequently other sins are not transmitted. 
324 See Genesis 5:7, 6:5 and Judges 17:6. Aquinas would go on to liken such a state to one as being 
like a wine barrel with the hoops removed. See QDM Q 4, A 2, ad 4. 
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was removed, Adam could no longer correctly order his desires, how is that any 
different to the account proposed here? On this account, when appropriately 
attended to, God’s gift of grace (the revelation of his goodness), is also sufficient to 
correctly order desires. The only difference is, perhaps, in degree. The revelation of 
God’s goodness that Adam received might have been in some way clearer than the 
revelation we receive, and so the revelation we receive might have a weaker effect 
on our intellect and will. But, just as Adam’s will became disordered when this grace 
was removed, so might a person’s will become likewise disordered should grace, 
this revelatory stimulus, be removed or weakened. 
Secondly, note that on Stump’s account, there are both first-, second-, and, 
crucially third-order desires possible.325 Third-order desires have the capacity to 
move second-order acts of intellect and will.326 In being able to move the will, third-
order volitions also have the capacity to affect the disposition of the will. Thus, 
these third-order volitions look like they have the capacity to affect the disposition 
of the second-order will, as a third-order act of will can act on the second-order will 
directly. Just as first-order habits can be formed by second-order acts of will, 
                                                          
325 Stump writes,  
 
[I]n forming a third-order volition, the agent is not reiterating the process gone through to 
formulate a second-order volition...forming a third-order volition consists in reasoning 
about and either accepting or rejecting a second-order volition. So an agent has a third-
order volition V3 to bring about some second-order volition V2 in himself only if his intellect 
at the time of the willing represents V2, under some description, as the good to be pursued. 
But since V2 is a desire for a first-order volition V1 generated by a reason’s representing V1 
(at that time) as the good to be pursued, V3 will consist just in reaffirming the original 
reasoning about V1 which led to V2. In forming a third-order volition and considering 
whether he wants to have the relevant second-order volition, the agent will consider 
whether a desire for a desire for some action p (or state of affairs q) is the good to be 
pursued. But a desire for a desire for p (or q) will be a good to be pursued just in case the 
desire for p (or q) is a good to be pursued, and that in turn will depend on whether the 
agent considers p (or q), under some description, at that time, a good to be pursued. So a 
third-order volition that supports a currently held second-order volition is in effect just the 
expression of a re-evaluating and affirming of the reasoning that originally led to V1. And, in 
the same way, a third-order volition that rejects a currently held second-order volition will 
just be an expression of the re-evaluation and rejection of the reasoning that led to the 
second-order volition. A third-order volition, then, is a result of a recalculation of the 
reasoning that originally underlay a second-order volition. (Stump, 1988: 405) 
326 Stump writes regarding third-order desires, ‘There are also cases in which an agent's reasoning is 
confused and warrants conflicting second-order desires. An agent who notices such a conflict in his 
second-order desires and who reflects on it may then sort out the confusion in his reasoning and 
form a third-order volition in consequence.’ (1988: 406) 
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perhaps third-order acts of will can forge second-order habits, directly affecting the 
dispositions of the second-order will in a way second-order acts of intellect alone 
were unable to do.  
Imagine a drug addict, John, who is unable to form second-order volitions. He 
wants to want to quit, and he wants to want to continue to take heroin. Now, 
whilst in this state, John hears that his former partner has late stage cancer and is 
not long for this world. Shortly thereafter, John wakes up in the emergency room; 
he had (inadvertently) taken an overdose. Whilst still in the emergency room, his 
doctor, a childhood friend and someone familiar with his situation, reprimands him 
seriously:  
Look, John. You could easily have died tonight. Had you been found five 
minutes later, you would not have made it. Think of your daughter. If you 
died, your child would soon be an orphan. You have no other family – your 
child would be put into the foster system. Have you thought about what 
might happen to her? 
With this, the doctor turns and leaves the room. John in stunned. The doctor’s 
reprimand cuts him to the core. This event is an occasion for him to see afresh the 
cost his wanting to want to remain an addict might have on his child, and in so 
reasoning about what he now wants to want to want, he is able to weaken his 
second-order desire to remain an addict, and strengthen his second-order desire to 
quit such that it forms a second-order volition. His addiction has not disappeared, 
but John now has the strength of will to start to fight against it. Over time, through 
repeated reflection on the doctor’s comments, and through habitual rejection of 
drugs, John is now, perhaps, able to strengthen his will to the place where he can 
control his drug use. 
Returning to this account of grace; all we need now to do is posit that God’s 
revelation of goodness motivates an analogous second-order habit forming third-
order desire. When appropriately attended to, such a revelation of God’s goodness 
could, then, in some indirect sense, be operative on the dispositions of the second-
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order will. So, if either one of these responses gains traction, it looks like this 
objection from tradition can be addressed as well. 
If this is plausible, it seems the revelation of God’s goodness can in fact motivate a 
person to (an ordinary, non-wholehearted second-order) desire union with God, 
namely, to the will of justification, even given the Anti-Pelagian Constraint. So, that 
might be one response to the first inhibitor to union, but what about the second, 
that it is impossible to be personally close to a person who remains in some sense 
psychologically fragmented? 
 
Suffering and Sanctification 
In the previous section, I equated the will of justification (i.e., saving faith) with an 
ordinary (non-wholehearted) second-order desire for union with God. In chapter 
one, I suggested that an ordinary second-order desire was not sufficient for union 
with God, as the presence of conflicting second-order desires entailed the presence 
of psychological fragmentation, and that it is impossible even for God to be 
sufficiently close enough for maximal real union with a person who is so 
psychologically fragmented. It is therefore also part of the Christian tradition that a 
person who has the will of justification also goes through the process of 
sanctification, a process that both preserves the will of justification and integrates 
other second-order desires around the desire for union with God. The process of 
sanctification, then fulfills the following two desiderata:  
1. integrating all second-order desires around the desire for union with 
God, and 
2. aligning a person’s first-order volition around the second-order volition 
for union with God. 
However, once a person has the will of justification, that is, they have a second-
order desire for union with God, grace no longer needs to be operative, for it can 
now be cooperative. Nevertheless, in virtue of the fact this second-order desire for 
union with God is not wholehearted, such cooperation is only a possibility, and by 
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no means guaranteed. As a result, God must still externally motivate the believer to 
ensure psychological integration around this desire for union with God. The 
necessity of this external motivation, which as I will indicate, is most often 
associated with suffering, is one reason why, for instance, Gregory the Great would 
write that it is mysterious: 
when things go well with good people here, and ill with bad people...327 
And John Chrysostom would write:  
to have these sufferings is the privilege of those especially dear to God.328 
In her book, Wandering in Darkness, Stump teases out the way suffering can aid in 
the process of sanctification (and in its close neighbour, perseverance), that is, in 
the process of psychological integration. For Stump, suffering is, in some ways, like 
medicine that God administers to us to heal the disease of internal fragmentation. 
Just as we can understand the process of our becoming internally fragmented on 
the model of seed germination, as mentioned in chapter two, we can also 
understand it on the model of HIV viral infection.329 We are born with the ‘HIV’ 
virus of original sin, and this virus soon comes to take over its host, replicate, and 
damage the will, like a disease damages the human body. Suffering is then 
(analogous antiretroviral) medicine which God, as our medical doctor, uses to fight 
this disease and heal the damage done to our wills so that we might be well again, 
that is, internally integrated. Now, this medicine need not come in a single, 
transformative dose. Rather, it may come in many small doses, which, over time, 
has the desired effect. Therefore, minor suffering which does not immediately lead 
to spiritual transformation is not a counter-example to the defence. For, just as 
physical health can take a long time to achieve, so can spiritual health. Similarly, we 
may need to keep taking the medicine to keep us from becoming ill again, even if 
we cannot get any healthier. Therefore suffering, even great suffering, which does 
not lead to spiritual growth is also not a counter-example to the defence. Just as 
some are as physically healthy as they can be yet need to take medicine, sometimes 
                                                          
327 Moralia in Job, Book. 5, Morals, 241–2.  
328 John Chrysostom, 1960: 165. 
329 These analogies were provided through personal correspondence with Stump. 
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powerful medicine, to stay that way, so are some as spiritually healthy as they can 
be yet need to suffer, sometimes greatly, to stay that way. 
In other ways, suffering is not like medicine that God administers to us to heal the 
disease of internal fragmentation. Like all analogies, this analogy is limited. It is 
limited primarily because it relies on a first- and third-person account of health: 
from a first-person point of view, a person experiences the illness of internal 
fragmentation, and God, as a medical doctor, from a third-person point of view, 
administers the medicine of suffering; it is then the medicine of suffering which is 
doing the work of fighting the disease and healing the damage of internal 
fragmentation. But this first- and third-person model of suffering is very much not 
what Stump has in mind. Rather, on her defence, suffering is second-personal: it is a 
mode of, and an occasion for, a second-person experience of God, and the 
revelation of God’s goodness, and it is this second-person experience of God which 
is doing the work of fighting the disease and healing the damage of internal 
fragmentation.  
To see this, recall that the ultimate good for a human being is being in a union of 
love with God. Such a union requires mutual closeness, a closeness which, in turn, 
requires an openness to the other, an openness borne out of a desire to be in union 
with the other. Now, for two people come to become open in this way, there must 
be interaction between them, each having a second-person experience of the 
other, where their life-stories come to be woven together. Such second-person 
experiences do not naturally happen to us, for we do not naturally open ourselves 
up to others. Suffering provides a context for this sort of second-person experience 
to occur. For example, think about the last time you took an airplane flight and sat 
next to a stranger.330 You might have exchanged some pleasantries with the person 
sitting next to you, but it is not likely you took the conversation much deeper than 
that. And so, you probably ended the flight strangers to one another, just as you 
were when you began the flight. Now, say that something terrible happens on the 
airplane, a traumatic ordeal that forces you to drop your guard and open to the 
                                                          
330 This example is due to Stump from her (unpublished) response to Paul Draper at the St Thomas 
Summer School session on the Problem of Evil in 2012. 
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other person. Such an occasion is an occasion for your life-story to be interwoven 
with the life-story of the person who was once a stranger but now no more. For the 
two of you are then dealing with one another in a second-person way, focusing not 
merely on yourself (a first-person experience) but rather on the other person, and 
not merely as a ‘he’ or ‘she’ but rather as ‘you’. Suffering is like this. Suffering 
provides a context for God to interact with us in a second-person way, where we 
become open to God in a way that we would not ordinarily open up to him, just like 
we would not ordinarily open up to strangers, and in the trauma, our life-story 
becomes interwoven with God’s. By being open to God, we allow him to enter us, 
which, in turn, gives him the opportunity to fight the disease and heal the damage 
of internal fragmentation. This, then, begins the process of justification and 
continues in the process of sanctification. 
Now, as long as the suffering a mentally fully functioning adult experiences 
contributes either to the process of her justification or the process of her 
sanctification, or prevents a person from becoming worse by losing the will of 
justification,331 God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing her to suffer in this 
way, since her suffering contributes to her internal integration, which is necessary 
for her to avoid the worst thing for her, namely, permanent separation from God. 
This is the negative benefit of suffering, and, importantly, such suffering does not 
require the sufferer’s consent, since it is always justifiable to cause a person to 
suffer, even without their consent, if that suffering can contribute to preventing an 
even worse outcome for that person in the future. In contrast, the positive benefit 
of suffering has to do with what happens after the processes of justification and 
sanctification are complete, namely, union with God, the greatest thing that can 
happen to a person; this is the positive benefit of suffering, and it does require the 
person’s consent. Now, union with God comes in varying degrees, such that one 
person may be capable of a deeper union with God than another. Consider an 
Olympic powerlifter, John, and a philosophy professor, Peter. Both John and Peter 
are asked to lift the heaviest weight they can lift. Even though both John and Peter 
                                                          
331 This last disjunct is due to Stump (in personal correspondence), for, as she rightly points out, it is 
always possible for a person to return to the original state before justification occurred, and God 
may use suffering to prevent this backsliding from happening. 
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give their maximum effort and so lift the heaviest weights they can lift, John will be 
able to lift a much a heavier weight than Peter can lift. So, Stump says, it is with 
union with God. Even though two individuals might have as deep a union with God 
as it is possible for them to have, one of them might be capable of a much deeper 
union than the other. And so just as John suffers a strict diet, a demanding exercise 
regime, and the inevitable injuries that come with powerlifting to become stronger, 
so a person might suffer to become capable of a deeper union with God. However, 
just as it would be morally unjustifiable to force Peter, that is, without his consent, 
to suffer what John suffers, namely, the strict diet, demanding exercise regime, and 
inevitable injuries, no matter how good we thought becoming stronger would be 
for Peter, so it would be morally unjustifiable to force a person, that is, without her 
consent, to suffer so that she would be capable of a deeper union with God, no 
matter how good we thought a deeper union with God would be for her. 
Consequently, Stump maintains that any suffering for future benefit must be 
consensual if it is to be morally justifiable. In summary, according to Stump, 
suffering for negative benefit is morally justified if it is involuntary simpliciter, and 
suffering for positive benefit is morally justified if it is involuntary secundum quid, 
that is, the suffering is justified if and only if the sufferer either explicitly or tacitly 
consents to such suffering. 
Paul Draper, however, argues that Stump’s single morally sufficient reason for 
God’s allowing suffering does not account for all incidents of the suffering of 
mentally fully functioning adults, namely, suffering which is for future benefit but 
not consented to.332  
For the sake of argument, Draper concedes that any suffering that both meets 
Stump’s two constraints and is justified by the negative benefit of harm prevention 
is sufficiently morally justified, even if the suffering is involuntary simpliciter. Draper 
then focuses on the fact that suffering that meets Stump’s two constraints, and is 
justified by some future positive benefit, is only sufficiently morally justified if the 
                                                          
332 See Draper 2011. Stump writes, that Draper’s review, which is ‘the toughest review the book has 
received, is also in my view the deepest and most insightful of all the responses to the book.’ (2012: 
212 f. 12). 
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suffering is involuntary secundum quid. He then suggests that there could be a 
certain group of people whose suffering cannot be justified by the negative benefit 
of harm prevention (because they are sufficiently far along the process of 
sanctification that the threat of permanent separation with God is not a tenable 
one) and who also do not (or cannot competently) consent to suffer for the future 
benefit of deeper union with God. If it were the case that someone in this group of 
people was to suffer, then Stump’s morally sufficient reason would not apply to 
them and Stump’s defence would fail. 
For this objection to hold, Draper must show that there is that some suffering that 
both cannot be justified by the negative benefit of harm prevention, and is not, or 
cannot be consented to. To see how Draper argues for this, it is important to recall 
again Stump’s account of the will and Stump’s account of internal integration. 
Stump suggests that there is a hierarchy in the will. An individual can have first-
order desires (those things she wants to do) and second-order desires (those things 
she wants to want to do). At any one time an individual can have numerous first- 
and second-order desires. Those desires the will is most inclined toward at time will 
become volitions at that time. If a second-order volition has no conflicting second-
order desires, it is a ‘wholehearted’ volition. If a second-order volition has 
conflicting second-order desires, it is an ordinary volition. First-order volitions result 
in action, whilst second-order volitions result in the strengthening (or weakening) of 
some first-order desire. Assuming no internal manipulation, a person is morally 
responsible for her first-order volitions (regardless of whether she has a 
corresponding second-order volition), but she only acts with freedom of the will if 
her first-order volitions also correspond to a second-order volition.333 Furthermore, 
freedom of the will comes in two kinds: ordinary and strenuous. If a person acts 
with ordinary freedom of the will, her first-order volition corresponds with an 
ordinary second-order volition, whilst if she acts with strenuous freedom of the will, 
her first-order volition corresponds with a wholehearted second-order volition.  
                                                          
333 In other words, John acts with freedom of the will if John does what he wants to want to do. If 
John does not do what he wants to want to do, his second-order volition is frustrated and not freely 
acted upon. 
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According to Stump’s account, permanent union with God requires strenuous 
freedom of the will, and acting with strenuous freedom of the will, in this respect, 
requires internal integration around the good.334 Given Stump’s account of the 
hierarchy in the will, internal integration consists in two separate processes: 
• integrating all second-order desires around the good, and 
• aligning first-order volitions with second-order volitions. 
Draper takes Stump to mean that the operative grace given in process of 
justification secures the first whilst the cooperative grace given in the process of 
sanctification secures the second. Because an individual who is not justified cannot 
join in permanent union with God, Draper concedes that suffering that occurs for 
the sake of justification can always be justified on grounds of negative benefit. 
However, in order for suffering that occurs for the sake of sanctification to be 
justified under the auspices of negative benefit, the following three criteria must be 
fulfilled at every point along the process of sanctification: 
I. Sanctification is required to avoid permanent separation with God 
II. Sanctification is ongoing throughout the life of justified individual 
III. Sanctification is difficult to accomplish without suffering  
It is easy to see how Stump’s account of sanctification could meet criterion (I). One 
remains morally responsible for one’s actions even if one’s first- and second-order 
volitions conflict. If John has a wholehearted second-order desire for union with 
God, yet a first-order volition for something contrary to union with God, John will 
not act on his second-order volition for union with God. 
However, it is less clear that criteria (II) and (III) are met. With regard to (II) there is 
at least a sizable Protestant community that believes in the doctrine of ‘entire 
sanctification’ or ‘Christian perfection’, that is, that it is possible for the process of 
sanctification to be completed in this life.335 If they are correct, Stump’s account is 
                                                          
334 Stump suggests that the will is in fact an inclination or disposition toward the good (where the 
good is presented to it being as good for x by the intellect), and because the will is disposed to the 
good, it can never be integrated around, for instance, evil. 
335 Perhaps the most famous exponent of the doctrine of Christian perfection is John Wesley, who 
wrote; 
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vulnerable to Draper’s objection. With regard to (III), by Stump’s own account, 
harmonizing first- and second-order volitions is slowly achieved by cooperative 
grace, through growth in the gifts of the Holy Spirit. But if sanctification only 
requires growth in the gifts of the spirit, it is not obvious how such growth can be 
meaningfully aided by suffering. If such growth is not meaningfully aided by 
suffering, and, if that person still suffers, the only other way to justify morally that 
suffering is under the guise of some future positive benefit. 
So, Draper would appear to have shown that the suffering of at least some justified 
individuals cannot be justified by the negative benefit of harm prevention, and so, if 
                                                          
 
Some thoughts occurred to my mind this morning concerning Christian perfection, and the 
manner and time of receiving it, which I believe may be useful to set down.  
 
1. By perfection I mean the humble, gentle, patient love of God, and our neighbour, ruling 
our tempers, words, and actions.  
I do not include an impossibility of falling from it, either in part or in whole. Therefore, I 
retract several expressions in our Hymns, which partly express, partly imply, such an 
impossibility.  
 And I do not contend for the term sinless, though I do not object against it.  
2. As to the manner. I believe this perfection is always wrought in the soul by a simple act of 
faith; consequently, in an instant.  
But I believe a gradual work, both preceding and following that instant. 
3. As to the time. I believe this instant generally is the instant of death, the moment before 
the soul leaves the body. But I believe it may be ten, twenty, or forty years before. 
 
I believe it is usually many years after justification; but that it may be within five years or 
five months after it, I know no conclusive argument to the contrary. If it must be many 
years after justification, I would be glad to know how many. Pretium quotus arroget annus? 
And how many days or months, or even years, can any one allow to be between perfection 
and death? How far from justification must it be; and how near to death? (Wesley, 1872: 
446).  
 
Although Wesley’s view had changed from the much more radical belief he held through the 1740s 
and 1750s, that Christian perfection entailed sinlessness, and could be secured instantly at the point 
of conversion, we can surmise that by 1767 Wesley had settled on what would become his all-
things-considered belief, namely: 
 
• All persons are born, or swiftly become, morally imperfect. 
• A work of God is required to make a person morally perfect again. 
• This work of God can be completed well in advance of a person’s death. 
• Therefore, it is possible for a person be morally perfect, that is, it is possible for a person to 
attain Christian perfection in this life. 
151 
 
one such person does not (or cannot)336 consent to some suffering she undergoes, 
it appears as though there is no morally sufficient reason for her suffering.337 
However, Stump has an easy response to this objection. Draper’s objection is based 
on a misunderstanding over the line between the explanatory work done by 
justification and the explanatory work done by sanctification, and all Stump has to 
do to preserve the comprehensiveness of her single morally sufficient reason for 
suffering is to deny that justification integrates all second-order desires around the 
good. On this understanding of Stump’s account, operative grace is sufficient to 
produce an ordinary second-order volition for union with God, but it is not 
sufficient to produce a similar wholehearted second-order volition.338  
On this new understanding, sanctification does not just involve the integration of 
first-order and second-order volitions. Sanctification also completes the process of 
integrating second-order desires around the good. Just as in the process of 
justification, this requires God’s external motivation to do so, and, just like in the 
process of justification, the motivating role suffering can play is evident.339 In the 
same way that beginning the process of justification is difficult without suffering, so 
                                                          
336 We say ‘cannot’ because a person cannot be expected to give acceptable consent to something 
she cannot even comprehend before the fact (as, we suspect, some particularly horrendous 
suffering cannot be). 
337 Stump could respond by suggesting that suffering could be morally justified since such suffering is 
likely to prevent a person losing the will of justification. However, the only instance where this 
would affect our conclusion (i.e., there is no morally justifiable reason for some suffering for persons 
who have completed the process of sanctification) is in the case of a person who is already internally 
integrated, and it is difficult to see how an internally integrated person would be likely to lose the 
will of justification without first becoming internally fragmented (thereby preserving our conclusion). 
If suffering to prevent the loss of the will of justification is morally justified without it being likely 
that a person will lose the will of justification, what is to stop, for instance, suffering in heaven? 
338 There is a further reason why this is a good move for Stump to make: operative grace is not 
sufficient to produce a wholehearted second-order volition for union with God, as to do so would 
require removing God to remove all conflicting second-order desires. And to do this would be to 
destroy that individual’s freewill, rendering a union between the two wills impossible. On Stump’s 
account, internal integration is possible if a person wants it. The problem is just that part of that 
person does not want to be internally integrated around the good. As far as both Stump and Aquinas 
are concerned, to change a person’s desire against their will is to take their freewill away. 
339 Integrating second-order desires around the good requires the removal of errant second-order 
desires through God’s giving of cooperative grace. The fact that you want to want to do these errant 
second-order desires also entails that part of you wants to reject God’s cooperative grace. Bringing 
you to a place where you accept, or are quiescent toward God’s cooperative grace (and therefore 
come to give up these errant second-order desires) is analogous to God’s bringing you to a place 
where you are quiescent toward God’s operative grace. Just as suffering can be used by God for the 
latter, so suffering can be used by God for the former. 
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is completing the process of sanctification, that is, integrating all one’s desires 
around the good, difficult without suffering. And so, if suffering can be justified 
inasmuch as it motivates the process of justification (i.e., motivating a person’s will 
to quiescence with respect to operative grace), then suffering can also be justified 
in motivating at least aspects of sanctification, as suffering is used for an almost 
identical purpose (i.e., motivating a change in second-order desires by acceptance 
or quiescence with respect to God’s cooperative grace). Furthermore, this move 
reinforces the fragility of the will of justification. If it is not (at least initially) a 
wholehearted desire, justification might very well be considered fragile, and the will 
of justification easy to lose. Preventing this loss, just as much as motivating the 
completion of sanctification, may well prove sufficient explanation for suffering. 
Nevertheless, only suffering that motivates the integration of second-order desires 
is likely to meet criteria (I), (II), and (III) needed for moral justification. Given this, if 
Stump’s harm-preventing, morally sufficient reason is to justify all suffering of 
mentally fully functioning adults, she must hold that specifically second-order 
integration is not possible in this life. (For if such integration is possible, Stump’s 
account remains vulnerable to Draper’s objection.) Now, if these clarifications are 
made, Stump can meet criterion (II) by claiming that all people are either being 
motivated toward justification or are going through the process of sanctification 
and criterion (III) by claiming that suffering has a valuable contribution to make in 
motivating both processes. On the assumption that all suffering can be morally 
justified by harm prevention, even if consent cannot be given for such suffering, 
Draper’s objection is obviated.340 
                                                          
340 See Vitale 2013 for a similar comment: 
 
Another way Stump could respond is by dropping her focus on consent altogether and 
instead claiming that all suffering is harm-preventing. Stump assumes that once someone is 
united to God in loving relationship, suffering can no longer be hell-preventing. But why 
think that? She could say instead that even for those currently united to God, suffering best 
enables them to avoid falling out of union with God and thus to avoid hell. In fact, Stump 
already suggests in her discussion of Abraham that lapses in faith are possible even after 
one has previously shown ‘whole-hearted trust in God’s promises’ (pp. 303–4; cf. p. 405). I 
have raised doubts about Stump’s use of harm-prevention, but, given that she is already 
committed to it, I see no insurmountable obstacle to extending its use to the justification of 
the suffering of those already in union with God, thereby negating the need for consent to 
play a justificatory role. (1198) 
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So, Draper’s objection concerned the possible lack (or sheer impossibility) of 
consent in suffering for future benefit. To respond to this objection, Stump can 
justify all suffering under the auspices the negative benefit of harm prevention 
alone.341 Because humans are internally fragmented, and because to remain in such 
a condition would lead to the worst thing for them (i.e., permanent separation from 
God), all suffering must contribute to motivating an individual’s internal integration 
around the good.  
On Stump’s account, justification and sanctification (into which I shall include 
perseverance in the will of justification) form either side of this process of internal 
integration, and there is a line between where justification finishes and 
sanctification begins. Both Stump and Draper accept that justification occurs at the 
moment of conversion and then sanctification continues thereafter. However, 
Draper’s objection requires that the line between the work done by justification 
and the work required from sanctification be much further along the process of 
internal integration than is actually the case on Stump’s account. As a result, for 
Draper, the process of sanctification does far less work than the same process does 
for Stump. By correcting this misinterpretation, it is much easier to see how on 
Stump’s account, the process of sanctification is both difficult to accomplish 
without suffering, and could require at least a lifetime to complete.342 
The consequence of requiring an increase in sanctification’s explanatory work is 
interesting for Stump’s account inasmuch as it would seem to commit her to the 
following five claims about justification and sanctification: 
1. Completing the process of justification is necessary but not sufficient for 
union with God. 
2. Completing the process of sanctification is necessary for union with God. 
3. Justification produces an ordinary second-order volition for union with God. 
                                                          
341 Stump could also argue that it is impossible for someone who is so far along the process of 
sanctification that she is in no danger from permanent separation with God to refrain from giving 
consent; however, this argument is both much more complicated to prove, and does not account for 
the possibility that for some particularly horrendous suffering, consent may not be possible. 
342 This is more the case given the evident capacity for errant second-order desires to arise at any 
point in one’s life. 
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4. Sanctification requires the integration of second-order desires around the 
good,343 as well as the integration of first- and second-order volitions. 
5. Completing the process of sanctification before death is not possible. 
Operative grace is therefore the name given to grace that actually motivates a 
person to effectively desire union with God for the first time (which, I have argued 
elsewhere, culminates the process of justification). Likewise, cooperative grace is 
just the grace that continues to motivate a person to desire union with God once 
they already have a second-order volition for union with God (which I have 
described as the process of sanctification). The only difference between operative 
and cooperative grace is that in the latter case, the recipient of grace already has a 
second-order volition for union with God. Cooperative grace is considered 
cooperative because the recipient accepts the gift of grace (i.e., the effect of 
operative grace is to leave them with a second-order volition to accept future 
revelation of God’s goodness), rather than being merely quiescent with respect to 
it. The only difference between the two is the in the recipient of such grace, and not 
in either the grace itself or the giver of the grace, and this difference in the recipient 
of grace is explained by the effect of operative grace. 
In the case of both operative and cooperative grace, a person’s will can be 
strengthened by reflection upon the revelation of the goodness of God revealed 
through God's general act of creation or through His subsequent supernatural acts. 
Operative grace requires our quiescence to this general revelation or to these acts 
(but not our cooperative acceptance of these as being revelations from God), whilst 
cooperative grace includes our cooperation with this general revelation (i.e., the 
second-order volition we now have to desire union with God, and therefore, the 
willingness to see and to appropriately reflect upon the revelation of God’s 
goodness in creation). 
I suspect, too, that normal grace, the general motivating or strengthening of the 
will, is either operative or cooperative, with no remainder. For this to be the case, 
                                                          
343 Perhaps this is best explained as integration around the ordinary second-order volition for union 
with God produced by justification. 
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grace must always ultimately motivate a desire for union with God. But here note 
that the desire for union with God is an ultimate end, and often worked out 
through a complex system of secondary desires. For instance, the desire for union 
with God is incompatible with a desire to leave the naked unclothed, and the 
hungry unfed. As a result, this desire for union with God prompted by grace could 
also prompt (or strengthen) the desire to feed the hungry and clothe the naked, 
and indeed, this desire for union with God may only even manifest itself in this 
desire to clothe and feed. 
So, on this account, through both suffering and blessings, a person can be 
motivated toward psychological integration around this desire for union with God 
in a way that is compatible with the APC and in a way that preserves a person’s 
moral responsibly and freedom of the will. 
 
A Framework for Dealing with Shame 
In the previous chapter, I indicated that (aligned344) shame might inhibit union with 
God both since such shame can cause internal fragmentation (preventing personal 
closeness), and also since such shame can inhibit joint attention with God 
(preventing significant personal presence). In that section, I also outlined a general 
four-fold taxonomy in which different causes of (subjective) shame could be 
categorized, namely, shame arising due to  
1. reflection on one’s own individual moral wrongdoing,  
2. reflection upon wrongs that have been done to you,  
3. reflection upon depredations of nature that might have befallen you, 
and 
4. reflection on your communal participation in a certain community that 
has perpetrated significant wrongdoing. 
                                                          
344 By aligned, I refer to an instance of shame that is both subjective (descriptive) and objective 
(normative). 
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In each case, such reflection causes a person to believe it to be appropriate for the 
other to reject them as a person, that is, on Aquinas’s account of love, that it is 
appropriate for them to reject the desire for union with them that forms one of the 
twin desires of love. 
In thinking about how to deal with shame it is worth reflecting on one approach 
that seems, from the outset, doomed to fail. Paying the victim of a crime a sum of 
money, or some other form of compensation, for instance, will not take away the 
fact that the crime happened to them, that they were disrespected, and that 
therefore, that it would be appropriate for them to reject you (in some sense). 
Rather, it seems this sort of shame must be defeated, rather than compensated for. 
So, what can defeat shame? It is helpful to think back to the general cause of 
(subjective) shame, namely, the belief that one has failed to meet what one takes 
to be a community standard, a standard that one also takes to be in some sense 
authoritative. Now, one might initially think that the way to defeat shame involves 
coming to meet this original community standard. However, such a view seems 
problematic. For one, doing so does not alter the fact that at one point, you failed 
to meet this standard. The fact I turn up to the office in a suit tomorrow doesn’t 
make it any the less the case that I turned up in jeans and a tee-shirt yesterday. For 
another, it may be impossible. For instance, if (for whatever reason) meeting the 
standard involves possessing some physical characteristic, one might just not have 
said characteristic. Alternatively, if meeting the standard involves not having done 
action x in the past, and if it is a matter of historical fact that you have done action 
x, you can never meet said standard.  
A more promising route, then, might involve undermining or changing the 
community standard that you do not meet. Indeed, Stump suggests that all 
instances of shame can be defeated by ‘trumping’ a previous community standard. 
And such can be done by any person who meets a new, higher standard (given that 
this standard that is also accepted by the community as trumping the previous 
standard). So, if this new trumping standard is accepted by the community, 
demonstrably meeting this new higher standard, and especially, meeting it in a way 
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that is connected to the way in which you did not meet the original standard, will 
defeat the cause of previously felt shame.  
How might this occur? Stump suggests defeating could involve something akin to a 
celebration of your life, where this celebration picks out those parts of your life that 
meet this trumping standard, and so do deserve honour. And, as mentioned, this is 
particularly the case where what is being celebrated are those aspects of you that 
are in some way connected the initial cause of shame. Were such a celebration to 
occur, Stump argues it would be made clear to you that it is no longer appropriate 
for others to reject you, and so the belief that it is appropriate that they reject you 
can be undermined. Stump writes:  
The natural remedy for shame is honor or admiration. A person who is 
honored or admired has something attractive about him, and those who are 
attracted to him have some desire for him. To the extent that others have a 
warranted desire for him, they have the second desire of love for him, 
namely, the desire for union (of one sort or another). And if others are 
drawn to him and desire union with him, the shamed person’s shame is 
lifted… 
So, for the first three kinds of shame, personal shame, a full remedy for 
shame will consist in two things. First, the shamed person will have 
something beautiful, something admirable or honorable, about him on a 
standard of value more important than the standard by which he is shamed. 
And, second, this admirable or beautiful element in the shamed person’s life 
will defeat the shame. That is, it will be greater and more worth having than 
what is lost through the shame, and the defects that are the source of the 
shame will be somehow inextricably interwoven into that greater good.345 
However, whilst it is possible to see this sort of antidote to shame as being able to 
deal with subjective shame in (2) and (3), it is harder to see how this could deal with 
                                                          
345 See Stump 2016. 
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communal shame (4), and, contra Stump, to my mind impossible to see how it 
might deal with the (objective) shame caused by one’s own wrongdoing (1). 
With respect to (2) and (3), Stump cites both Harriet Tubman and Joseph Merrick as 
exemplars of people whose subjective shame was defeated by a public celebration 
of their life.346  With respect to (4), it seems that if the community that you are part 
of is shamed due to some action of a few of its members, it is plausible to think that 
it can be honoured by the actions of some of its members, too. So, for instance, a 
nation is honoured when its football team wins the world cup, or (in centuries past) 
when it conquers other nations. I will, however, return to (2), (3), and (4) in the final 
chapter. For now, I want to focus a little further on the (objective) shame that 
comes from one’s own wrongdoing. 
The (objective) shame that emerges upon reflection on one’s wrongdoing appears 
to be a direct relational consequence of sin.347 If Peter believes it is appropriate for 
Jack to desire to reject him as a person, whatever it was about Peter’s sinful action 
that caused this relational damage needs to be righted. But what might have 
caused such damage? It helps here to draw from a common intuition that 
wrongdoing is an expressive act. As well as causing harm, wrongdoing also 
communicates disrespect. Consider, then, the following from Linda Radzik: 
In wronging others, the offenders treat those whom they harm as having 
lower value than they, and the wrongful acts express this false and insulting 
view.348 
Peter’s wronging Jack communicates the false belief that he, Peter, is in some sense 
more valuable than Jack. Given this insulting communication, it is understandable 
that Peter might believe it appropriate that Jack desire to reject him as a person.  
                                                          
346 See Stump 2016. 
347 ‘A relational conception of sin conceives of it in terms of broken or alienated relationships; sin, on 
this view, consists in the fact that our relationship with God and each other is not what it ought to 
be.’ (Bayne and Restall, 2009: 151). 
348 Linda Radzik, 2008: 76. 
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Furthermore, so long as this communication is not retracted, it continues to be 
broadcast long after the wrong action was committed.349 So long as this broadcast 
continues uninterrupted, it remains just as appropriate for Jack to reject Peter as a 
person as it did as Peter was in the very act of wronging Jack.350 So if it is 
appropriate that Jack reject Peter as a person (i.e., that Jack refrain from desiring 
union with Peter), it is also appropriate that Peter feel shame. The way to remove 
this communication, then, is for Peter to offer a retraction; an apology that 
indicates a correctly appraised respect for Jack, and indicates clearly that Peter 
distances himself from his original communication.  
Of course, this apology must be sincere, that is, the apology must appropriately 
reflect and communicate an actual change of heart. An insincere apology will not 
heal the relational damage caused by wrongdoing; indeed, it will most likely make it 
worse. So, what can ground the sincerity of an apology? Following Griswold and 
Swinburne, I propose that in all cases, repentance, and associated remorse, are 
required to do this.351 Imagine if Peter had punched Jack in the arm. If Peter 
apologises, but then continues to punch Jack in the arm, it is quite evident his 
apology is insincere. Peter evidently did not mean to retract or distance himself 
from his initial communication of disrespect because he is re-broadcasting that 
same message at regular and ongoing intervals. However, if Peter apologises, and 
then refrains from physically assaulting Jack, this might just be enough to ground 
the sincerity of Peter’s apology. 
In some cases, then repentance is both necessary and sufficient to ground the 
sincerity of an apology. In other cases, however, repentance alone is evidently 
insufficient to do this. Imagine if, instead of punching Jack, Peter deliberately cut off 
Jack’s arm. It seems to me quite unlikely that Peter’s refraining from cutting off any 
                                                          
349 Radzik, 2008: 75-78, 123. 
350 Radzik writes, ‘To wrong another person is to insult and threaten that person. To do nothing (or 
to fail to do enough) to correct that action is to allow the insult and the threat to stand. It is to 
condone their continued influence. When one fails to atone, one suggests that one still views the 
victim as inferior and that one remains a threat to the victim. The obligation to atone, then, amounts 
to an obligation to cease wronging the victim.’ (Radzik, 2008: 77). 
351 I take repentance to include believing that you wronged the other and refraining from further 
wrongdoing. See Griswold 2007 and Swinburne 1989. 
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other parts of Jack’s anatomy will be enough to ground the sincerity of his apology 
(and if it does not seem so to you, escalate Peter’s action until repentance alone 
does seem entirely insufficient!).  
To repentance and apology, then, a third action may also be required: the offering 
of some supererogatory penance.352 To ground the sincerity of an apology it is, in 
certain cases, necessary to offer something both personally costly and suitably 
acceptable to one’s victim; a gift that goes above and beyond whatever reparation 
is required. If Peter deliberately cut off Jack’s arm, it would not be sufficient for him 
to buy Jack a box of chocolates (an insufficient penance), or for Peter to pay for 
Jack’s prosthetic arm (arguably, what is owed in reparations), rather, Peter should 
(and this is only one of a myriad possibilities) see to it that he does what he can to 
make Jack’s recovery as smooth and as easy as possible, both for Jack and perhaps 
for his family, too. If this is within his power, Peter might consider setting up a 
college fund for Jack’s children. Peter may volunteer his services at an amputee 
clinic, or invest heavily in companies that develop prosthetic hands. Upon doing 
this, it should be apparent that whatever apology Peter offers, even if it is not 
accepted by a resentful Jack, is nevertheless sincere. When Peter’s sincere apology 
is offered, I suggest that it is no longer appropriate for Jack to reject him as a 
person (although, of course, Jack may continue to do so, just as Peter may continue 
to feel subjective shame), and so it is possible for Peter’s shame to be defeated.353 
However, when it comes to wrongdoing done with respect to God, it seems this 
account runs into a problem. Even granting that the doctrine of original sin leaves 
apology and repentance within our power (which, as I shall discuss in chapter five, 
is itself far from clear), the scriptural text (certainly in the Old Testament) seems 
quite clear that repentance alone is not sufficient to ground the sincerity of any 
                                                          
352 Swinburne, 1989: 149. 
353 Although forgiveness might have a role in securing union (unless Jack forgives Peter, Jack will be 
unable to wholeheartedly desire union with Peter), forgiveness has no role to play in defeating 
shame. Jack’s forswearing resentment, even if he now desires union with Peter, does not remove 
the appropriateness of his rejection of Peter, and therefore does not deal with the cause of Peter’s 
shame. 
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apology we might give.354 And so, to deal with shame over wrongdoing, some 
offering of penance is required. However, it is not the case that God demands this 
offering – as I will explain later on in this chapter, God could (and does) forgive 
without it – rather, that without our offering of penance, we cannot deal with our 
belief that it would be appropriate for God to reject us, even if He in fact does not. 
The problem with owing God penance, however, is that penance is necessarily 
supererogatory, and yet on accepted Christian doctrine, we already owe God 
everything.355 There is no possibility for supererogatory action, and so nothing we 
can do to ground the sincerity of any apology we might offer God. We owe God our 
money, our time, our bodies and our lives. Giving any of these back as an attempt 
at some supererogatory penance will not make my apology seem any sincerer. 
Peter’s offering Jack a $50 token penance (with no reparative payment) after Peter 
has stolen $60 from him is very unlikely to ground the sincerity of Peter’s apology. 
Indeed, it could well make the apology less sincere than it initially would have been 
with repentance alone. 
So, however we deal with the problem of shame, something about Christ’s life, 
passion, death and resurrection is required to deal with, at least, (1) and (4). How 
Christ’s life passion and death might do this, I will address in the final chapter. 
 
A Framework for Dealing with Guilt 
In many respects, the problems of guilt and shame are quite similar. In both cases it 
is the belief that it would be appropriate that is the nexus of the problem. It is this 
belief that motivates a person’s willed loneliness through their psychological 
fragmentation and their inability to engage in dyadic attention with God, and 
therefore, it is this belief that must be changed if (full and complete) union 
between persons is to occur.356  
                                                          
354 See Exodus 29 on God instructing the Israelites to prepare sacrifice as a penance for their 
wrongdoing. 
355 See Psalm 24:1 and Romans 11:36. 
356 If they do not feel guilt or shame now, if presented all pertinent information, they would. 
162 
 
However, the two are distinct in other respects. Whereas shame is clearly relational 
and references an existential dimension, guilt is deontic and references a moral 
one. Nevertheless, in the case of guilt, there is a very straightforward remedy for 
Peter’s belief that it is appropriate for Jack to desire he undergo some hard 
treatment: Peter must simply undergo this hard treatment. Once undergone, it is 
no longer appropriate for Peter to undergo it again, and, in recognising this, Peter 
can (but, subjectively speaking, by no means will) overcome his objective guilt. Here 
is one way to think about this: Peter’s wrongdoing produces a certain sort of 
(moral) debt, and this debt requires a certain sort of reparative payment to clear it. 
It is appropriate to pay unpaid debt, and Peter’s recognition of this in the light of his 
unpaid debt is captured in his feeling guilt. Peter’s guilt, therefore, can be dealt 
with merely through his full payment of reparations appropriate to his 
wrongdoing.357 
Although guilt can prevent the union necessary for fully functioning relationships, it 
is a common intuition that relationships cannot be fixed by mere payment alone.358 
Given that I am suggesting guilt can be dealt with through mere payment alone, 
guilt, then, is only indirectly a relational consequence of sin. Guilt is therefore best 
described as a deontic consequence of sin, with its solution being likewise deontic 
in nature.359  
According to this deontic consequence, sin results in the build of up of a moral 
debt. The way to deal with this debt, then, is simply to repay it. In the same 
manner, dealing with one’s guilt involves (voluntarily or otherwise) undergoing the 
sort of hard treatment it is appropriate for your victim to desire for you. In ordinary 
cases, determining what hard treatment is owed is relatively straightforward. 
Monetary compensation can be worked out and offered, or a generally 
proportional penal (be it prison, corporal or even capital) sentence can be served. 
                                                          
357 Swinburne, 1989: 149. 
358 See, for instance, Swinburne, 1989: 152. 
359 This problem of guilt can be closely mapped onto the deontic consequence of sin identified by 
Bayne and Restall. They write, ‘A deontic conception of sin conceives of sin in terms of a failure to 
fulfil our moral obligations. Sin, on this view, is immoral behaviour, and it results in a moral debt; it 
involves a debit in our moral ledger.’ (Bayne and Restall, 2009: 151). 
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According to the scriptural data we have, the reparations that we owe God, 
however, are not pecuniary. Neither indeed are they described in terms that have 
any understandably limited timeline for payment. Rather, the reparations appear to 
take the form of everlasting banishment from God’s revealed presence.360 And so it 
would seem that any attempt to deal with one’s guilt by removing one’s moral debt 
through the paying of reparations leads to exactly the same outcome as living with 
one’s guilt. In both cases, separation from God is permanent and union with God is 
impossible. 
So, each of the three inhibitors to union has a general solution. The problems 
associated with original sin and psychological fragmentation can be overcome 
through an externally motivated quiescence to grace, the problem of guilt can be 
resolved through the payment some appropriate reparations, and the problem of 
shame can be resolved by offering an apology made sincere by repentance and in 
some cases, penance.  
However, it is still far from clear how each of these inhibitors might be overcome 
with respect to union with God, or how the life, passion, death and resurrection of 
Christ might be efficacious in securing Atonement. 
In the case of guilt, sin builds up a moral debt that only reparative payment can 
clear. Whilst this debt remains, a person’s guilt can prevent them from (at least) 
wholeheartedly desiring union with God, or from being able to dyadically join 
attention with Him. Furthermore, attempts to make reparative payment to deal 
with guilt requires indefinite separation from God. 
In the case of shame, sin is expressive and communicates disrespect to the victim of 
the wrongful action. This communication continues to be broadcast until retracted 
and replaced by a sincere apology. Whilst it goes unretracted, it is appropriate that 
God reject a person (even if He in fact does not). Reflection on the appropriateness 
of this belief is, like guilt, sufficient to prevent dyadic joint attention with God or 
wholehearted desire for God. However, one of the necessary constituent actions 
                                                          
360 Whilst this became more apparent post-reformation, there seems to be some scriptural 
precedent for this view. See Isaiah 66:24, Daniel 12:1-2, Matthew 25:43, Mark 9:48, 2 Thessalonians 
1:5-10, Jude 13, and Revelation 14: 9-11. 
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that would ground the sincerity of an apology to God, the offering of some 
supererogatory penance, cannot be offered by a sinful person for there is, 
seemingly, nothing at all supererogatory that this person can offer God. 
It is into these seemingly intractable situations that the Christian tradition teaches 
the life, passion, death and resurrection of Christ can be appropriated by a penitent 
sinner. But exactly how Christ’s passion is to be appropriated remains quite unclear. 
In the next chapter, I intend to survey previous attempts to explain how such 
appropriation might occur, whilst in the final chapter I intend to develop an 
alternative account of how each problem might be dealt with.  
Before I get there, however I want to deal very briefly with the question of 
forgiveness. 
 
The Question of Forgiveness 
As I have now framed it, there are three problems the Atonement must overcome. 
First, the problem of original sin and the disordering of the mind, initially preventing 
and subsequently limiting a person’s desire for union with God. Second, the 
problem of shame, the belief it would be appropriate for the other to reject them 
as a person. Third, the problem of guilt, the belief that it would be appropriate for 
the other to desire some hard treatment for them. At this point, it is interesting to 
note that, structurally, the source of each of these problems is in the person 
requiring atonement. But given that the source of each problem is located (in some 
sense) in the person requiring atonement, what role might the ‘other’ (in this case, 
God) play in atonement? 
It is often thought that forgiveness plays some role in atonement. However, on 
standard accounts forgiveness (for instance, Haber’s view of forgiveness as a 
normative power,361 Nussbaum’s view of forgiveness as expressing grief,362 or 
                                                          
361 See Haber 2009. 
362 Nussbaum, 2009. See also Garrard and McNaughton 2002 on forgiveness as expressing solidarity 
with humankind. 
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Butler’s view of forgiveness as forswearing resentment363) it seems difficult to see 
what role it could play, or, in the case of the Christian doctrine, if forgiveness does 
play a role, how God could forgive prior to the incarnation. Take, for example, the 
view attributed to Bishop Butler that forgiveness involves the forswearing of 
resentment.364  
Even if God forswears resentment (and its corollary desires for vengeance), it is 
difficult to see how that might help deal with any of the problems the Atonement is 
supposed to overcome. Take either guilt or shame, for instance. Someone 
foreswearing to do what it would have been appropriate for them to do (i.e., 
forswearing to demand some hard treatment, or forswearing the rejection of the 
other) does not make what it would have been appropriate for them to do, 
inappropriate.365  
Could forgiveness can help motivate a person’s quiescence? Perhaps. But so, too, 
might a lack of forgiveness motivate someone to try and get right with the other, or 
God. Furthermore, the fact that either God (or the other) forswears anything does 
not make it appropriate that He (or they) should not have had those feelings. It 
simply does not follow that, should someone immediately forgive you after you 
have committed some truly horrendous wrong, you should feel no guilt or shame 
over what you have done. If anything, the expression of such forgiveness might 
make the problems of guilt and shame more intractable.  
Take, for instance, Jeffrie Murphy’s view that unwarranted forgiveness harms the 
forgiver. Murphy writes: 
A failure to resent moral injuries done to me is a failure to care about the 
moral value incarnate in my own person (that I am in Kantian language, an 
end in myself) and thus a failure to care about myself.366 
                                                          
363 See Garcia 2011. 
364 See Garcia 2011. 
365 At least, inappropriate qua the forgiven. Of course, the forgiver might now be breaking a promise 
(or something similar) were they to recant on their foreswearing, but this only renders their 
recanting inappropriate for them, not for the forgiven, in the view of the forgiven. 
366 Murphy and Hampton, 1988: 18. 
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It may be that in such circumstances (namely, being immediately forgiven after 
some serious wrongdoing) you come to recognise that the other’s forgiving action 
has, in fact, further harmed them. 
So, forgiveness has, perhaps, no necessary role to play in defeating either shame or 
guilt. Jack’s forswearing resentment, even if he now desires union with Peter, does 
not remove the appropriateness of his rejection of Peter, or the appropriateness of 
his desire for Peter’s hard treatment, and therefore, Jack’s forgiveness does not 
deal with the cause of either Peter’s shame or guilt. 
So, if the attitudes or actions of a victim, including their forgiveness, cannot change 
the appropriateness of a wrongdoer’s guilt or shame, why discuss forgiveness at 
all? 
Well, as mentioned in chapter one, union between persons requires two wills to be 
operative. If you, as a wrongdoer, do in fact deal with your guilt and shame, and 
you do somehow come to have a wholehearted desire for union with the other, 
there is still no guarantee that real union between you and your victim will obtain, 
for your victim may not desire union with you.  
Forgiveness, then, removes an impediment to union on the side of the victim – it 
does not effect a change in the wrongdoer (beyond, perhaps, motivating them to 
make amends367). Forgiveness is, therefore, essential for union between persons, 
but it is one sided. And given this, it might seem, securing God’s forgiveness might 
not require Christ’s atoning sacrifice. Indeed, plausibly, there might be no problem 
on God’s side, no barriers to God’s desire to really unite with you, that the 
Atonement must overcome. At least, it seems to me that there is no obvious 
ironclad reason that would prevent an omnibenevolent, omnipresent God from 
immediately forgiving any wrongdoing done against him. And granting this, it is far 
                                                          
367 This thought about motivation could explain why Hebrews 9:22 states ‘In fact, the law requires 
that nearly everything be cleansed with blood, and without the shedding of blood there is no 
forgiveness.’ Recognising that you must make amends before God forswears vengeance is a very 
good motivation to go ahead and make amends, and may, ultimately, prove more loving than simply 
forgiving and letting a person continue their life. Swinburne writes concerning this point, ‘it is good 
that if we do wrong, we should take proper steps to cancel our actions, to pay out debts, as far as 
logically can be done.’ (Swinburne, 1989: 150). 
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from obvious that such a God would necessarily withhold forgiveness until a 
suitable penance or reparation was paid.368 
With this much said, I will now turn to the final two chapters of this thesis, in an 
attempt first to survey and then address how Christ’s life, passion, death and 
resurrection might aid in the process of securing union with God.  
                                                          
368 I take it that this point is at the heart of the disagreement between Stump and Swinburne over 
the nature of the Atonement. On Swinburne’s account (1989), it is fitting for God to wait until 
penance or reparation are paid before offering forgiveness, indicating that at least some of what 
happens during the Atonement is aimed at removing at something preventing God from uniting with 
us. On Stump’s account (2012), there is nothing prevent God from uniting with us, and so, the 
Atonement is squarely focused on removing something prevent us from uniting with God. 
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Chapter 4 
Atonement and Transaction 
 
I began the first chapter of this thesis by suggesting that the Atonement presents 
itself as the solution to a problem, and that, over the course of the first three 
chapters of this thesis, I would try to identify both what exactly this problem is, and 
also what the problem inhibits, that is, what the Atonement is supposed to secure. 
In chapter one, I suggested that the Atonement secures a person’s real union with 
God, a union uniquely made possible at the beatific vision. In chapter two, I 
addressed three possible inhibitors to beholding the beatific vision, and so, 
inhibitors to uniting with God, namely, an unwillingness to behold the vision, an 
inability to wholeheartedly desire to behold the vision, and a (twofold) inability to 
behold the vision. In chapter three, I outlined ways in which these inhibitors could 
be overcome. I suggested that the first two inhibitors could be overcome through 
the revelation of the goodness of union with God, alongside external motivation to 
appropriately reflect upon this goodness. The last inhibitor, the inability to behold 
the beatific vision, was broken down into the problem of shame and the problem of 
guilt. I suggested in the case of the former, shame, that the offering of some 
supererogatory penance, alongside a repentant apology, was necessary in order to 
remove objective shame. In the case of the latter, guilt, I suggested the payment of 
some appropriate reparation was required to remove objective guilt. Furthermore, I 
suggested that only when objective guilt and objective shame are dealt with in 
these ways can a person behold the beatific vision. Unfortunately, however, it 
seems as though both the sinner’s offering of some supererogatory penance, and 
their payment of appropriate reparations are hopelessly beyond them.369 These, 
then, are precisely the problems any account of the Atonement must resolve. But 
                                                          
369 If it was not, it would seem Christ’s life, death, and passion (and so forth) are not necessary for a 
person’s salvation. 
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how? How is it, as Richard Cross puts it, ‘that Christ's life and death…can be 
appropriated by us?’370 
Before, in the final chapter, I offer my solution to these problems, it will prove 
instructive to first survey historical attempts explain the Atonement, a task that will 
form the focus of this fourth chapter. Of particular interest will be the way in which 
guilt and shame (or close substitutes for guilt and shame) are dealt with, for, it 
seems most accounts involve some form of a transaction or a transfer between 
Jesus and the penitent sinner, and so are susceptible to the following argument: 
1. You say you are guilty (or shamed). 
2. You say Christ Saves you only if Jesus takes away your guilt (or shame). 
3. But guilt (and shame) does not transfer from person to person. 
4. So, Jesus cannot take away your guilt (or shame), and so Jesus cannot save 
you. 
5. So, Christianity is false. 
Before I look at the different ways this transfer has been explained, I want first to 
provide an overview of the scriptural desiderata for an account of the Atonement. 
Naturally, any attempt at establishing the lineaments of such a transaction must, 
necessarily, also engage with divine revelation, along with major interpretations of 
such revelation. However, because this is a project in analytic theology, and 
because I am engaging in systematic theology and not exegetical or biblical 
theology, it is enough for this thesis to capture what I take to be the most plausible 
plain and straightforward interpretations of the text. 
 
Divine Data: Ecumenical Tradition and Divine Revelation 
Reading through the seven ecumenical creeds it is relatively clear that the Christian 
doctrine of the Atonement is linked, somehow, to Christ. The Chalcedonian Creed 
                                                          
370 Cross, 2001: 401. 
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affirms that Christ became incarnate ‘for us and for our salvation’. The Athanasian 
Creed affirms that ‘Christ suffered for our salvation’ whilst the Nicene Creed affirms 
that Christ ‘was crucified for us’. However, none of these ecumenical creeds spell 
out exactly what this ‘for us’ or ‘for our salvation’ amounts to. Neither, indeed, do 
they settle upon what it is about Christ that secures this Atonement.371  
The biblical text, too, offers little more to help narrow down the explanatory 
possibilities. It is quite apparent the New Testament authors believed that Jesus 
gave himself to save us from our sins.372 And that in saving us from our sin, Christ 
reconciled us back to God, restoring a relationship that sin had damaged.373 
However, it seems the biblical text does not come to a consensus over how Christ’s 
giving himself up for our sins secured this reconciliation. For instance, Jesus, Paul, 
and John all refer to the Atonement as a work of ransom, as though the giving of 
Christ’s life served as a payment to someone.374  
In places, it appears as though this ransom is paid in Christ’s blood.375 However, 
both Jesus and some New Testament authors also specify that Christ’s blood has 
                                                          
371 The Nicene creed, for instance, references Jesus’s incarnation, birth, life, passion, death, 
resurrection and ascension. 
372 For instance: 
1 Peter 3:18 ‘For Christ also died for sins once for all, the just for the unjust, so that He might bring 
us to God, having been put to death in the flesh, but made alive in the spirit’ 
1 Corinthians 15:3 ‘For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received, that Christ died 
for our sins according to the Scriptures,’ 
John 1:29 ‘The next day he saw Jesus coming to him and said, "Behold, the Lamb of God who takes 
away the sin of the world!’ 
Matthew 1:21 ‘She will bear a Son; and you shall call His name Jesus, for He will save His people 
from their sins.’ 
373 For instance:  
2 Corinthians 5:18-19 ‘Now all these things are from God, who reconciled us to Himself through 
Christ and gave us the ministry of reconciliation, namely, that God was in Christ reconciling the 
world to Himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and He has committed to us the word 
of reconciliation.’ 
Romans 5:10-11 ‘For if while we were enemies we were reconciled to God through the death of His 
Son, much more, having been reconciled, we shall be saved by His life. And not only this, but we also 
exult in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received the reconciliation.’ 
374 Mark 10:45 ‘For even the Son of Man did not come to be served, but to serve, and to give His life 
a ransom for many.’ 
1 Timothy 2:5-6 ‘For there is one God, and one mediator also between God and men, the man Christ 
Jesus, who gave Himself as a ransom for all, the testimony given at the proper time.’ 
Revelation 5:9 ‘And they sang a new song, saying, "Worthy are You to take the book and to break its 
seals; for You were slain, and purchased for God with Your blood men from every tribe and tongue 
and people and nation.’ 
375 So, for instance, both Peter and Paul write: 
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some transformative effect (the blood, of course, could still serve as a ransom, but 
then in addition it also seems to have a transformative affect).376 And, in addition to 
the payment of this ransom, the author of Hebrews also presents Jesus’ life as a 
sacrifice.377 However, it is not explicitly mentioned to whom this ransom might be 
paid, or to whom this sacrifice might be offered. Nevertheless, that someone is 
appeased by Christ’s propitiation seems evident.378 
In addition, it appears Christ’s atoning work also involved the defeat of the devil,379 
and the release from slavery and into ‘adoption as sons’ of those availing of his 
work.380 
                                                          
1 Peter 1:18-19 ‘knowing that you were not redeemed with perishable things like silver or gold from 
your futile way of life inherited from your forefathers, but with precious blood, as of a lamb 
unblemished and spotless, the blood of Christ.’ 
Colossians 1:20 ‘and through Him to reconcile all things to Himself, having made peace through the 
blood of His cross; through Him, I say, whether things on earth or things in heaven.’ 
Ephesians 1:7 ‘In Him we have redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses, 
according to the riches of His grace.’ 
376 Matthew 26:28 ‘for this is My blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many for 
forgiveness of sins.’ 
Hebrews 9:14 ‘how much more will the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered 
Himself without blemish to God, cleanse your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?’ 
1 John 1:7 ‘but if we walk in the Light as He Himself is in the Light, we have fellowship with one 
another, and the blood of Jesus His Son cleanses us from all sin.’ 
377 Hebrews 7:27 ‘who does not need daily, like those high priests, to offer up sacrifices, first for His 
own sins and then for the sins of the people, because this He did once for all when He offered up 
Himself.’ 
Hebrews 10:12-14 ‘But when Christ had offered for all time a single sacrifice for sins, he sat down at 
the right hand of God, waiting from that time until his enemies should be made a footstool for his 
feet. For by a single offering he has perfected for all time those who are being sanctified.’ 
378 Romans 3:25 ‘whom God displayed publicly as a propitiation in His blood through faith This was 
to demonstrate His righteousness, because in the forbearance of God He passed over the sins 
previously committed’ 
1 John 2:2 ‘and He Himself is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for those of 
the whole world.’ 
1 John 4:10 ‘In this is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us and sent His Son to be the 
propitiation for our sins.’ 
379 1 John 3:8 ‘The reason the Son of God appeared was to destroy the works of the devil.’ 
Hebrews 2:14 ‘through death [Christ] might destroy him who has the power of death, that is, the 
devil.’ 
Revelation 12:11 ‘And they have conquered him by the blood of the Lamb and by the word of their 
testimony, for they loved not their lives even unto death.’ 
380 Hebrews 4:3-5 ‘In the same way we also, when we were children, were enslaved to the 
elementary principles of the world. But when the fullness of time had come, God sent forth his Son, 
born of woman, born under the law, to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might 
receive adoption as sons.’ 
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Aside from these battle/ransom/sacrifice motifs, Paul also portrays the death of 
Christ as having some legal, that is, deontic ramifications for those who avail of it.381 
With both Peter and Paul indicating that Christ also underwent some ontological 
change becoming, somehow, sin on our behalf.382 
Peter, in alluding to the passage in Isaiah that details the suffering of the messiah, 
also indicates that Jesus’s suffering has a role to play in the Atonement.383 Whilst 
Paul, in Galatians, indicates that Christ ‘became a curse’ for us in order to redeem 
us.384 
Nevertheless, despite these differences, there does appear to be a consensus that 
Christ’s suffering was necessary, not just sufficient, for some aspect of our 
salvation.385 
So even from this cursory glance at the scriptural data, it is evident that the data 
does not lend itself to an obvious model for the Atonement. At the very least, the 
passages referring to Christ’s Atonement appear to discuss (at least) ontological, 
deontic, and relational effects of his work – all gesturing towards ‘solutions’ to 
                                                          
381 Romans 5:18 ‘So then as through one transgression there resulted condemnation to all men, 
even so through one act of righteousness there resulted justification of life to all men.’ 
382 2 Corinthians 5:21 ‘He made Him who knew no sin to be sin on our behalf, so that we might 
become the righteousness of God in Him.’ 
1 Peter 2:24 ‘and He Himself bore our sins in His body on the cross, so that we might die to sin and 
live to righteousness; for by His wounds you were healed.’ 
Hebrews 9:27-28 ‘And just as it is appointed for man to die once, and after that comes judgment, so 
Christ, having been offered once to bear the sins of many, will appear a second time, not to deal 
with sin but to save those who are eagerly waiting for him.’ 
383 The passage in Isaiah he quotes from reads: 
Isaiah 53:4-6 ‘Surely our griefs He Himself bore, And our sorrows He carried; Yet we ourselves 
esteemed Him stricken, Smitten of God, and afflicted. But He was pierced through for our 
transgressions, He was crushed for our iniquities; The chastening for our well-being fell upon Him, 
And by His scourging we are healed. All of us like sheep have gone astray, Each of us has turned to 
his own way; But the LORD has caused the iniquity of us all To fall on Him.’ 
384 Galatians 3:13 ‘Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us—for it is 
written, “Cursed is everyone who is hanged on a tree”.’ 
385 Acts 17:2-3 ‘And Paul went in, as was his custom, and on three Sabbath days he reasoned with 
them from the Scriptures, explaining and proving that it was necessary for the Christ to suffer and to 
rise from the dead…’ 
Luke 24:25-26 ‘And he said to them, “O foolish ones, and slow of heart to believe all that the 
prophets have spoken! Was it not necessary that the Christ should suffer these things and enter into 
his glory?”’ 
Hebrews 9:22-23 ‘Indeed, under the law almost everything is purified with blood, and without the 
shedding of blood there is no forgiveness of sins. Thus it was necessary for the copies of the 
heavenly things to be purified with these rites, but the heavenly things themselves with better 
sacrifices than these.’ 
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structurally different problems.386 So, with this in mind, it should come as no 
surprise to learn that the subsequent Christian tradition saw the development of 
numerous very different models in an attempt to make sense of these apparently 
contradictory passages. Nevertheless, I suggest that despite their differences, these 
general models all share a similar feature, namely, they all seem to involve a 
transaction of some sort. In each case, the one in need of Atonement requires the 
transactional involvement of at least one further person to secure their Atonement. 
In the case of the earliest models of the Atonement, those following the ransom 
motif, whatever it is about Christ’s work that is valuable is offered as (literal or 
symbolic) ransom, typically to the devil, in order secure human reconciliation with 
God.  
In Anselm’s satisfaction model, the reason Atonement cannot be secured without 
Christ’s crucifixion is because of something to do with God the Father. And so, God 
the Son offers whatever is causing this impasse to God the Father on behalf of us.  
In Abelard’s exemplar model (a model in many respects similar to the Thomist 
model), the reason Atonement cannot be secured without Christ’s crucifixion has 
something to do with us. And so, Christ offers us a solution to whatever it is that 
prevents us from reconciliation with, namely, the moving image of a heroic self-
sacrifice.  
In both the Thomistic and the reformed tradition, traditions typically associated 
with the doctrine of substitution (formerly) and penal substitution (latterly), our sin, 
or our guilt, or our punishment, or our hard treatment are transferred from us onto 
Christ, with him then doing what is necessary to deal with whatever it was that was 
transferred onto him (such that once this takes place, on at least the reformed 
tradition, Christ’s righteousness is then somehow transferred, or imputed, back to 
us, with this double transfer then securing the possibility of our reconciliation with 
God). 
                                                          
386 For more on the biblical data pointing to an ontological, deontic and relational Atonement, see 
Bayne and Restall 2009.  
174 
 
So, in all these explanations, there is a transaction taking place, a transaction either 
between God and some third party (often, but by no means always, either death or 
the devil), between God and God, between God and humanity, or between 
humanity and God. And in each case, as I will illustrate, it is the transaction that is 
the weak link in the explanation.387 As I see it, however, beyond an inability to 
satisfactorily explain the transfer problem, there are no definitive philosophical 
arguments against each of the theories I will survey, rather, it is the case that these 
theories, in one way or another, fail to meet all the scriptural desiderata. Given that 
this is a work of analytic theology, these failings are perhaps not to be thought of as 
catastrophic for the theory, but rather, as serving as a mere consideration against 
the theory. Nevertheless, in the final chapter, I will, by employing the work I have 
done on the beatific vision, offer a theory that can I take to both adequately deal 
with the transfer problem, and also meet all relevant scriptural desiderata.  
 
Transaction: God to Some Third Party 
For much of the first thousand years of Church history, the major Atonement motif 
was that of ransom. This is not to say that there was one universally accepted 
account of this ransom – there was not – rather, that the idea of (literal or non-
literal) ransom was one key family resemblance shared by most attempts to explain 
the Atonement.388 We see evidence of this view in Ignatius of Antioch (c. 35 – 
108)389 and the first full development of this view in Irenaeus (c. 130 – 202).390 In 
the third centuries the view is championed by both Origin and Tertullian, whilst in 
the fourth century it is defended by (amongst many others) Eusebius of Caesarea, 
                                                          
387 For, it seems, there is no adequate philosophical mechanism that can account for the sort of 
transfer needed to secure the Atonement. And if such a mechanism were to be found, such a 
mechanism would be unable to explain why God could not transfer whatever it is that needs 
transferring to, for instance, a plant. 
388 I include within this motif of ransom both the Christus Victor model (including its modern guise in 
Gustaf Aulén’s work, see Aulén 1969) and Irenaeus’ recapitulation model (the view that in his 
obedience in resisting the devil’s temptations Christ therefore reverses Adam’s capitulation, see 
Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, 3.18.1, 5.21.2.). 
389 Ignatius of Antioch, Letter to the Ephesians, 19. 
390 Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, 3.18.7, 5.1.1., 5.21.1-3. 
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Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Jerusalem, John Chrysostom, Jerome, Ambrose, and 
Augustine.391  
The motivation behind the ransom model is not, as one might initially have been 
thought, that God has to do a deal with the devil to redeem humanity. Rather, the 
thought is that whilst God could, in his power, defeat the devil without any 
difficulty, God instead opts to, overcome the devil through his (poetic) justice, his 
goodness and his wisdom.392 On this line of thinking Gregory of Nyssa writes: 
All God’s attributes are at once displayed in this – his goodness, his wisdom, 
and his justice. That he decided to save us is proof of his goodness. That he 
struck a bargain to redeem the captive indicates his justice. And it is 
evidence of his transcendent wisdom that he contrived to make accessible 
to the enemy what was [otherwise] inaccessible.393 
In an excellent chapter, Nicholas Lombardo explains that advocates of this ransom 
model can be split into two categories. Those who think of the ransom as a literal 
transaction between God and the devil (or God and death), and those who think of 
it as being a metaphorical transaction. Of the former, he writes, their view looks 
something like this: 
Through sin, the devil obtains legal authority over humanity, and God can 
only redeem humanity if the devil crucifies Christ, someone over whom he 
does not have any legal rights. So God allows the devil to crucify Christ, and 
as a result humanity is set free from the power of sin and death.394 
Christ allows the powers of evil to crucify him, but their malice backfires in 
this supreme act of overreaching, so that, through his acceptance of death, 
Christ ends up conquering the devil and liberating humanity from sin and 
death. The ransom, then, consists in Jesus handing himself over to be 
crucified.395 
                                                          
391 See Lombardo, 2013: 188. 
392 See, for instance, Augustine, De Trinitate, 13.17. 
393 Catechetical Oration, 23, 300. 
394 Lombardo, 2013: 229. 
395 Lombardo, 2013: 187. 
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However, this literal ransom view was not defended by all, indeed, perhaps even 
most of the patristic fathers. Certainly, Gregory of Nazianzus, John Damascene and 
Adamantius, all reject the thought that a literal ransom took place (although they 
seem happy to use language that suggests they are happy with a non-literal, 
metaphorical ransom motif).396 Criticising the literal ransom view, Gregory of 
Nazianzus writes: 
Now, then, we will examine an issue and doctrine overlooked by many but 
in my view very much to be examined. To whom was the blood poured out 
for us, and why was it poured out, that great and renowned blood of God, 
who is both high priest and victim? For we were held in bondage by the Evil 
One, sold under sin, and received pleasure in exchange for evil. But if the 
ransom is not given to anyone except the one holding us in bondage, I ask to 
whom this was paid, and for what cause? If to the Evil One, what an 
outrage! For the robber would receive not only a ransom from God, but God 
himself as a ransom, and a reward so greatly surpassing his own tyranny 
that for its sake he would rightly have spared us altogether. But if it was 
given to the Father, in the first place how? For we were not conquered by 
him. And secondly, on what principle would the blood of the Only-begotten 
delight the Father, who would not receive Isaac when he was offered by his 
father but switched the sacrifice, giving a ram in place of the reason 
endowed victim? It is clear that the Father accepts him, though he neither 
asked for this nor needed it, because of the divine plan, and because the 
human being must be sanctified by the humanity of God, that God might 
himself set us free and conquer the tyrant by force and lead us back to 
himself by the mediation of the Son, who also planned this to the honor of 
the Father, to whom it is manifest he yields all things.397 
As Lombardo goes on to note:  
                                                          
396 See Lombardo, 2012: 207. 
397 Gregory of Nazianzus, Orations, 45.22, in Festal Orations, 182. 
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legalistic reconstructions of the devil’s ransom are theologically unattractive 
and even ridiculous, but they make sense and they work logically, so it is 
easy to think that they accurately represent the patristic consensus. But 
patristic authors are not telling a legal story of redemption. They are telling 
an ontological story, and they think the pivotal moment of salvation is the 
resurrection, not the crucifixion.398  
So, what about the alternative metaphorical transaction view? Well, rather than the 
devil having any legal authority over humanity, Christ merely draws out the power 
of evil, taking it upon himself in full force on the cross, overcoming death and all 
evil through his resurrection. After Christ’s resurrection, we are allowed, through 
association and through the sacraments, to participate in this victory.399 
In essence, God draws out evil to himself to defeat it. However, this view of Christ’s 
death is only one small aspect of salvation crucifixion. Lombardo writes: 
Since Anselm, soteriological reflection in the West has focused on the 
crucifixion, and when that same narrow focus is brought anachronistically to 
the writings of the patristic era, distortion necessary results, because 
patristic authors do not focus on the cross in the same way. For patristic 
authors, salvation comes through the resurrection and the sacraments. The 
crucifixion is necessary and crucial, but it is not the locus of salvation; it is 
only the ransom, the price of salvation. Patristic authors give little attention 
to the devil’s ransom in their writings, because it is Christ’s resurrection, not 
his crucifixion, that brings about our resurrection. Contrary to Anselm, for 
patristic authors redemption is not above making forgiveness possible, it is 
                                                          
398 Lombardo, 2013: 231. 
399 This is how Lombardo explains it: 
 
Through sin, humanity becomes subject to evil, suffering, and death. In order to restore 
humanity, God becomes man, so that he can draw out the power of evil in all its various 
manifestations and take it upon himself. Then, after absorbing the full force of evil in his 
crucifixion, Christ overcomes death by his resurrection and makes it possible for us to share 
in his victory by being joining to his Person through the sacraments. The devil does not have 
any true rights over humanity, nor is any literal ransom paid to him. The language of rights 
and ransom serves only as a way of praising God’s wisdom and justice in bringing about our 
salvation through Christ’s crucifixion; it does not ascribe any true legal authority to the 
devil. (2013: 229). 
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about making possible the purification and restoration of human nature. 
There is no sense in which God could not, or would not, forgive humanity 
unless Christ died on the cross – which is why, unlike many theologians after 
Anselm, patristic authors are completely untroubled by stories of Jesus 
forgiving sins before his crucifixion.400 
This focus on the purification and restoration of human nature is certainly laudable. 
However, if there is no literal transaction at work, if it is all a metaphor and 
symbolic language, it is very difficult to see how Christ’s death can be anything 
more than metaphorically, but not literally, efficacious. Certainly, we can concede 
that, as Lombardo puts it, ‘God sends his Son to absorb the malicious fury of evil 
and then conquer death through his resurrection’,401 but how exactly does this lead 
purification or restoration? On the framework I have proposed, how could this 
possibly take away a person’s guilt and shame? 
So, on the one hand, the literal ransom view proposes an ethically unacceptable 
transaction between God and devil. On the other, the metaphorical ransom view 
proposes what is essentially a metaphorical transaction. But a metaphorical 
transaction seems like it will be entirely inefficacious. And this was the very 
dilemma that Anselm discovered, a discovery which caused first major shift in 
Atonement thinking. 
 
Transaction: God to God 
Anselm, it seems, read the patristics literally. Like Gregory of Nazianzus before him, 
Anselm thought the ransom theory quite inappropriately presented the devil as the 
de jure (rather than, at best, de facto) ruler of humanity. Although there is little 
evidence the patristic defenders of the ransom theory really did think this the devil 
had actual (rather than metaphorical) rights over humanity, this straw man was the 
position that Anselm reacted against. Anselm writes in Cur Deus homo: 
                                                          
400 Lombardo, 2013: 230. 
401 Lombardo, 2013: 231 
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Now we are also accustomed to say that in order to liberate humanity God 
was obligated to act against the devil through justice before he acted 
through force, so that when the devil killed him who did not deserve death 
and who was God, he would justly lose the power that he held over 
sinners… But I do not see how this has any cogency. If either the devil or 
human beings were their own, or belonged to anyone other than God, or 
remained in the power of anyone other than God, then maybe this would be 
the right thing to say. But since in fact neither the devil nor human beings 
belong to anyone other than God or stand outside God’s power, on what 
grounds was God obligated to do anything with his own, about his own, or 
in his own, other than to punish his own slave who had persuaded a fellow 
slave to abandon their common master and transfer allegiance to him, a 
traitor harbouring a fugitive, a thief who received a thief along with what he 
had stolen from his master? 402 
But if all humanity already belongs to God, what possible purpose could Christ’s 
sacrifice have? As Anselm famously presented this dilemma: 
If God could not save sinners except by condemning a just man, where is his 
omnipotence? If, on the other hand, he was capable of doing so, but did not 
will it, how shall we defend his wisdom and justice? 403 
In grappling with this dilemma, Anselm rejected the first horn, suggesting that only 
Jesus could redeem us through his heroic self-sacrifice, because, given his divine 
nature, his self-sacrifice is of infinite value. This infinitely valuable self-sacrifice 
could then be offered to God by way of compensation for the infinite offense 
caused by the sin of humanity. The crucifixion is therefore, for Anselm, ‘a 
transaction between God the Father and God the Son, where the beauty of Christ’s 
heroism makes the restitution required by God for the ugliness of sin.’404 However, 
there is quite an obvious problem with this account. Why would God the Father 
                                                          
402 Williams, 2007: 251. 
403 Williams, 2007: 275 
404 Lombardo, 2013: 166. 
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want this heroic self-sacrifice? It is easy enough to see why the devil might have 
wanted it, but why God? As Lombardo notes: 
Anselm’s account of redemption shares an important structural feature with 
the one he criticizes in Book I.6.7 of Cur Deus homo: each interprets the 
crucifixion as a transaction. Every transaction involves someone who gives 
and someone who receives. When the crucifixion is interpreted as a 
transaction, the Son, in his humanity, is obviously the one who gives. But 
who receives? In the interpretation Anselm criticises in Book I.6.7, the 
recipient is both ambiguous and plausible. In Anselm’s theory, however the 
recipient is neither unambiguous nor plausible. Is the recipient the triune 
God, God the Father, or God’s honor? It is not clear, and none of the 
alternatives are very plausible…In the end Anselm trades the devil’s ransom 
for the Father’s ransom.405 
So, it seems as though on this Anselmian view, the problem the crucifixion is 
designed to solve is a problem on God’s side. God must be satisfied. For whatever 
reason, God’s honour must be restored before reconciliation between humanity 
and God can occur. Nevertheless, it is still not clear how I, a sinner, might benefit 
from this self-sacrifice. 
In recent years, Richard Swinburne has tried to develop Anselm’s position to show 
how a sinner might avail of this self-sacrifice.406 To do this, Swinburne draws a 
distinction between obligatory and supererogatory acts. He suggests that failure to 
do what is obligatory, that is, sin, leads to guilt, whilst doing what is supererogatory 
leads to merit. Guilt, however, carries with it an additional stigma of being 
‘unclean’. Swinburne suggests that as moral agents, we are responsible for dealing 
with our guilt and removing its stain. Contingent on the severity of what we have 
done, Swinburne thinks this removal takes the form of some combination of the 
following necessary and contingent acts: 
                                                          
405 Lombardo, 2013: 165. 
406 Whilst Swinburne differs from Anselm’s view in as much as he grapples with the second horn of 
Anselm’s dilemma, arguing that Christ’s death was not necessary – a perfect angel could, plausibly, 
have stood in for Christ – it was fitting. 
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Necessary acts: 
• Repentance. The public and private disavowal of one’s bad action. 
• Apology. Expressing to the victim remorse for one’s actions. 
Contingent acts: 
• Reparation. If required by the victim, restoring as best possible the state of 
affairs as it existed prior to the wrongdoing. 
• Penance. Somehow thoughtfully related to the wrongdoing, this costly act 
affirms the strength of apology and goes beyond what reparation requires, 
to thereby – if required - remove the stain of guilt. 
• Forgiveness. On behalf of the victim, accepting the aforementioned acts and 
no longer holding the wrongdoer as ‘originator of the wrong act’, thereby 
removing the wrongdoer’s guilt stain.407 Forgiveness, however, is contingent 
upon the aforementioned act’s appropriateness in the light of the 
wrongdoing.408  
Swinburne thinks that a victim cannot be obliged to perform an action because a 
wrongdoing was perpetrated against them, and so there can be nothing obligatory 
about forgiveness. With the same logic, there is nothing necessarily obliging the 
victim to demand reparation or penance.409 This being the case, God can remove 
our guilt by forgiving those who repent and apologize for their sin (i.e., there living 
of a second-rate life, despite the obligation to live a first-rate one410). So why does 
God not do so? Swinburne remarks:  
                                                          
407 Porter, 2004: 232. 
408 To forgive when insufficient atonement has been made is - arguably - akin to not taking seriously 
the wrongdoing of the wrongdoer. There is something (Swinburne argues) intuitively wrong about 
accepting a token reparative show from a wrongdoer, e.g. forgiving a mass murderer on the basis 
that he sent each family of his victims $1, or forgiving someone who refuses to apologize. 
409 Imagine a very rich victim and very poor wrongdoer who broke (with no malice intended, i.e. 
merely objectively guilty) one of the rich man’s many expensive vases, it seems intuitively unfair for 
the rich victim to force the poor wrongdoer to work for, say, twenty years, to pay back full 
reparation for his vase and thereby expunge his guilt. 
410 See Porter, 2004: 232. 
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God could have forgiven us without demanding reparation and penance, if 
he had chosen; and it would not have been wrong of him so to choose411 
Nevertheless, because, on Swinburne’s account, it is important for us to understand 
both the consequences and seriousness of our actions, and important for us atone 
as best we can to expunge the stain of guilt, he continues 
it is good that if we do wrong, we should take proper steps to cancel our 
actions, to pay out debts, as far as logically can be done.412  
And this is where Christ’s sacrifice comes in. Swinburne sees Christ as dying a 
supererogatory death, and thereby accumulating merit. Swinburne thinks Christ’s 
meritorious death can therefore by offered by the Christian as an acceptable 
sacrifice for God, and that this offering ‘can be used by us as a reparation for sin.’413 
In essence, then, Swinburne thinks that the Christian’s offering Christ’s death as 
reparations for one’s sin is appropriate to secure God’s forgiveness, and so to 
remove one’s guilt.414 
Swinburne’s view does offer a more nuanced view than Anselm’s satisfaction 
account. However, they both face the same fundamental problem. Even if Christ’s 
death is supererogatory, why would God want this as something tantamount to a 
present?415 The difficult here is twofold. Firstly, it seems God is at least initially 
unwilling to be reconciled with us, that is, the reason we are not reconciled is 
something to do with God (be this due to his honour, or his justice, or some other 
reason). Secondly, it seems that the solution provided to this problem makes no 
sense. How could God’s honour, or God’s justice, be satisfied with what is 
tantamount to the gift of a mangled corpse? Were such a gift to indeed prove 
efficacious, it would imply this was something God wanted or needed. God, the 
                                                          
411 Swinburne, 1989: 149. See also Swinburne, 1989: 160,  
 
[It] is the victim of wrongdoing-in this case God- who has the right to choose, up to the limit 
of an equivalent to the harm done and the need for a little more in penance, how much 
reparation and penance to require before he will forgive. 
412 Swinburne, 1989: 149 
413 Cross, 2001: 401 
414 Swinburne, 1989: 157, 161. 
415 In private correspondence, Stump has compared this transaction to giving someone who loves 
cats a mangled, tortured cat as a satisfactory gift. 
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designer of the universe, could, in theory, have created any number of alternative 
ways of satisfying his honour or justice, and yet He chose instead the brutal torture 
of His son. Why would this be considered fitting? How is this view compatible with 
the idea of God as love? Such questions, are, of course, not new. And indeed, it was 
reflection on these considerations that helped motivate the emergence of our next 
major Atonement model, what has become known as Abelard’s ‘moral influence’ 
model. 
 
Transaction: God to Humanity 
Writing shortly after Anselm, Abelard also rejected Anselm’s straw man, the literal 
reading of the ransom theory.416 As far as Abelard was concerned, ransoms are only 
paid to masters, and as God is our master, it seems absurd that God would want a 
ransom paid to himself.417 However, Abelard also rejected Anselm’s position, too, 
viewing it also as a violation of the moral order; for, as he saw it, the Anselmian 
position denied the love of God.418 For Abelard, our sins are directed to God, and 
so, God could forgive us at any time. That God could forgive people before the 
crucifixion went to show, as far as he was concerned, that the crucifixion was not 
necessary for forgiveness. So, if God were to withhold his forgiveness, for any 
reason, God’s love would be undermined. Rather than Christ’s death offering 
something to either the devil or God, Abelard suggested that Christ’s sacrifice was 
necessary because it offers us something instead; Christ’s self-sacrifice offers us the 
witness of his heroic embrace of death. Abelard writes: 
Now it seems to us that we have been justified by the blood of Christ and 
reconciled to God in this way: through this unique act of grace manifested 
to us – in that his Son has taken upon himself our nature and persevered 
therein in teaching us by word and example even unto death – he has more 
fully bound us to himself by love; with the result that our hearts should be 
                                                          
416 For more on Abelard’s view, see Quinn 1993. 
417 See Lombardo, 2013: 171. 
418 Or the part of Anselm’s account he was exposed to. 
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enkindled by such a gift of divine grace, and true charity should not now 
shrink from enduring anything for him.419 
In this way, reflection on Christ’s heroic self-sacrifice, a self-sacrifice in some sense 
made on our behalf, should motivate us to love God.420 The problem that the 
Atonement is designed to solve is therefore on our side, namely, the fact we do not 
desire to love God. This reflection on Christ’s heroic self-sacrifice, repeated every 
eucharist, therefore either prompts or strengthens in us a desire to love, and 
therefore to be united with union with, God. And inasmuch as it does this, Abelard’s 
account does seem to avoid the pitfalls of Anselm’s account. However, Abelard’s 
account also faces a significant problem. According to the biblical data, it seems as 
though Christ’s suffering was necessary for the Atonement, not merely sufficient for 
it. Unfortunately, Abelard’s account cannot accommodate for this.421 There are 
many alternative ways in which a person could be motivated to love God (one 
could, for instance, read stories about other acts of providence, or, as mentioned, 
one could marvel at the beauty of creation). Certainly, Christ’s heroic self-sacrifice 
might be a particularly apt motivator (even, perhaps, the most apt) however, it 
seems reflection on the story of Christ’s heroic self-sacrifice would, for those not 
living in the first century, have (broadly) the same effect whether or not the story 
had any historical truth to it. 
Nevertheless, both Abelard and Anselm explain, in the words of Lombardo, the 
salvific value of the crucifixion with respect to a spectator. For Anselm, the 
spectator is God the Father, and the spectacle is the beauty of Christ’s 
                                                          
419 Abelard, 1956: 283. 
420 As Nicholas Lombardo writes, on Abelard’s account: 
 
Christ’s death is redemptive because it reveals God’s love and because this revelation of 
God’s love inspires charity in us. We are justified by the blood of Christ, but it is not Christ’s 
death or even his heroic embrace of death that justifies us. We are justified by witnessing 
Christ’s death, because this witnessing inspires “that deeper affection in us which not only 
frees us from slavery to sin, but also wins for us the true liberty of sons of God, so that we 
do all things out of love rather than fear.” (Lombardo, 2013: 178). 
421 Lombardo notes that Abelard’s account ‘cannot give a plausible rationale for New Testament 
affirmations about the salvific necessity of the crucifixion.’ (Lombardo, 2013: 178). 
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heroism. For Abelard, the spectator is fallen humanity, and the spectacle is 
Christ’s selfless love, which inspires charity.422 
However, in both cases, each account fails to meet one of desiderata for a 
successful account. The ethical implications of Anselm’s view, that God is not 
perfectly loving, serve to render it, at best, incomplete, whilst the failure to account 
for key scriptural passages renders Abelard’s view likewise incomplete. 
 
Transaction: Humanity to God 
Aquinas, writing after both Anselm and Abelard, shows surprising sensitivity to 
Abelard’s general position. Like Abelard, Aquinas puts the problem of the 
Atonement on the side of the human, with Christ’s sacrificial death doing 
something to sort this out. For Aquinas, like Abelard, reflection on the death of 
Christ can have a morally transformative effect on a person’s life, motivating them 
toward a life of grace. However, Aquinas adds something distinctive to Abelard’s 
view. Aquinas suggests that this moral transformation is aided by a transfer of 
penalty from humanity to Christ; Christ acts, in this sense, as a sort of substitute. 
Aquinas writes: 
[Christ] willed to suffer that he might make satisfaction for our sins. And he 
suffered for us those things which we deserved to suffer because of the sin 
of our first parent. The chief of these is death, to which all other human 
sufferings are ordered as to their end … Accordingly, Christ also willed to 
suffer death for our sins so that, without any fault of His own by himself 
bearing the penalty we owed, he might free us from the sentence of death, 
in the way that anyone would be freed from a penalty he owed if another 
person undertook the penalty for him.423 
So, beyond Anselm’s suggestion that Christ’s sacrifice might be a fitting offering to 
God, Aquinas thinks there is some sort of transfer of punishment that takes place, a 
                                                          
422 Lombardo, 2013: 179. 
423 CT 227. Also, ST III Q 46 A 1 and SCG Book 4 Chapter 55. 
186 
 
transaction from sinful humanity to the sinless Christ. But how might we explain 
this transfer? Speaking of its possibility, Aquinas suggests that  
the penalty of satisfaction is in a certain sense voluntary. It can happen that 
those who differ with respect to guilt [worthy of] penalty are one with 
respect to the will in a union of love. For this reason, sometimes someone 
who has not sinned voluntarily bears the penalty for another person.424 
Here, Aquinas suggests that a transfer of penalty is possible when the one paying 
the penalty is willing to do so, out of love for the other, and the other is willing to 
let them do so, because they cannot do it themselves.425 
Aquinas thought that reflection on this transaction, and the thought that Christ’s 
substitutionary self-sacrifice was done out of love, was the most fitting way to 
begin the process of transformation in the life of a sinner, and so, more fitting than 
mere self-sacrifice alone. But, like Abelard before him, despite being the most 
fitting way to do this, Aquinas thinks that God’s omnipotence allows for other ways, 
and so, that this transfer of penalty was not strictly necessary. He writes:  
a judge who has to punish a fault committed against another … cannot remit 
the fault or penalty without injustice. But God has no one superior to him; 
rather he himself is the highest and universal good of the whole world. And 
for this reason, if [God] remits sin, which is defined as a fault from its being 
committed against [God] himself, he does no one an injury, just as any 
human being who, without [requiring] satisfaction, remits an offense 
committed against himself does not act unjustly but is merciful.426 
Nevertheless, Aquinas does think it was the most fitting way of healing our 
corrupted human nature, and because it was the most fitting way, it was the way 
God determined to achieve it.  
However, just as was the case with Abelard, Aquinas’s account seems incompatible 
with some of the biblical data on the crucifixion. To begin with, it is not obvious that 
                                                          
424 ST I-II Q 87 A 7. 
425 This position, that of vicarious punishment, is one advocated by Murphy 2011. 
426 ST III Q 46 A 2 ad. 3. 
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Christ in fact bears human sin. Nor is it obvious why Christ so dreaded the cross.427 
Reflection on the inadequacy of Aquinas’s account to explain the biblical data lead 
the reformation’s development of his substitutionary account into what has 
become known as penal substitution. On this point, Stump writes: 
There is, however, one idea important in theories of the Atonement found, 
for example, in the Reformation which is not mentioned in this chapter 
because, as far as I can see, it is not in Aquinas. Luther, for example, in his 
explanation of the Atonement, emphasizes the idea that Christ somehow 
actually bears all human sin; that is, in some way all the sins ever committed 
in human history are transferred to Christ’s soul in his suffering on the cross. 
There is no similar or analogous claim in Aquinas’s account. There is 
consequently some problem for Aquinas in squaring his account with the 
New Testament story of the passion. At any rate, the cry of dereliction from 
the cross is certainly easier to explain on Luther’s view than on Aquinas’s 
interpretation; and so is Christ’s agony in the garden of Gethsemane. For 
Aquinas, it is difficult to explain why the incarnate deity should have been in 
such torment over his death when so many of the merely human martyrs 
went gladly, even cheerfully, to death by tortures worse than crucifixion.428 
Rather than the mere penalty for sin, it is sin itself which is transferred from a 
person to Christ. And whilst this view does accord more closely with the biblical 
texts, it too, is ethically troubling. For one, it is far from clear that there is any 
mechanism for transferring sin from one person to another. Secondly, even if our 
sin was transferred, it is far from clear that such a move is either just, or that we are 
now innocent. Furthermore, it is not clear at all that, even if possible, transferring 
sin from one person to another would entail the transfer of guilt and shame over 
one’s prior sinful action. 
                                                          
427 In recent years, Stump has tried to rectify this lack in the Thomist account by suggesting that at 
the cry of dereliction Jesus opened himself up to all the psyches of every person, past, present and 
future, and that the psychological pain of experiencing what it might be like to sin in the ways such 
people have sinned was sufficient to prevent Christ from dyadically attending to God the Father, 
thereby (in some sense) causing a break in the Trinity. It was this ‘break’ that Christ was afraid of 
prior to the crucifixion. For more, see Stump, 2012a: 4-7.  
428 Stump, 2003: 453. 
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There are, of course, other major models of the Atonement available.429 However, 
each of these models seems to require some form of transaction or another, too, 
and in each case, this transaction raises ethical and theological concerns.  
Given this, rather than offering a further transaction model, I will, in the final 
chapter, outline a possible non-transactional model of the Atonement, but 
importantly, a non-transactional model that nevertheless that can satisfy the 
requisite scriptural desiderata. 
 
Non-Transaction and Union 
Over the last two millennia there have been many differing attempts to try and 
explain the Atonement in transactional terms. In my estimation, all prior attempts 
have failed to completely explain how Christ’s work can aid our Atonement either 
because they do not satisfy the scriptural desiderata, or because they are unable to 
adequately (i.e., they are unable to provide a coherent ethically and metaphysically 
viable account) account for the transaction itself. Rather than continuing to focus 
on trying to find an explanation for this transaction, I propose instead to explore 
what a transactionless, union account of the Atonement might look like.430 
In the final chapter, I will develop the thought that our ultimate union with God 
(the Father) at the beatific vision is secured through our prior union with God the 
Son (which is itself preceded by union with the God the Spirit). That is to say, 
something about our union with God the Son deals with our present inability to 
behold the beatific vision. The general lineaments of such a union view are not 
without scriptural warrant, either. The apostle Paul, for instance, writes: 
Ephesians 5:29-32 ‘For no one ever hated his own flesh, but nourishes and 
cherishes it, just as Christ does the church, because we are members of his 
body. “Therefore a man shall leave his father and mother and hold fast to 
                                                          
429 See for instance, Grotius’s governmental theory (1617) recently reinterpreted by Oliver Crisp as 
‘penal non-substitution’ (Crisp, 2008). 
430 Taking a leaf from John McDowell, if A looks like it entails either B or C, and neither B nor C are 
good, you should not focus on which is the least bad. Rather, you should “look for a different 
picture” and focus on getting rid of A. And in this case, A is a transactional account of Atonement. 
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his wife, and the two shall become one flesh.” This mystery is profound, and 
I am saying that it refers to Christ and the church.’ 
Romans 12:4-5 ‘For as in one body we have many members, and the 
members do not all have the same function, so we, though many, are one 
body in Christ, and individually members one of another.’ 
1 Corinthians 12:12 ‘For just as the body is one and has many members, and 
all the members of the body, though many, are one body, so it is with 
Christ.’ 
Furthermore, as already alluded to, the idea of union with Christ has already been 
teased in the work of many of the church fathers,431 as well as in the work of 
Anselm, Abelard and Aquinas.432  
                                                          
431 So, for instance, Gregory of Nyssa writes:  
 
[Christ] united himself with our nature, in order that by its union with the Divine it might 
become divine, being rescued from death and freed from the tyranny of the adversary. For 
with his return from death, our mortal race begins its return to immortal life. (Catechetical 
Oration, 25, 302). 
 
To which Lombardo comments: 
 
Since our problem is more ontological than epistemological, it follows that the solution 
must likewise be more ontological than epistemological… Baptism joins us spiritually to 
Christ, but we are comprised of body and soul and so our bodies, as well as our souls, must 
be joined to Christ. Therefore, something else is needed: the Eucharist. The soul is joined to 
Christ through faith and baptism, and the body is joined to Christ through reception of the 
Eucharist. By our union with Christ’s incorruptible body, our bodies also become immortal. 
(Lombardo, 2013: 225). 
432 So, concerning this mystical body, Stump writes of Aquinas: 
 
According to Aquinas, Christ is the head of the Church; and since all human beings are 
potentially members of the Church, Christ is (at least potentially) the head of the whole 
human race. By saying that Christ is the head, Aquinas means that he is first among human 
beings in order, perfection, and power; but, more importantly, he also means that together 
Christ and human beings form one mystical body, analogous to the physical body formed by 
the head and other members of a human body. All human beings are potentially, and 
believers are actually, part of this mystical body. In his passion Christ merits grace sufficient 
to cure all human sin; and as head of the body of the Church, he infuses the grace he has 
merited into those persons actually united with him in this mystical body. (Stump, 2003: 
443). 
And discussing Aquinas’s account of the Eucharist, she writes: 
 
Furthermore, the nature of the Eucharist is such that when a believer partakes of it, he does 
not turn the sacrament into his substance, as happens when he eats other food, but instead 
he becomes part of the body of Christ and is incorporated into the body of Christ. Aquinas 
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However, with the help of the previously established framework, I intend, in the 
next and final chapter, to develop this union account of the Atonement further than 
these previous accounts. For, unlike prior accounts, I will suggest that this sort of 
non-transactional account is primarily metaphysical in nature, and I will tease out a 
possible metaphysical account of union that might make sense of such a 
transactionless view.   
                                                          
says, “there is this difference between corporeal and spiritual food: corporeal food is 
converted into the substance of the human being who is nourished [by it] … but spiritual 
food converts a human being into itself”. (Stump, 2003: 446). 
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Chapter 5 
The Christian Doctrine of the Atonement 
 
I began the first chapter by arguing that however the Atonement achieves it, the 
goal of the Atonement involves securing a person’s union with God at the beatific 
vision. In chapter two, suggested several general inhibitors to such union that any 
account of the Atonement must purport to overcome if it is to provide a plausible 
explanation for the doctrine. In the third chapter, I identified a general framework 
for dealing with each of these inhibitors; however, I noted that there were 
particular problems generated by orthodox Christian belief that make finding an 
orthodox account of the Atonement particularly intractable. In the previous 
chapter, I surveyed some (what I took to be) unsatisfactory ways in which previous 
theologians and philosophers have tried to address some of these issues. 
Whilst I take what has come before to be helpful in its own right, as a prolegomena 
for (what I take to be) any future successful account of atonement, in this final 
chapter, I intend to gesture towards one (what I take to be) possible model for the 
Atonement that meets the desiderata so outlined, that is, an alternative account of 
the way in which Christ’s life, passion, death, and resurrection might be used by the 
penitent sinner in order that they might be able to behold the beatific vision and so 
be united with God. The (transactionless) union model that I will propose, as I see 
it, both makes sense of the biblical data, and avoids some of the ethical pitfalls 
previous accounts of Atonement have fallen into.  
Specifically, I will look at both how the work of Christ can fit into the framework set 
out in chapter three, and how we might, through union, avail of such work. That is, 
how the work of Christ (and our availing of it) can help motivate a person’s 
quiescence to grace, and how the work of Christ can help a person deal with their 
objective guilt and their objective shame, such that they can both wholeheartedly 
desire union with God, and also come to share attention with God at the beatific 
vision. 
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Grace and the Sufferings of Christ 
In chapter three, I suggested that the problem of psychological fragmentation can 
be dealt with when a person comes to quiescence with respect to God’s self-
revelatory gift of grace, and so, reflects on God’s goodness and comes to desire 
union with Him. However, I also suggested that in addition to giving this self-
revelatory gift of grace, God can also externally motivate a person to quiescence 
through, for instance, suffering, such that for a person who would otherwise be 
resistant to grace, this resistance ‘cracks’ or ‘melts’ into quiescence.  
I propose, then, that there are two ways that Christ’s life, passion, death and 
resurrection can be used to motivate this desire for union with God. First, by 
standing as an example of grace (i.e., as an example of God’s great goodness), and 
second, as a form of external motivation toward quiescence with respect to this 
grace. 
With respect to the first way, Christ’s heroic self-sacrifice demonstrates, as Abelard 
explained, God’s great love and goodness. If we recall Abelard’s view: 
Christ’s death is redemptive because it reveals God’s love and because this 
revelation of God’s love inspires charity in us. We are justified by the blood 
of Christ, but it is not Christ’s death or even his heroic embrace of death that 
justifies us. We are justified by witnessing Christ’s death, because this 
witnessing inspires “that deeper affection in us which not only frees us from 
slavery to sin, but also wins for us the true liberty of sons of God, so that we 
do all things out of love rather than fear.”433 
On this view, Christ’s life, passion, death, and resurrection all reveal an aspect of 
God’s goodness, where appropriate reflection on this goodness can motivate a 
                                                          
433 Lombardo, 2013: 178. 
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person to desire union with God, in much the same way that reflecting on a 
beautiful sunset might also motivate a desire for God.434  
With respect to the second point, Christ’s suffering also provides a form of external 
motivation to quiescence, both in as much as it demonstrates love, and also in as 
much as one’s heart might be moved as one hears someone has sacrificed 
something great for you. A person hearing, for instance, of the tremendous sacrifice 
of an army unit in order to save their life, or of a person being vicariously punished 
on their behalf,435 might at once be both full of gratitude, but it could also bring 
about something like survivor’s syndrome in the hearer,436 with both of these aiding 
in the process of bringing them to quiescence. Likewise, reflection on the fact that a 
lover went out their way to do something romantic or special for their beloved can 
motivate love in the reflecting beloved. 
So, as well as demonstrating God’s goodness, inasmuch as one recognises that 
Christ’s heroic self-sacrifice was exemplary of love (Jesus himself said ‘Greater love 
has no one than this, that they lay down their life for their friends’437), reflection on 
this act of love has the capacity to externally motivate (but will, of course, not 
inevitably lead to) quiescence with respect to God’s operative grace. In a similar 
manner, sombre reflection on the nature of Christ’s sacrificial death might also 
move a person to quiescence through something akin to survivor’s syndrome.  
And this second position is echoed in Aquinas’s account of the Atonement. 
Concerning this account, Stump comments: 
When a person has been readied by past experience and grace, the passion 
and death of Christ are the means for subduing the sinner’s final resistance 
to such a volition. The internal opposition to undergoing the wholesale 
                                                          
434 Clearly, however, Christ’s life, passion, death, and resurrection can’t just reveal an aspect of God’s 
goodness. If the goodness revealed these is due to their atoning work, there is a very real threat of 
circularity if this is the only way in which said events contribute to the Atonement. 
435 See, for instance, Murphy 2009. 
436 That is, something like survivor’s guilt; why did I survive and they, these good people, die? 
437 John 15:13. See also Hebrews 12:3. 
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changes and the humbling entailed by such a volition is broken by the 
suffering of Christ and the love it shows.438 
However, there is a worry with this sort of analysis. In what way is this self-sacrifice 
in fact good? If it is good because it reveals God’s goodness, or if it is good only in 
virtue of motivating us to quiescence, it seems we are presenting a purely circular 
argument for its either being good or being exemplary.439 If it is good in some other 
respect, what respect might that be? Well, it is helpful at this point to note that the 
exemplarist account seems unable to address either the problem of guilt or the 
problem of shame. And since it cannot do so, whatever a successful account of 
atonement might look like, it cannot be purely exemplary. So long as whatever it is 
that deals with the problem of guilt and the problem of shame are in some way tied 
to Christ’s self-sacrifice, such self-sacrifice could be considered good (and so, both 
heroic and exemplary) with respect to that. 
And so, whilst this account can provide a slightly fuller explanation of Abelard’s 
exemplarist account, it cannot, by itself, explain either why the Atonement is 
necessary, or the full body of scriptural data. Indeed, as mentioned, it also does not 
offer any explanation for how either (aligned) guilt or shame might be dealt with. 
However, this is not problematic. As I argued in the third chapter, it is very plausible 
that guilt and shame require distinct solutions, and so it should come as no surprise 
that a one-size-fits-all account of the Atonement fails to adequately explain all the 
desiderata. So long as the problems of objective guilt and objective shame can be 
explained in a way compatible with this exemplarist account, and in a way that does 
fit the remaining scriptural desiderata, this supposed deficiency is, in fact, 
understandable. 
 
 
                                                          
438 Stump, 2003: 387. 
439 That is, if it is only a demonstration of goodness, it is unclear to me what it is about an innocent 
person being crucified that might count as a demonstration of goodness, or might motivate me to 
quiescence (besides, perhaps, confusion). 
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Atonement and Shame 
In the second and third chapters, I drew a distinction between objective and 
subjective shame. I suggested that one might experience subjective shame without 
being objectively shamed, and that one might be objectively shamed without 
experiencing subjective shame. I noted that whilst it was the experience of 
subjective shame that inhibits union between others, I did not think an account of 
the Atonement needed to account for subjective shame that was not aligned with 
objective shame, as, I suggested, a person might deal with their subjective shame 
through coming to realise that their subjective shame does not track objective 
shame, that is, by being presented with all relevant information demonstrating that 
the two are unaligned.440 
In either case, I said that shame stemmed from a failure (merely perceived, in the 
case of subjective shame, necessarily actual in case of objective shame) to meet a 
community standard that the shamed person either considered to be (in the case of 
subjective shame) or in fact was (in the case of objective shame) in some sense 
authoritative over them, such that either they believed it to be appropriate (i.e., 
subjective shame), or it in fact was appropriate (i.e., objective shame) for others to 
reject them. Furthermore, I suggested that there were four general causes of 
shame, namely, shame caused by: 
(1) reflection on one’s own individual moral wrongdoing,  
(2) reflection upon wrongs that have been done to you,  
(3) reflection upon depredations of nature that might have befallen you, and  
(4), reflection on your communal participation in a certain community that 
has perpetrated significant wrongdoing.  
In that chapter, I suggested that in each case, the cause of shame had to be dealt 
with, so, given these four causes, finding one single solution to the problem of 
                                                          
440 However, even if this were not the case, the solution to the presence subjective shame unaligned 
with objective shame would very likely be identical to subjective shame that was aligned with 
objective shame. If I have a working explanation for the latter, it will also cover the former, and so 
no further explanation would be required. 
196 
 
shame was unlikely. Developing Stump’s own account, I suggested that the antidote 
to (2), (3), and (4) might be explained by something akin to the celebration of the 
shamed person’s life. Whilst I noted (2) and (3) were unlikely to apply to shame 
with respect to God (and so, in this case, that subjective and objective shame were 
unaligned, and did not need explaining in an account of the Atonement), I 
nevertheless suggested that, generally and for each, a celebration that focused 
upon their subsequently meeting a trumping community standard, one that in 
some way related to the initial source of shame, might defeat the shame that 
stemmed from the trumped community standard by which a person had judged 
themselves to have fallen short. However, I suggested it was difficult to see how 
this might help us deal with shame stemming from (1), and it was not altogether 
obvious that this solution extended to (4). 
Nevertheless, I think (2) and (3) do share sufficient similarity with (4) to warrant 
extending a similar sort of explanation to this latter cause, too. In each case, the 
shamed person is not to blame for their experience of shame (and to the extent 
that they can be blamed, can that experience be captured by (1)). Following Stump, 
I therefore suggested that in the case of (2), (3) and (4), the trumping standard that 
defeats their shame involves some form of communal honour. Thus, for (2) and (3), 
a person who is truly honoured (due to their possession of something intrinsically 
valuable), may no longer feel it is appropriate for another to reject them as a 
person, so long as the honour is in some way connected to the original cause of 
shame. In the case of (4), this meant celebrating something intrinsically valuable 
that is in, or has happened to, the community itself.441 
With this in view, we can think about in the specific case of (what might constitute) 
objective shame at being a member of the human race, and, indeed, how such 
shame might be defeated.442 Consider, then, the following: In becoming incarnate, 
Christ honoured the human race, and so, every human person can take pride in the 
                                                          
441 For one such example, consider Germany’s recent acceptance of Syrian refuges. 
442 I take this to be a theological consequence of the doctrine of original sin, and offer no further 
defence of this. Unlike other examples of communal subjective shame (for instance, the shame one 
might experience when one’s football team is humiliated), the shame that stems from membership 
of the sinful human race is, plausibly, aligned to objective shame with respect to God. 
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fact that God chose to become incarnate as a human person.443 Furthermore, every 
human person can take pride in the fact that not only did Christ become incarnate, 
he also did so with them in mind, with a view to both friendship and love with 
them. Finally, the incarnation, it seems, was in some way directly motivated by the 
fallen condition of humanity, that is, it was connected to the original cause of 
shame, namely, sin and the fall. In this way, reflection on Christ’s incarnate life can, 
plausibly, deal with this fourth cause of shame, at least, with respect to being a 
member of humanity in general. 
What about the shame that stems from one’s own wrongdoing? I take this to be 
the most forceful element of the problem of shame. On the face of it, it seems 
difficult to reconcile this sort of shame with a celebration of what is intrinsically 
honourable in a person (or in a community, as in (4)). It seems absurd to suppose 
that, in 1945, a Nazi concentration camp guard should feel as though it was no 
longer appropriate for others to reject him in virtue of the celebration of some 
morally upstanding aspect of his character. Instead, in chapter three, I suggested 
that the source of this shame stemmed from the communicative nature of his 
wrongdoing, and so, to deal with this shame, that he himself must work to remove 
the communication of disrespect issued by his wrongdoing. I suggested, however, 
that removing this communication required a sincere retraction and expression of 
remorse; namely, an apology, where the sincerity of this apology was grounded in 
some supererogatory act – a supererogatory act of penance which, with respect to 
God, was, I suggested, impossible for him to offer. 
So, how might Christ’s life, passion, death, or resurrection help him with this 
offering of penance? Well, in the first place, the same grace that can bring a person 
to a general desire for union with God also has within it the resources to motive a 
person to apology and repentance, but as mentioned earlier, even if such unique 
grace could motivate a person to penance as well, what penance could that person 
                                                          
443 I recognise, of course, that Christ could not represent every specific community. He was, for 
instance, a male carpenter living in first century Judaism, however this does not preclude him from 
representing humanity as a whole, in the same way that humanity can be proud of world record 
holders, or great (historical) explorers that are unconnected to the communities in which you 
consider yourself a member. 
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offer? I suggested that, even if they wanted to, there is nothing a fallen human can 
offer God that God does not already demand from them. 
There is, however, one thing that God does not demand of an innocent person. It 
would appear that God does not demand the sacrifice of their innocent life. So, for 
instance, in the biblical narrative, the lives of Adam and Eve were not required of 
them until they had sinned.444 However, once no longer innocent, their lives (and 
following the doctrine of original sin, the lives of all who followed them) were 
indeed demanded from them.445  
It is seemingly for this reason that God required the Israelites to engage in the 
sacrifice of animals without blemish or spot,446 signifying the supererogatory 
sacrifice of an innocent life.447 Indeed, paralleling this, the book of Hebrews 
indicates that Christ’s blemish free life448 and sacrificial death also secured an 
appropriate, and fully sufficient penance. A penance both supererogatory, and also 
costly enough such that its pleading by a penitent sinner is sufficient for it to be 
appropriate that God no longer desire to reject them as a person.449  
The penance Christ provides the penitent sinner to plead is referred to in Hebrews 
9:11-15 using the Mosaic imagery of an offering of Christ’s blood (in place of a 
blemish free animal) in something akin to God’s heavenly temple. This shocking 
imagery is, I think, designed to remind the penitent sinner of the seriousness, 
solemnity and horror which ought to grip them as they plead this as penance. Once 
pled, however, the writer of Hebrews explains (10:19), the sinner may confidently 
enter God’s presence, no longer ashamed.450 This pleading, then, could be seen in 
                                                          
444 The implication of Genesis 3:19-22 given Romans 5: 12-21 is that Adam would have had 
everlasting life had he not sinned. After Adam fell, his (and every subsequent) life was required by 
God. 
445 Romans 6:23. 
446 John Hare connects the shed blood of a sacrificial animal with a ‘ransom for lives’ mentioned in 
Exodus 30:12 and Numbers 35:31-3. (Hare, 2011: 135) 
447 See Exodus 12:5, Leviticus 1:10. 
448 1 Peter 1:19. 
449 On this account, God could have forgiven us without demanding reparation and penance; 
however, we could not have dealt with our shame, even with God’s forgiveness, without offering a 
suitable penance. 
450 See also Romans 3:23-25, Romans 5:9, 1 Corinthians 10:16, Ephesians 1:7, 2:3, Colossians 1:20, 
Hebrews 13:12, 1 Peter 1:19, and Revelation 1:5. 
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the same vein as the playground version of ‘swearing on someone’s life’. Only to be 
done if really meant – and it should be costly to the swearer. The swearer must, as 
Aquinas suggested, ally themselves to Christ first, such that this pleading is not 
done lightly (as, for instance, swearing on the life of someone you do not know, or 
do not care for, might be done). 
To be clear, on this account, the unblemished Christ’s heroic self-sacrifice is not 
something desired by God, rather it is representative of the magnitude of sin, and is 
(plausibly) both supererogatory (inasmuch as it is not required by God) and 
significant enough to ensure the sincerity of the penitent pleader when reflectively 
pled, and is thereby when so pled sufficient for the sinner to overcome their belief 
that it is appropriate for God to reject them as a person.451 Rather than on 
Swinburne’s account, where Christ’s life is offered by way of reparation, Christ’s 
sacrifice is here offered by the penitent sinner as the only form of supererogatory 
penance available to them.452 
A person who is quiescent to God’s operative grace has, then, the capacity to desire 
union with God, and also the capacity to offer an apology made sincere by their 
repentance and also the pled penance of Christ’s innocent and voluntary 
supererogatory self-sacrifice. In so doing, the penitent person can thereby defeat 
the objective shame caused by their own wrongdoing. In offering a sincere apology, 
it is no longer appropriate for God to reject them as a person. 
In addition, through reflection on both the incarnation (and its cause) and this self-
sacrifice, it seems plausible to think that a person can come to see that God has 
‘allied’ Himself with humankind, and has invited us to ally with Him. Through 
reflection on the great honour that this could be taken to be, it is plausible that 
such a person would come to defeat the God-directed objective that may result 
from membership in a fallen humanity, where such objective shame is not 
necessarily the result of their own individual wrongdoing. 
                                                          
451 Recognising that an innocent person died for you might cause shame; however, it is either 
inappropriate shame, else this shame can be defeated by something akin to a celebration of your 
life. 
452 Cross, 2001: 401 
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Atonement and Guilt 
Like shame, I have suggested that guilt, the belief that it is appropriate for another 
to desire your hard treatment, can also cause psychological fragmentation, and can 
also prevent joint attention with God. In this way, even if a person has a (even 
wholehearted) desire for union with God, and has dealt with their shame, unless 
their (objective) guilt is dealt with, they cannot enjoy real union with God.  
In chapter three, I presented the most obvious solution to the moral problem of 
guilt, namely, the payment of whatever hard treatment is owed by way of 
reparations for one’s wrongdoing. However, it seems, at least part of what we owe 
God, the traditional consequence for our sin, involves everlasting separation from 
God’s revealed presence (either as a consequence, as I argued might be the case in 
chapter two, or explicitly as a punishment, as is often traditionally understood). So, 
whether a person tries to deal with their guilt or not, the outcome is the same: full 
and complete real union with God will be impossible for them. 
As alluded to in the previous chapter, typical attempts to explain this problem 
either involve some appeal to vicarious punishment453 or to the transfer of guilt or 
punishment from the sinner onto Christ. However, as Richard Cross points out, 
there just does not seem to be any transfer mechanism available to us that can 
explain how we might come to appropriate the work of Christ.454 Likewise, Oliver 
Crisp notes that whilst we might find examples of hard treatment paid for by 
others,  
…we find no examples of legislation allowing substitution when the crime is 
a serious felony, such as murder. In such cases, the one guilty must meet the 
penal consequences of that crime, and we would consider it a terrible 
miscarriage of justice were a substitute punished in place of the 
perpetrator.455 
                                                          
453 Murphy, 2009. 
454 Cross, 2001: 401. This point was also noted by Kant, see Hare, 1996: 243-58.  
455 Crisp, 2016: 130 
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So how can we make headway on this issue? What about the (seemingly) finite life, 
passion, death, or resurrection of Jesus might constitute an equivalent offering? 
Well, we can start by looking at what else Christ might have achieved during the 
crucifixion that has hitherto remained unexplored.  
As well as demonstrating his love, and shedding his blood as a penance, the 
scriptural data suggests Christ also paid the penalty of sin, that is, separation from 
the revealed presence of God, in himself during the crucifixion. Taking the cry of 
dereliction at face value, it would seem apparent that Jesus felt in some sense 
separated from God the Father. Following Abelard,456 and using a face value 
reading of Deuteronomy 21:23 and Galatians 3:12-14, I will offer one reason to 
think this separation was neither arbitrary nor indicative of sin, namely, that in 
virtue of sinlessly ‘hanging on a tree’, Jesus was subject to the ‘curse’ of God, a 
‘curse’ that involved the withdrawal of the divine presence.457 
Of course, such a view raises more questions than it answers. How could this 
happen? Why was not this separation permanent? How might this be efficacious in 
our Atonement? I will get to these questions in turn, but before, I do, it is worth 
surveying the scriptural and contextual support for this position. 
Quoting from Deuteronomy 21:23 Paul writes in Galatians 3:13: 
Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us, 
for it is written: “Cursed is everyone who is hung on a pole.” 
We find written in the work of both Josephus458 (who connected Deuteronomy 
21:23 to crucifixion) and also writers from the pre-Christ Essene community459 that 
                                                          
456 Abelard, too, argued that Christ was literally cursed for hanging on a cross. See Lombardo, 2013: 
176, quoting from Abelard’s Sermon 12. 
457 Either due to an inability for the cursed person to dyadically attend to God, or due an actual 
withdrawal of God’s manifest presence. Furthermore, if God the Son understands what it is like for 
the man Jesus to experience being forsaken by God; this experience of being forsaken would be 
eternally understood by the divine nature of Christ, and though in one sense finite, perhaps in 
another, may thus correspond to something like an everlasting separation from God’s revealed 
presence. 
458 Flavius Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews, 13.380. 
459 ‘This refers to the Lion of Wrath […ven]geance against the ones who look for smooth things, 
because he used to hang men alive, [as it was done] in Israel in former times, for to anyone hanging 
alive on the tree, [the verse app]lies: “Behold, I am against [you],[says] the Lord of Hosts.” (2.13a)’ 
Commentary on Nahum, frags. 3-4 1.6-9 [WAC, 218]. 
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crucifixion was interpreted by at least certain contemporaneous members of the 
Jewish faith as fulfilling the conditions for being cursed by God as laid out in 
Deuteronomy 21:23. As James VanderKam, puts it, ‘understanding Deuteronomy 
21:23 to mean hanging to execute [was] common to them [the Essenes] and to 
Paul.’460 
If this interpretation is correct, in being crucified, quite independent from his blood 
being shed, or his demonstration of exemplary love, Christ received a curse from 
God as he hung on the cross. Following Abelard,461 I venture to suggest that this 
curse was equivalent to banishment (in some sense) from God’s revealed presence, 
and was, perhaps, the motivation for Christ’s cry of dereliction; ‘My God, my God, 
why have you forsaken me?’462  
This passage in Deuteronomy is the only place in the Christian scriptures where the 
‘curse’ of sin is set apart from an act of sin, and it only appears in the covenant God 
made with Moses. This Mosaic covenant was set out as something akin to God’s 
marriage covenant with Israel,463 and unlike other covenants God had previously 
made (for instance, the Noahide or the Abrahamic covenant), it appears this 
covenant was subject to nullification upon the dissolution of the God/Israel 
‘relationship’.464 The book of Jude suggests that early Christians read Christ himself 
as one of the parties in this covenant,465 and Paul, in Romans 7:1-2, suggests that 
upon Christ’s death the covenant through which Christ had been cursed was no 
longer in effect on Christ. Taking this together, it looks as though a case can be 
made for Christ paying in full the penalty for sin – the ‘curse’ of God, that is, 
experiencing the withdrawal of God’s presence – without sinning himself. And, 
because the covenant this ‘curse’ was contained within was dissolved by his death, 
Christ could pay this penalty without the effects of this curse remaining 
everlastingly upon him. 
                                                          
460 VanderKam and Flint, 2004: 356. 
461 Abelard, too, argued that Christ was literally cursed for hanging on a cross. See Lombardo, 2013: 
176. 
462 Matthew 27:46. 
463 See Exodus 19:5-8 and particularly Jeremiah 2:2, Ezekiel 16:1-63.  
464 Jeremiah 3:8, for instance, describes God divorcing Israel (but not Judah). 
465 Jude 5. 
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Having said this much, nothing about this explanation explains how a penitent 
sinner could come to appropriate this reparative payment in a way sufficient to deal 
with their objective guilt. All we have so far is an account of Christ receiving the 
curse of God for sin, and then paying it in full in himself. Indeed, Paul, recognising 
this, suggests that ‘if Christ had not been raised, your faith is futile; you are still in 
your sins.’466 On Paul’s view, there is something about the resurrection of Christ 
that is essential to our appropriation of this aspect of Christ’s work, namely, some 
future interaction between the penitent sinner and the risen Christ. As I see it, high 
on the list of possible interactions is the future union of the Church with Christ 
(either as friends, or as lovers, or both) as described by Paul in Ephesians 5:25-32.  
Paul sees the penitent sinner, in the church, uniting with Christ ‘in one flesh’ in 
something analogous to a marital union, an analogy carried over from the covenant 
God made with Moses into the ‘new covenant’ Paul suggests Christ established 
after his resurrection.467  
So, how might this union view help us make headway on the problem of objective 
guilt? Before we can answer this question, it is worth noting that there are two 
generally competing views on what such union might involve. On the one hand, we 
have something like an organic whole account of union (a position associated with 
Augustinian realism468) wherein we literally become part of Christ (much like Jesus 
of Nazareth might have become ‘part of’ the Son of God)469, and on the other, there 
is an account of union where we enter into something closer to a federal union. 
These general models, however, are really representative poles on a continuum 
that stretches from something like ‘I am on Christ’s team’ to ‘I am Christ’. 
                                                          
466 1 Corinthians 15:17. As already discussed, this was very much the view of the early church 
fathers, too. 
467 See Hebrews 8:7-9:28 and Romans 7:1-2. 
468 See, for instance, Meconi 2013 for a development of the metaphysics of deification as 
participation (either by methexis or koinonia) in the totus Christus of Christ’s mystical body. 
469 In the case of the organic whole model, a person uniting with Christ might end up uniting with 
one who paid in full the hard treatment for sin. Given a certain type of union, it may be the case that 
such union is sufficient to make it the case that it is no longer appropriate for God to desire their 
hard treatment, for they are, in some sense, (dependent on the model of union, perhaps merely a 
part of) Christ, and Christ has already repaid this hard treatment in full. 
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Although finding an ‘I am Christ’ model that explains the problem of objective guilt 
does not seem outside of the bounds of possibility (for one, this sort of model has 
been used previously by Michael Rea to explain the transmission of original guilt;470 
for another, there is something mysterious about the hypostatic union in the 
Incarnation, and about the union shared between members of the Trinity, so why 
not here, too?471), trying to solve one problem, namely, the Atonement, by posing 
an even larger, more metaphysically obscure one does seem somewhat counter-
productive. As a result, I will focus only upon a particular federalist solution, 
namely, what I will call a marriage-bond federalist union.472 
The motivation for a marriage-bond style federalist approach comes from the only 
passage in the Bible I know of that deals with anything like a transfer of hard 
treatment, Numbers 30:15. Detailing what happens when a spouse binds 
themselves to a particular course of action and then fails to act on their promise, 
the author of Numbers 30 writes: 
If, however, [a husband] nullifies [his wife’s vows] some time after he hears 
about them, then he must bear the ןוֹוָע [‛âvôn, guilt] of her wrongdoing. 
I will take it that this new covenant which Christ set up after his resurrection is, like 
the Mosaic covenant, set up as a marriage covenant between himself and what is 
described in the New Testament as his bride, the church.473 Given this, if there’s a 
plausible way in which Christ can nullify any tacit or explicit agreement ‘his bride’ 
might have made to obey God, whilst the sinful actions of the members of the bride 
remain in some sense bad, they are (perhaps) no longer wrong. If punishment is 
connected to wrongdoing, such actions are therefore no longer deserving of 
                                                          
470 See Rea 2007. 
471 Something like ‘Soteriological Perichoresis’, or ‘Soteriological Nestorianism’.  
472 Although I am titling this a ‘marriage-bond’ union, nothing precludes this from reinterpreted as a 
‘friendship-bond’. As far as I can see, the practical differences between these two accounts would be 
almost entirely semantic (although, semantically, as Andrew Pinsent noted in conversation, the 
‘friendship-bond’ might more neatly mirror what God was after (and failed to get) in the stories of 
both primal and original sin). 
473 See Luke 5:34-35, Revelation 19:7. 
205 
 
punishment, and, therefore, that objective guilt over them is no longer 
appropriate.474 
A sly move perhaps, but Paul writes in Romans 5:13 that ‘[s]in is not counted where 
there is no law.’ And then in 1 Corinthians 10:23 Paul essentially admits that whilst 
not all things are helpful, all things might be lawful for a Christian. Thus, it could be 
the case that in some future (federalist) union with Christ, Christ could 
(somehow475) annul any obligations a penitent sinner has to obey God’s commands. 
In so doing, it would, in some sense, be no longer be appropriate for God to 
demand hard treatment from them, for they would not be objectively guilty.476  
Summing up this attempt to deal with objective guilt: Paul, in Galatians 3:13, 
suggests that Christ received the curse of God when he was crucified. Romans 7:1-2 
can be read as indicating that Christ’s death annulled the covenant through which 
this curse was active, thereby cancelling the curse and rendering it the case that 
Christ paid the penalty of the curse in full. According to Ephesians 5:25-32, at some 
future point in time the Church will join in union with Christ, and when it does, if 
Numbers 30:15 can be applied, just like taking on a spouse’s pre-nuptial debt, Christ 
can annul any obligations members of the church have to God’s commands, 
thereby rendering it inappropriate for God to desire that they undergo some hard 
treatment (this does not render the sinner’s actions good, they remain bad, they 
are just no longer prohibited bad actions477). By removing these obligations and 
making it inappropriate for God to demand some hard treatment from the sinner, 
the penitent sinner’s belief that it is appropriate that God desires they undergo 
some hard treatment is overcome, and the union-inhibiting problems associated 
with their objective guilt can, in theory, be dealt with. 
                                                          
474 One metaethical model that might make sense of this is Darwall’s second-person perspective 
(2006 and 2012). On Darwall’s model, we, through what he calls recognition respect, create 
something akin to tacit pacts with each other, to treat each other in certain ways. These tacit pacts 
are then the ground of our normative obligations to others, however, if these tacit pacts could be in 
some sense cancelled, our normative obligations would, theoretically, also disappear. 
475 See Hare 1996 (243-258) for one ‘incorporative union’ model. 
476 In perhaps the same sense, it may have been inappropriate for God to have, in the Genesis 
narrative, demanded hard treatment from Adam before the primal sin, for anything other than 
eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, before his knowledge of good and evil. 
477 Romans 5:13. 
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One interesting consequence of the model is this: if the Atonement is based upon 
some future (or present) union with Christ, the idea of there being a limited 
Atonement, that is, that only a specific pre-determined number of people who can 
be atoned for, is made redundant. For, there is, in which ever way this union is 
cashed out, presumably no upper limit to the number of people who can unite to 
Christ. 
In addition to the lack of an upper limit, if God is ineffable, as I suggested in chapter 
one, God’s self-revelation (in operative grace) must also be (propositionally) 
ineffable. And so, whatever or however the intellect processes this ineffable self-
revelation, the intellect cannot process it propositionally. It cannot for, if the 
doctrine of divine ineffability is true, there is no true propositional knowledge of 
God to be had at all. If operative grace is indeed the divine self-revelation, such 
grace must consist in something akin to non-propositional, connatural knowledge of 
God’s goodness or beauty (and so on). If saving faith is prompted by operative 
grace (as on the traditional order of salvation it is), saving faith also cannot involve 
belief in a certain series of propositions about God for the simple reason that there 
are no such true propositions to be believed. And, with this in mind, it seems 
possible for people of different faiths, and even of no faith, to ultimately experience 
union with the same God.478  
Finally, in chapter two, I suggested that those in hell may be unable to take 
advantage of the provisions of Christ’s work. If this is indeed the case, it seems 
unlikely that the reason for this inability is due to them being unable to reflect on 
Christ’s life, passion, death, and resurrection, or due to them being unable to plead 
                                                          
478 On this point, it seems Aquinas concurs: 
 
If, however, some were saved without receiving any revelation, they were not saved 
without faith in a Mediator, for, though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they did, 
nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing in Divine providence… (ST II-II Q 2 Q7). 
 
Taking this a step further; if, due to God’s ineffability, it is the case that operative grace only consists 
in something akin to connatural knowledge of God, we may have no trustworthy way of 
(propositionally) adjudicating between those who profess knowledge of God. Accepting both 
conclusions should lead to a position of significant religious humility; we are simply unable to 
comment on the salvation of others. But in taking up this position, the Christian is in good company. 
In his Sermon on the Mount, Jesus made clear: Judge not, that you be not judged. (Matthew 7:1) 
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Christ’s blood as a penance. Instead, if there are indeed any inhabitants of hell, it is 
more likely the case that this union with Christ is a one-time only affair, and that 
such inhabitants missed out on it. Why might this be the case? I can only think of 
two possibilities. Either due to 
1. some arbitrary decision; on this view, it is, in fact, possible for there to be an 
additional future union with Christ for those who did not unite with Christ 
the first time around, only, God has decided that this will not happen, or 
2. some metaphysical limit; on this view, it is in fact metaphysically impossible 
for there to be a future additional union with Christ, for those who did not 
unite with Christ the first time around. 
As (2) seems, to my mind, more palatable than (1), I suggest this might be a plumb 
line by which to measure the viability of possible accounts of union (federalist or 
otherwise). By this measure, those that can provide a one-time only account of 
union might be preferred over those that require (1) as an explanation for why 
those in hell remain in hell, unable to dyadically share attention with God due to an 
inability to deal with their objective guilt. 
 
Atonement and Forgiveness 
So far, I have presented an account of the Atonement that has made no reference 
to divine forgiveness. So, what role (if any) might forgiveness play in this account?  
As I mentioned at the end of chapter three, atonement accounts can be split into 
two general ‘types’: those that see the Atonement as somehow permitting God to 
unite with us, and that that see the Atonement as allowing us to unite with God. In 
the former, whatever it is that inhibits union is on God’s side. In the latter, 
whatever it is that inhibits union is on our side.479 
On, for instance, Richard Swinburne’s account of the Atonement, divine forgiveness 
lies right at the heart of what the Atonement is trying to secure. So, whilst God 
could forgive at any time, Swinburne thinks it is good for us for God to withhold 
                                                          
479 And, of course, these are not mutually exclusive. 
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forgiveness until we have taken ‘proper steps to cancel our actions, to pay our 
debts, as far as logically can be done’.480 Thus, for Swinburne, the Atonement must 
remove an obstacle on God’s side, for, we cannot be united with God until he first 
forgives us, and his forgiveness is neither immediate, nor guaranteed. 
On the account I have presented, however, every inhibitor to union with God is on 
our side. We do not need an account of divine withholding in order to explain why 
we are not (and why some may never be) really united with an omnibenevolent, 
omnipresent God. No doubt, forgiveness is, even on the account I have presented, 
essential for union with God. As on Swinburne’s account, if God does not forgive, 
there can be no union with him. However, unlike on Swinburne’s account, I see no 
reason for why an omnibenevolent God would not forgive immediately (and 
certainly, why God would not immediately forgive those who ask for his 
forgiveness), and do so without adding any extra requirements.  
Thus, because my account falls into the latter ‘type’ of atonement accounts, whilst 
forgiveness is evidently important for union, I can see no reason why it would not 
be given immediately.481 Furthermore, although God might be quick to forgive, 
God’s forgiveness does not unilaterally secure our union with him: for the reasons I 
have given, union with God is something we, through availing of the inhibitor-
defeating elements of the Atonement, must also be active participants in. 
 
The Christian Doctrine of the Atonement 
On the account of the Atonement that I have presented, Christ’s life, passion, 
death, and resurrection all play their own key roles in the Atonement. At the end of 
chapter four, I indicated that union with God at the beatific vision might be secured 
through a further union, namely, the union of a person with Christ. I mentioned in 
                                                          
480 Swinburne 1989: 150. 
481 It is also worth reiterating what I said in chapter three: forgiveness is fundamentally relational. As 
such, forgiving someone does not imply that one no longer demands reparation from them. It is 
compatible with forgiving someone that one still requires punishment from them. Consider, for 
instance, the naughty pupil who mocks the teacher in class. The teacher might forgive the pupil and 
yet still put them in detention. 
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chapter one that in order for union with God to obtain, a person must have a 
wholehearted desire for such union, and they must be able to be significantly 
personally present to God at the beatific vision. In chapter two, I suggested that 
guilt, shame, and the psychological fragmentation that inevitably stems from 
original sin all inhibit union with God in their own ways, and therefore, that any 
account of Atonement must deal with these three problems. In chapter three, I 
discussed the various ways these problems might be dealt with, whilst in this final 
chapter, I gestured towards one way the life, passion, death, and resurrection of 
Christ might be efficacious at securing this Atonement, whilst at the same time 
trying to keep my presentation sensitive to the scriptural data. 
In chapter four, I surveyed various major traditional attempts to explain the 
Atonement, and looking back at each account I surveyed, I note that each is broadly 
represented in the account I have proposed in this chapter. 
The ransom theorists posited a (often) metaphorical transaction between Christ 
and some third party that allowed for union with God. As I see it, this metaphorical 
transaction just is the believer’s union with Christ. After this union, no transaction is 
needed, for there is, in one sense, only one remaining party transacting, so to 
speak, with itself. 
On Anselm’s satisfaction theory, the payment of some penalty really was required. 
Likewise, on the account I presented, a penalty is also required. However, I 
suggested that this penalty was not for God’s benefit (for instance, to satisfy his 
honour, or his justice), but for the benefit of the one who would otherwise 
experience guilt. As I explained it, this penalty is indeed paid by Christ, however he 
pays in full the penalty of his own curse (at the time of his cry of dereliction) whilst 
‘hanging on a tree’, with us availing of this payment through our subsequent union 
with him. 
Additionally, just as on Abelard’s moral influence view, I have argued that reflection 
on Christ’s death can move a person to quiescence, as well as motivating the desire 
for union with God. 
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And, like as on Aquinas’ account, I have argued that when we ally ourselves to 
Christ, Christ’s death can be pled by us to God to ground the sincerity of our 
apology.  
So, on the account I have presented, each aspect of the Christian doctrine of 
Atonement has its theologically driven resolution. Full and complete union with 
God is securable, and it is the life, passion, death, and resurrection of Christ that 
secures each aspect of the Atonement required for such union. Furthermore, on 
this account, to deal with guilt, Christ’s death had to have been by crucifixion, Christ 
must have risen from the dead, and it had to have been Christ that suffered and 
died. 
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Conclusion 
 
Over the course of this thesis I have tried to show how reflection on the doctrine of 
the beatific vision can shed new light on the doctrine of the Atonement. I have 
suggested that the end-point of the Atonement is a person’s real union with God at 
the beatific vision, and that whatever else the Atonement secures, it must also 
remove any inhibitors to the beholding of this vision, and therefore, inhibitors to 
real union with God.  
In chapter two, I suggested that the following three inhibitors would need to be 
dealt with: 
1. An unwillingness to behold the beatific vision 
2. An inability to wholeheartedly desire the beatific vision 
3. An inability to behold the beatific vision 
In chapter three, I proposed a framework for analysing how these inhibitors might 
be overcome, as well as outlining specific obstacles to their removal present in the 
Christian tradition. In chapter four, I examined previous attempts to explain the 
Atonement, showing how each faced its own version of what I called the problem 
of transaction, whilst in chapter five, I presented my own attempt to explain how, 
through appropriate reflection on the heroic self-sacrifice of Christ, through 
pleading the blood of Christ, and through transaction-avoiding union with Christ, 
the Atonement might overcome each of these inhibitors to beholding the beatific 
vision, so securing a person’s union with God. 
Thus, on the account I have provided, it is the case that union with God the Father 
is, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, possible only through union with Christ (which is 
itself, at least in this life, possible only through union with God the Spirit). This, 
then, is the reunion account of the Atonement. 
Throughout, I have suggested that as well as being ethically reasonable, a 
satisfactory account of the Christian doctrine of the Atonement needs to make 
sense of the scriptural data, whilst also engaging with the major Atonement 
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interpretative traditions, and I believe the account I have gestured towards in 
chapter five does indeed meet each of these criteria. 
There is, of course, much more work to be done, both in exploring the possible 
implications of the beatific vison and also fleshing out this reunion account of the 
Atonement. As I see it, there are numerous other plausible models of union with 
Christ available, and I foresee fruitful work being done both in the developing of 
alternative accounts of such union, and also the honing (and possible discounting) 
of current models, especially with respect to accounts of union that can explain 
how and why union with Christ might be, at some future point, impossible for those 
not already so united. 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
 
   CT   Compendium theologiae  
DCD   De civitate Dei 
DDC   De doctrina christiana 
QDM   Quaestiones disputatae De malo 
SC   Sentence Commentary 
SCG    Summa contra gentiles  
ST    Summa theologiae   
214 
 
Bibliography 
 
ABELARD (1956). ‘Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans’ in A Scholastic 
Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham, ed. and trans. Fairweather, E. R. 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press) pp. 276-87. 
 
ABRAHAM, W. J. (2009). ‘Systematic Theology as Analytic Theology’ in Analytic 
Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, eds. Crisp, O. and Rea, 
M. (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 54-69. 
 
ADAMS, M. M. (1992). ‘St. Anselm on Evil: De casu Diaboli’ In Documenti e studi sulla 
tradizione filosofica medievale 3: 429–30. 
 
ADAMS, M. M. (1993). ‘The Problem of Hell: A problem of evil for Christians’ in 
Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor of Norman 
Kretzmann eds. Stump, E. and Kretzmann, N. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press) pp. 301-327. 
 
ADAMS, M. M. (1999). Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press). 
 
ADAMS, R. M. (1999). Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
ALSTON, W. (1993). Perceiving God (Cornell: Cornell University Press). 
 
ALSTON, W. (1996). ‘Belief, acceptance, and religious faith,’ in Faith, Freedom, and 
Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today eds. Jordan, J. and Howard-Snyder, 
D. (London: Rowman & Littlefield). 
 
AQUINAS (1947). Summa Theologica trans. Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province (Benziger Brothers). 
 
AQUINAS (1955). Summa Contra Gentiles trans. Anton Pegis (New York NY: Image 
Books). 
 
AUDI, R. (2011). Rationality and Religious Commitment (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
 
AUDI, R. (2011a). ‘Faith, Faithfulness, and Virtue’ in Faith and Philosophy 28: 294-
309. 
215 
 
 
AULEN, G. (1969). Christus Victor trans. H.G. Herbert. (New York: MacMillan). 
 
AYERS, L. (2004). Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian 
Theology (New York: Oxford University Press). 
 
AUGUSTINE (1958). On Christian Doctrine trans. Robertson, Jr., D. W. (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill). 
 
AUGUSTINE (1953). Augustine: Earlier Writings trans. John Burleigh (Philadelphia 
PA: Westminster Press). 
 
BABCOCK, W. (1988). ‘Augustine on Sin and Moral Agency’ in Journal of Religious 
Ethics 16 (1): 28 - 55. 
 
BAKER-HYTCH, M. (2016). ‘Analytic Theology and Analytic Philosophy of Religion: 
What's the Difference?’ in Journal of Analytic Theology 4 (1):347-361. 
 
BAYNE, T. and RESTALL, G. (2009). ‘A Participatory Model of the Atonement’ in 
New Waves in Philosophy of Religion, eds. Nagasawa, Y. and 
Wielenberg, E. (Palgrave Macmillan) pp. 150-66. 
 
BLOND, P. (2008). ‘The beatific vision of St. Thomas Aquinas’ in Encounter Between 
Eastern Orthodoxy and Radical Orthodoxy: Transfiguring the World Through 
the Word eds. In Pabst, A. & Schneider, C. (Ashgate) pp. 185-214. 
 
BRINKS, C. L. (2014). “Response to Yoram Hazony, The Philosophy of Hebrew 
Scripture” in The Journal of Analytic Theology 4:238-249.   
 
BROWN, R. (1978). ‘The First Evil Will Must be Incomprehensible: A Critique of 
Augustine’ in Journal of the American Academy of Religion 46 (3): 315-329. 
 
BUCKAREFF, A. A., and PLUG, A. (2005). ‘Escaping Hell: Divine Motivation and the 
Problem of Hell’ in Religious Studies 41(1): 39-54. 
 
BURNS, J. P. (1988). ‘Augustine on the Origin and Progress of Evil’ in The Journal of 
Religious Ethics 16 (1): 9-27. 
 
CHIGNELL, A. (2009). ‘’As Kant Has Shown’: Analytic Theology and the Critical 
Philosophy’ in Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, 
eds. Crisp, O. and Rea, M. (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 117-35. 
 
 
216 
 
CHURCLAND, P. (1985). ‘Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of the 
Brain’ in the Journal of Philosophy 82:1, pp. 8-28. 
 
CHURCHLAND, P. (1989). ‘Knowing Qualia. A Reply to Jackson’ in A 
Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of 
Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT) pp. 67–76. 
 
CLARK, K. J. (2001) ‘God is Great, God is Good: Medieval conceptions of divine 
goodness and the problem of hell’ in Religious Studies 37: 15-31. 
 
CLEVELAND, L. K. and CLEVELAND, W. S. (2016). ‘The Defeat of Heartbreak: 
Problems and Solutions for Stump's view of the Problem of Evil Concerning 
Desires of the Heart’ in Religious Studies 52(1): 13-4. 
 
COAKLEY, S. (2009). ‘Dark Contemplation and Epistemic Transformation: The 
Analytic Theologian Re-meets Teresa of Avila’ in Analytic Theology: New 
Essays in the Philosophy of Theology eds. Crisp, O. and Rea, M. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) pp. 280-312. 
 
COAKLEY, S. (2013). ‘On Why Analytic Theology is Not A Club’ in Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 81(3): 601-608. 
 
COLLINS, P. (2010). Partaking in Divine Nature (T & T Clark). 
 
CONEE, E. (1994). ‘Phenomenal knowledge’ in the Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy. 72 (2): pp. 136–150. 
 
COTNOIR, A. (2017). “Mutual Indwelling” in Faith and Philosophy 34(2): 123-151. 
 
CRAIG, W. L. (1989). ‘“No Other Name”: A middle knowledge perspective on the 
exclusivity of salvation through Christ’ in Faith and Philosophy 6: 172-88. 
 
CRISP, O. and REA, M. (2009). Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of 
Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
CRISP, O. (2005). ‘Problems with Perichoresis’ in Tyndale Bulletin, 56(1): 119-140. 
 
CRISP, O. (2008). ‘Penal Non-substitution’ in Journal of Theological Studies 59 (1): 
140-168. 
 
217 
 
CRISP, O. (2016). The Word Enfleshed: Exploring the Person and Work of Christ 
(Baker Academic). 
 
CRISP, O. (2017). “Analytic Theology as Systematic Theology” in Open Theology 3: 
156–166. 
 
CROSS, R. (2001). ‘Atonement without satisfaction’ in Religious Studies 37 (4): 397-
416. 
 
CROSS, R. (2011). ‘Vehicle Externalism and the metaphysics of the incarnation: a 
medieval contribution’ in The Metaphysics of the Incarnation eds. 
Marmodoro, A. and Hill, J. (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 186 – 204. 
 
DARWALL, S. (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and 
Accountability (Harvard University Press). 
 
DARWALL, S. (2012). ‘Pufendorf on Morality, Sociability, and Moral Powers’ in 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 50(2): 213-238. 
 
DENNET, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.). 
 
DOUGHERTY, T. (2014). The Problem of Animal Pain: A Theodicy for all Creatures 
Great and Small (Palgrave). 
 
DRAPER, P. (2011). ‘Review of Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of 
Suffering’ in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, URL: 
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24772-wandering-in-darkness-narrative-and-the-
problem-of-suffering/ [accessed 25th August 2017] 
 
EFIRD, D. and WORSLEY, D., (2015). 'Critical Review of Eleonore Stump's Wandering 
in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering' in The Philosophical 
Quarterly 65 (260): 547-58.  
 
EFIRD, D. and WORSLEY, D. (2017a). ‘Divine Action and Operative Grace’ 
forthcoming in The Heythrop Journal (forthcoming). 
 
EFIRD, D. and WORSLEY, D., (2017b). ‘What can an Apophaticist Know? Divine 
Ineffability and the Beatific Vision’ forthcoming in Philosophy & Theology. 
 
FEINGOLD, L. (2010). The Natural Desire to See God According to St Thomas and His 
Interpreters Second Edition (Florida: Sapientia Press). 
 
218 
 
FRANKFURT, H. G. (1971) ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’ in 
Journal of Philosophy 68(1): 5-20. 
 
GAINE, S. (2015). Did the Saviour see the Father? Christ, Salvation, and the Vision of 
God (London: Bloomsbury). 
 
GARCIA, E. V. (2011). ‘Bishop Butler on Forgiveness and Resentment’ in 
Philosophers' Imprint 11(10): 1 – 19. 
 
GARRARD, E. and MCNAUGHTON, D. (2002). ‘In defence of unconditional 
forgiveness’ in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1): 39–60. 
 
GASSER, G. (2015). ‘Toward Analytic Theology: An Itinerary’ in Scientia Et Fides 3(2): 
23-56. 
 
GIBSON, J. A. (2014). ‘Anselm on Freedom and Grace’ in Oxford Studies in 
Philosophy of Religion Volume 5 ed. Kvanvig, J. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press) pp. 88-121. 
 
GOCKE, B. (2013). ‘An Analytic Theologian’s Stance on the Existence of God’ in 
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5(2): 129-146. 
 
GOULD, J. B. (2008). ‘The Grace We Are Owed’ in Faith and Philosophy 25: 261-275.  
 
GREEN, A. (2009). ‘Experiencing the Mind of God (Without Hebrew Lessons): Alston, 
Shared Attention, and Mystical Experience’ in Religious Studies 45: 455–470. 
 
GREEN, J. (2006). ‘Kaleidoscopic Response to the Penal Substitution View’ In The 
Nature of the Atonement: Four Views eds. Beilby, J. and Eddy, P. 
(Intervarsity Press) pp. 110-16. 
 
GREEN, W. (1949). ‘Augustine on Pride as the First Sin’ in The University of California 
Publications in Classical Philology 13: 407-432. 
 
GREGORY OF NYSSA (1957). The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, series II, vol. 5, 
trans. William Moore and Henry Austin Wilson (Grand Rapids MI: 
Eerdmans). 
 
GRISWOLD, C. L. (2007). Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
 
GROTIUS, H. (1617). Defensio Fidei Catholicae de Satisfactione Christi. 
219 
 
 
HABER, J. G. (1991). Forgiveness (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers). 
 
HARE, J. (1996) The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God’s Assistance 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
HARE, J. (2011). ‘Animal Sacrifices’ in Divine Evil?: The Moral Character of the God of 
Abraham eds. Bergmann, M., Murray, M. J., and Rea, M. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
 
HARRISON, S. (2006). Augustine’s Way Into the Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
HAZONY, Y. (2012). The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
 
HOBSON, P. (2005). ‘What puts Jointness into Joint Attention?’ In Joint Attention: 
Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology eds. 
Eilan, N. Hoerl, C., McCormack, T. and Roessler, J. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press) pp. 185-204. 
 
HOFFMANN, T. (2007). ‘Aquinas and Intellectual Determinism: The Test Case of 
Angelic Sin’ in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 89 (2):122-156. 
 
HOFFMANN, T. (2012). ‘Theories of Angelic Sin from Aquinas to Ockham‘ in A 
Companion to Angels in Medieval Philosophy, ed. Hoffmann, T. (Brill). 
 
HOWARD-SNYDER, D. (2013). ‘Propositional Faith: What It Is and What It Is Not’ in 
American Philosophical Quarterly 50: 357-372. 
 
HICK, J. (2000). ‘Ineffability’ in Religious Studies 36 (1): 35-46. 
 
JACKSON, F. (1982). ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ in Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127–136. 
 
JOHN CHRYSOSTOM (1960). Commentary on Saint John the Apostle and Evangelist: 
Homilies 48-88, in The Fathers of the Church Vol. 41, tr. Sister Thomas 
Aquinas Goggin (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press). 
  
JACOBS, J. (2015). ‘The Ineffable, Inconceivable, and Incomprehensible God 
Fundamentality and Apophatic Theology’ in J. Kvanvig, ed. Oxford Studies in 
Philosophy of Religion Volume 6 (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 158-
176. 
 
220 
 
KING, P. (2001). ‘Scotus’s Rejection of Anselm: The Two-Wills Theory’ in John Duns 
Scotus 1308–2008: Investigations into His Philosophy eds. Honnefelder, L. et 
al. (Aschendorff). 
 
KING, P. (2012). ‘Angelic Sin in Augustine and Anselm’ in A Companion to Angels and 
Medieval Philosophy ed. Hoffmann, T. (Brill). 
 
KITANOV, S. V. (2014). Beatific Enjoyment in Medieval Scholastic Debates 
(Plymouth: Lexington Books). 
 
KITTLE, S. (2015) ‘Grace and Free Will: Quiescence and Control’ in The Journal of 
Analytic Theology 3: 89-108. 
 
KVANVIG, J. L. (2013). ‘Affective Theism and People of Faith’ in Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 37: 109–128. 
 
LEWIS, C. S. (2000). Mere Christianity (London: HarperCollins). 
 
LEWIS, C. S. (2015a). The Great Divorce (New York: HarperCollins). 
 
LEWIS, C. S. (2015b). The Problem of Pain (New York: HarperCollins). 
 
LEWIS, D. (2004). ‘What Experience Teaches’ in There’s Something About Mary: 
Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge 
Argument eds. Ludlow, P., Nagasawa, Y. and Stoljar, D. (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT) pp. 77-104. 
 
LEWIS, D. (2007). ‘Divine Evil’ in Philosophers Without Gods ed. Anthony, L. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) pp. 231-242. 
 
LOAR, B. (2004). ‘Phenomenal Knowledge (Revised Version)’ in There’s Something 
About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s 
Knowledge Argument eds. Ludlow, P., Nagasawa, Y., and Stoljar, D. 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT) pp. 39-50. 
 
LOMBARDO, N. (2013). The Father’s Will: Christ’s Crucifixion and the Love of God 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
LOSSKY, V. (1971). The Vision of God (Bedfordshire: The Faith Press). 
 
221 
 
MACDONALD, P. (2014). ‘Analytic Theology: A Summary, Evaluation, and Defense’ 
in Modern Theology 30(1): 32-65. 
 
MACDONALD, S. (1998). ‘Primal Sin’ in The Augustinian Tradition, ed. Matthews, G. 
(University of California Press). 
 
MACDONALD, S. (2003). ‘Petit Larceny, the Beginning of all Sin: Augustine's Theft of 
the Pears’ in Faith and Philosophy 20 (4): 393-414. 
 
MARMODORO, A. (2011). ‘The Metaphysics of the Extended Mind in ontological 
entanglements’ in The Metaphysics of the Incarnation eds. Marmodoro, A. 
and Hill, J. (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 205 – 228. 
 
MARITAIN, J. (1951). ‘On Knowledge through Connaturality’ in The Review of 
Metaphysics 4(4): 473-481. 
MCCALL, T. (2015). An Invitation to Analytic Theology (Illinois: InterVarsity Press). 
 
MECONI, D. V. (2013). The One Christ: St Augustine’s Theology of Deification 
(Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press). 
 
MOORE, F. C. T. (1990). ‘Rome inferences and structural opacity’ in Mind 99 (396): 
601-608.  
 
MURPHY, J. G. and HAMPTON, J. (1988). Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
 
MURPHY, M. C. (2009). ‘Not Penal Substitution but Vicarious Punishment’ in Faith 
and Philosophy 26(3): 253-273. 
 
NEMIROW, L. (1990). ‘Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance’ in Mind 
and Cognition: A Reader, ed. by W. Lycan (Oxford: Blackwells). 
 
NIKOLIC, D. (2009). ‘Is synaesthesia actually ideaestesia? An inquiry into the nature 
of the phenomenon.’ In Proceedings of the Third International Conference 
on Synaesthesia, Science & Art (Grenada: Spain). 
 
NUSSBAUM, M. (2016). Anger and Forgiveness (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
PINI, G. (2013). ‘What Lucifer Wanted: Anselm, Aquinas, and Scotus on the Object of 
the First Evil Choice’ in Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy Volume 1 ed. 
Pasnau, R. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
POJMAN, L. (1986). ‘Faith Without Belief?’ in Faith and Philosophy 3: 157-176. 
222 
 
 
PINSENT, A. (2012). The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics: Virtues and 
Gifts (New York: Routledge). 
 
PINSENT, A. (2016). ‘Limbo and the Children of the Faerie’ in Faith and Philosophy 
33(3): 293-310. 
 
PLANTINGA, A. (2000). Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
PORTER, S. (2004). ‘Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal 
Substitution’ in Faith and Philosophy 21: 228-241. 
 
PRUSS, A. (2010). One Body: An Essay in Christian Sexual Ethics (Notre Dame: Notre 
Dame University Press) 
 
PSUEDO-DIONYSIUS, (1987). The Complete Works of Pseudo-Dionysius, trans. Colm 
Luibheid (New York NY: Paulist Press). 
 
QUINN, P. (1993). ‘Abelard on Atonement: ‘Nothing Unintelligible, Arbitrary, 
Illogical, or Immoral about It’’ in Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical 
Theology in Honor of Norman Kretzmann ed. Stump, E. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press) pp. 153–177. 
 
RADZIK, L. (2008). Making Amends: Atonement in Morality, Law, and Politics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 
 
RAGLAND, C. P. (2006). ‘The Trouble with Quiescence: Stump on Grace and 
Freedom’ in Philosophia Christi 8: 343-62. 
 
REA, M. (2007). ‘The Metaphysics of Original Sin’ in Persons: Human and Divine eds. 
Van Inwagen, P. and Zimmerman, D. (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 
319--356. 
 
REA, M. (2009). ‘Introduction’ in Rea, M. and Crisp, O, eds. Analytic Theology: New 
Essays in the Philosophy of Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 1 – 
32. 
 
ROGERS, K. (2005). ‘Anselm on Eudaemonism and the Hierarchical Structure of Moral 
Choice’ in Religious Studies 41 (3):249-268. 
 
ROGERS, K. (2008). Anselm on Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
223 
 
ROWE, W. (1979). ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’ in American 
Philosophical Quarterly 16: 335–41. 
 
RUDDER-BAKER, L. (2007). ‘Persons and metaphysics of resurrection’ in Religious 
Studies 43: 334. 
 
RUSSELL, H. (2010). ‘Efficacious and Sufficient Grace’ in Philosophy and Theology 22: 
353-372. 
 
RUSSELL, N. (2004). The Doctrine of Deification in The Greek Patristic Tradition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
SCHELLENBERG, J. L. (2005). Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press). 
 
STUMP, E. (1986). ‘Dante's Hell, Aquinas's Theory of Morality, and the Love of God’ 
in The Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16: 181-198. 
 
STUMP, E. (1988). ‘Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept 
of Free Will’ in Journal of Philosophy 85: 395-420. 
 
STUMP, E. (2002). ‘Aquinas’s Account of Freedom: Intellect and Will’ in Thomas 
Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives eds. Davies, B. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) pp. 275-294. 
 
STUMP, E. (2003). Aquinas (London and New York: Routledge). 
 
STUMP, E. (2006). ‘Love, by All Accounts’ in Proceedings and Addresses of the 
American Philosophical Association 80(2): 25-43. 
 
STUMP, E. (2007). ‘Justifying Faith: Grace and Free Will’ in Freedom and the Human 
Person ed. Velkley, R. L. (Catholic University of America Press). 
 
STUMP, E. (2010). Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
STUMP, E. (2012). ‘The Nature of the Atonement’ in Reason, Metaphysics, and 
Mind: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga eds. Clark, K. and 
Rea, M. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) pp. 132-134. 
 
STUMP, E. (2012a). ‘Atonement and the Cry of Dereliction from the Cross’ in 
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4(1): 1-17. 
 
224 
 
STUMP, E. (2012b). ‘Wandering in Darkness: Further Reflections’ in European 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4(3): 197-219. 
 
STUMP, E. (2014). ‘Faith, Wisdom, and the Transmission of Knowledge Through 
Testimony’ in Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue eds. O’Conner, T. and 
Callahan, L. (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 204-230. 
 
STUMP, E. (2016). ‘The Atonement and the Problem of Shame’ in Journal of 
Philosophical Research 41: 111-129. 
 
SUTO, T. (2004). ‘Virtue and Knowledge: Connatural Knowledge According to 
Thomas Aquinas’ in The Review of Metaphysics 58(1): 61-79. 
 
SWINBURNE, R. (1983). ‘A Theodicy of Heaven and Hell’ in The Existence and 
Nature of God ed. Freddoso, A. J. (Southbend, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press) pp. 37-54. 
 
SWINBURNE, R. (1989). Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
 
SWINBURNE, R. (1994). The Christian God (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
SWINBURNE, R. (1998). Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
 
TALBOTT, T. (1990). ‘The Doctrine of Everlasting Punishment’ in Faith and Philosophy 
7 (1):19-42. 
 
TALBOTT, T. (2004). ‘Misery and Freedom: Reply to Walls’, Religious Studies 40(2) 
217-224 
 
TIMPE, K. (2007). ‘Grace and Controlling What We Do Not Cause’ in Faith and 
Philosophy 24 (3): 284-299. 
 
TIMPE, K. (2014). ‘The Arbitrariness of Primal Sin’ in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of 
Religion. ed. Kvanvig, J. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
TIMPE, K. (2015). ‘On Analytic Theology’ in Scientia Et Fides 3(2): 9-21. 
 
TORRANCE, T. F. (2008). Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ (Downers Grove, 
Illinois: IVP Academic). 
 
225 
 
VAN DYKE, C. (2014) ‘Aquinas’s Shiny Happy People: Perfect Happiness and the 
Limits of Human Nature’ in Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 6 ed. 
Kvanvig, J. (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 269-291. 
 
VAN DYKE, C. (2014a). ‘I See Dead People: Disembodied Souls and Aquinas’s ‘Two-
Person’ Problem’ in ed. Pasnau, R. Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 
Volume 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). pp. 25-45. 
 
VAN INWAGEN, P. (1978). ‘The Possibility of Resurrection’ in International Journal 
for Philosophy of Religion 9: 114-21. 
 
VAN INWAGEN, P. (2000). ‘The Argument from Particular Horrendous Evils’ in 
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 74: 65-80. 
 
VAN INWAGEN, P. (2017). ‘I look for the resurrection of the dead and the life in the 
world to come.’ (Unpublished) 
 
VANDERKAM, J. C. and FLINT, P. W. (2004). The Meaning of the Dead Sea Scrolls: 
Their Significance for Understanding the Bible, Judaism, Jesus, and 
Christianity (London: T&T Clark International). 
 
VASQUEZ, G. (1621). Bellomontanus theologus, S.J. Commentaria ad disputationes 
in primam partem S. Thomae, Vol. 1 (Antwerp). 
 
VITALE, V. (2013). ‘Review of Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of 
Suffering’ in Mind 122: 1193-1201. 
 
WALLS, J. (1992). Hell: The Logic of Damnation (Southbend, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press). 
 
WALLS, J. (2002). Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
WESLEY, J. (1872). The Works of John Wesley Volume 11 ed. Jackson, T. (London: 
Wesleyan Methodist Book Room). 
 
WESTPHAL, M. (2009). ‘Hermeneutics and Holiness’ in Analytic Theology: New 
Essays in the Study of Philosophy and Theology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press) pp. 265-279. 
 
WHITE, Fr. T. J. (2016). ‘Divine Simplicity and the Holy Trinity’ in International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 18(1):66–93. 
 
226 
 
WHITE, V. (1944). ‘Thomism and ‘Affective Knowledge’ (III)’ in Blackfriars, 25 (294): 
321-328. 
 
WILLIAMS, A. N. (1999). The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
WILLIAMS, R. (2016). On Augustine (London: Bloomsbury Continuum). 
 
WILLIAMS, T. (2002). Anselm: Three Philosophical Dialogues (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company). 
 
WILLIAMS, T. (2007). Anselm, Basic Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2007). 
 
WOLTERSTORFF, N. (2016). ‘Knowing God Liturgically’ in Journal of Analytic 
Theology 4: 1-16. 
 
WOOD, W. (2009). ‘On the New Analytic Theology, or: The Road Less Travelled’ in 
The Journal of the American Academy of Religion 77(4): 941-960. 
 
WOOD, W. (2016). ‘Trajectories, Traditions, and Tools in Analytic Theology’ in 
Journal of Analytic Theology 4: 254-266. 
 
WORSLEY, D. (2016). ‘Could there be Suffering in Paradise?: The Primal Sin, The 
Beatific Vision, and Suffering in Paradise’ in Journal of Analytic Theology 
4:87-105. 
 
WORSLEY, D. (2017). ‘Experiencing the Word of God: Reading as Wrestling’ 
forthcoming in TheoLogica. 
 
YADAV, S. (2016). ‘Mystical Experience and the Apophatic Attitude’ in the Journal of 
Analytic Theology 4 (1):17-43. 
 
ZAGZEBSKI, L. (2008). ‘Omnisubjectivity’ in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 
ed. Kvanvig, J. (Oxford: Oxford University Press) pp. 231-248. 
 
ZIMMERMAN, D. (1999). ‘The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival: The “Falling 
Elevator” Model’ in Faith and Philosophy 16: 194-212. 
 
